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ABSTRACT 
Islamic banking is an experiment in finding innovative ways 
to regulate a financial system under Islamic law. In Kuwait the 
Kuwait Finance House has been operating for ten years as an 
Islamic financial institution surrounded by other institutions 
based on the western model. 
Kuwait is a particularly interesting centre for Islamic 
finance, as the Kuwait Finance House (Kuwait's only Islamic bank) 
has been one of the more profitable Islamic banks in recent 
years. Kuwait has benefitted greatly from the high oil revenues 
of the past twenty years, and its tiny size and population mean 
that most indigenous Kuwaitis now lead affluent lives. The Kuwait 
Finance House desires to help form a healthy economic climate, by 
using the acquired wealth wisely according to Islamic law. 
This study takes the reader through the principles of 
Islamic finance and compares its ideals to those of the western 
venture capitalists, who seek to improve the economic climate in 
the same way that an Islamic bank does. Chapters 3 and 4 deal 
with the Kuwaiti economy and financial system, introducing the 
reader to the country within which the Kuwait Finance House 
operates. The activities of the House are reviewed in chapters 
5,6 and 7, while chapter 8 evaluates how successful the House has 
been since its inception in 1979. Finally the concluding chapter 
looks to what lies ahead for the future of Islamic banking in 
general and the Kuwait Finance House in particular, with special 
emphasis on the development of a fully-fledged venture capital 
industry operating within Islamic law. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
In 1977 AD (corresponding to the Muslim date 1397 AH) 
"Decree Law No. 72 ... licensing establishment of a Kuwaiti 
shareholding company named 'Kuwait Finance House (KFH)'" was 
issued. The decree was signed by the Amir of Kuwait, his Prime 
Minister, his Minister of Awq~f and Islamic Affairs, his 
Ministers of Justice and Finance, .and finally by his Minister of 
Commerce and Industry. It marked the dawn of a realisation of the 
power of Islam in Kuwait, as the new company would engage in 
"financial, insurance and various forms of investment without 
practicing usury or charging interest." The Law was promulgated 
in order to exempt the KFH from any injunctions in the existing 
laws which were inconsistent with the nature of its activities. 
A Memorandum of Agreement was drawn up and the Articles of 
Association established in order to define the operations to be 
carried out. These operations could be named with some accuracy 
because of the experience of the 'Islamic banks' already formed 
in the Muslim world. However here was a country having become 
rich from its oil revenues, with per capita income one of the 
highest in the world, trying to bring some innovation into the 
financial system. Innovation is a word that will crop up often in 
this study, because the call to institute Islamic financial 
principles marked a realisation of the fact that the extant 
system was not perfect, and that this 'innovative' Islamic system 
. could offer innovative solutions to problems both large and 
small. 
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Kuwait is very close to the heartlands of Islam which are 
situated in present-day Saudi Arabia, Kuwait's most powerful 
neighbour and ally. On visiting Kuwait the visitor is immediately 
struck by the impression of a country that has had the 
opportunity to introduce all the modern day technology in a 
matter of years, whereas countries such as America, France and 
Germany had become accustomed to the new technology gradually and 
sometimes unwillingly. However Kuwait drank up all the trappings 
of a twentieth century society as fast as they could be 
introduced. The result was a society very sure of its new-found 
importance, yet still cognisant of its duty in the 'Umma' (the 
Islamic community), a duty which necessitated healthy growth in 
all sections of society. 
The KFH is an oasis of Islamic morality in the Kuwaiti 
financial arena, competing with the interested-based banks for 
customers, but the view taken in this thesis is that it is 
working for the time when the whole system will be Islamicised. 
In three countries of the Muslim world the whole economic order 
has been Islamicised; Iran, Pakistan and Sudan. In Iran 
legislation to remove interest was approved in 1983, and in 1984 
it came into force: the Central Bank controls all profit sharing, 
and it is noticeable that credit facilities have been 
increasingly dedicated to the productive sectors. Sudan has also 
seen a healthy economic growth in the small business productive 
sector, but progress is slow because of the frailty of a 
war-ravaged economy. Finally in Pakistan economic Islamicisation 
is in the balance after the election victory of Benazir Bhutto, 
who sees the new Islamic order as a remnant from the time of her 
predecessor, President Zia Al-Haqq. 
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In these countries government support is total because there 
is no alternative to Islamic banks, however in Kuwait the 
government's position as regards the Kuwait Finance House is 
rather different. The original authorised capital was 
KD 10 million; 
Ministry of Finance 
Ministry of Justice 
Ministry of Awq~f and Islamic Affairs 
Private Sector 
KD 2 
KD 2 
million 20% 
million 20% 
KD 0.9 million 9% 
KD 5.1 million 51% 
and in the Decree Law No.72 the three Ministries are named as the 
instigators of the KFH. The majority shareholding is left to the 
private sector, but it is the central government that has the 
largest block voting power. However two of the above ministries 
must also regulate the interest-based economy by way of the 
Central Bank. This leads onto an essential theme in this study, 
that is the power of the central government and therefore the 
Central Bank over the KFH. The KFH is registered and monitored by 
the CBK, but it is not ruled by it like the conventional banks 
because the Shari'a is the KFH's supreme monitor. 
This thesis views the KFH as an agent inside the Kuwaiti 
system and touches only lightly on a comparison with the other 
Islamic banks. This is because Kuwait is a special case with only 
one Islamic bank heavily subsidised by the government; its 
competition does not come from the other Islamic banks, but from 
the interest-based institutions operating in Kuwait. The in-depth 
study of Kuwait and its infrastructure in the following pages 
will give the reader an idea of the ground into which the KFH has 
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been planted as a seed to flower, while the examination of 
Venture Capital is carried out in order to suggest ways of 
development for Islamic finance. Muslims can learn from the 
system in the West even though they can afford to discard most of 
western dogma as alien to Islam. 
The Islamic financier sees the managing of funds as a 
three-way deal: 
DEPOSITOR 
II\ 
BANK 
\--->--->--->--->---1 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ I 
\ I 
\ I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
USER OF FUNDS 
I 
I 
\II 
In the above situation all participants depend on each other and 
shoulder an equal amount of responsibility. In the case of 
bankruptcy the distress is shared which lessens the impact; 'a 
problem shared is a problem halved' .It is this responsibility for 
the welfare of others that marks Islamic banking practices out 
from conventional banking practices; that is a point the reader 
will be convinced of after reading this study. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Islamic Financial Principles. 
1.1 Finance as a Part of Islamic Ideology. 
1.2 The Prohibition of Riba. 
1.3 The Instruments of Islamic Finance. 
1.4 Customer Accounts. 
1.5 The Advantages of an Islamic Financial System. 
Notes 
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1.1 Finance as a Part of Islamic Ideology. 
Islam is a discipline under whose values life should be 
directed. In this discipline the life of a Muslim, or "The one 
who has surrendered unto Allah", is seen as a business whose 
outcome must be spiritually profitable. The promise of reward on 
the final day, when God judges everybody's case, can be equated 
to the profit after a long term of investment. Directing one's 
life up till this final day is the major incentive in Islam (1). 
"And fear the day when you shall be returned to the Lord 
and every soul shall be paid in full what it has earned, and 
no-one shall be wronged". [Qur'~n 281]. 
This, and other similar quotations from the Qur'~n, begins to 
show us why finance forms so large a part of Islamic ideology. 
In the J~hiliyya period the tribes of Arabia had been 
involved in extensive trade caravans, and Islam encouraged the 
aspirations of these tribes by giving honest traders great 
chance of reward on "Yawm Al-Qiy~ma" (the day of Resurrection) . 
In the Hadith there are many occasions when Muhammad spoke of the 
rewards of a businessman: 
"A trustworthy and an honest and truthful businessman will 
rise up with the martyrs on the day of Resurrection" (from Hadith 
of b. Maj~h and al-Hakim) 
In another Hadith he seems to put them on an even higher 
level: 
"A truthful and trustworthy trader will rise up with the 
prophets, the righteous and the martyrs" 
Al-Hamimand al-Thirmidhi) 
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(from Hadith of 
Traders are compared to those who fought and gave their lives in 
"Jihad fi sabil Allah" (striving in the path of Allah), and can 
thus be described as waging an "Economic Jih~d" (2) in this life. 
Muhammad was a tradesman and was known to have travelled 
with several caravans on behalf of his lady Khadijah. Trade is 
described as a "FadlAllah" (a God-given glory), and is always to 
be carried out in an equitable fashion so that neither buyer nor 
seller is disadvantaged or cheated. 
Every human being should live his life as if in the presence 
of Allah, therefore it can be assumed that Allah presides over 
all matters of finance and property exchange. Property is only a 
trust from Him, so that when an exchange occurs He would not 
endure unlawful pressure or fraud on behalf of the one party. The 
Hadith: "Let no-one harm others or be harmed by others" (the 
Hadith of the five fundamental ones) shows how trade has to 
conform to the life discipline which has been set out for 
mankind. It is worthwhile noting the verse in the Qur'~n from 
Surat al-Baqara which reads: 
"And do not eat up each other's property by wrong means, nor use 
it as bait for judges, with intent that you may eat up wrongfully 
and knowingly a little of other people's property". [Qur' ~n 
2: 188] . 
This quotation can be applied to cases arising out of contractual 
agreements, and so reaffirms the need for honesty in life 
dealings. 
There is a Hadlth (3) which states that as a man gets older 
two things become younger in him; the desire to collect more 
wealth and to live longer. A Muslim should be content with what 
he can attain by fair means, and he is commanded by Allah not to 
- 7 -
cheat in the amounts he trades in. 
"So establish weight with justice and fall not short in 
balance." [Qur'~n 55:9). 
This injunction led to the formation of a very important office 
in early Muslim times, that of the Muhtasib, who would actually 
go round the market place checking that weighing scales were not 
falsely weighted and that all dealings were fair. Any property 
gained in an unlawful manner is Haram (4) and detracts from the 
worth of the Zakat (5) a man gives to the poor and needy. His 
progeny will be burdened by the false dealings of their ancestor 
for many generations: however property acquired by lawful means 
will be a blessing on future generations for ever. 
"When a servant of Allah earns property in an unlawful manner, 
and then gives it in charity, it will not be accepted of him. 
There will be no blessing in that he spends and that he leaves 
behind but it becomes a provision for the fire of hell. In 
reality, Allah does not wipe out evil with evil, but erases evil 
with good. Undoubtedly dirt does not clean dirt." (Hadith) 
The aims of the Qur'~n are equity, justice, mutual 
co-operation and self-sacrifice. All these can be seen as the 
natural way to form a welfare state, where this state is 
directed, by God's laws, to distribute the wealth equitably. For 
this reason hoarding is condemned, extravagance denounced and 
moderation enjoined. However the asectic way of life is very hard 
to justify in a Islamic view, as nowhere does Islam condone 
deprivation in any way. The seceding from life is seen by 
mainstream Islam as an avoidance of responsibility, a negative 
choice, an unworldly choice. The exchange of property should 
contribute to the overall economic goals of an Islamic regime, 
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and we should strive for economic growth at all times. 
This growth is desirable, because it means using our 
resources to the full, and it should reserve a good future 
without creating a gulf between the rich and the poor(6). In this 
point the Islamic system sees itself opposed to western 
capitalism, which has perpetuated the wealth of a few at the 
expense of the majority. However Islam does not back the Marxist 
ideology (7), that labour is the only thing of value in life: it 
encourages entrep~neurship, risk-taking and use of venture 
capital. It seeks to outdo both these extremes by imposing on its 
followers a stricter sense of their responsibility towards others 
while realising the need for individual striving. In this system 
the state plays the role of supporter and upkeeper of justice: it 
does not intervene but acts as a guide. 
Islamic banking is formed out of the necessity that a Muslim 
society strives for socio-economic justice. Its actions are an 
extension of the trading to which Muhammad attaches so much 
importance, and therefore it is ruled by the injunctions Muhammad 
made on such trade. Islamic banks must ensure the economic 
well-being of the community, which means helping towards full 
employment and economic growth. They must help to create 
stability in the value of money, so that it remains a stable 
store of value. While carrying out all these jobs it is necessary 
that an Islamic bank provides the services available in western 
banks. 
The aim (8) of an Islamic bank is to make its customers 
realize their social responsibilities towards the poor and needy. 
By encouraging full use of resources as directed by the religious 
sources, the bank can lead to a superior standard of life for all 
- 9 -
Muslims and can therefore be seen as a potential leader of the 
community. The importance attached to trade by Muhammad is 
translated into modern terms in the banking experiments now 
flourishing in many Muslim countries. Backed by a return to 
Islamic values they have begun to re-evaluate the life discipline 
imposed by Allah, so that all his wishes can be fullfilled whilst 
having a thoroughly modern outlook. These banks are part of a 
progressive stage in Islam, not a regressive one, because they 
are working towards a more equitable society in a positive way. 
The spirit they aim to promote is engendered in one story from 
Muhammad's time. When the Muh~jirun fled to Medina due to the 
unbearable persecution of the Meccan pagans, the "Ansar" 
(residents of Med~na) gave them shelter and split their 
belongings into half, and gave them to the Muh~jirun so that they 
could again prosper. This marriage of economics and spiritual 
well-being is very strong in Islam, because Islam is a power that 
promotes accountability in all areas of life. 
1.2 The Prohibition of Riba. 
One of the most important injunctions in Islamic finance is 
the prohibition of "riba". This is a word overflowing with 
interpretation (9), even though its literal translation of 
"expansion" or "growth" sounds quite simple. It comes to mean 
"usury", "interest" and "unjust profiteering"; but to really 
understand it we must look back to the origins of its prohibition 
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in Islam. 
In the Qur'~n rib~ is mentioned in different Suras, of which 
Sura II contains the most information: 
"Those who devour usury (rib~) will not stand except as stands 
one, whom the devil, by his touch, has driven to madness. That is 
because they say, trade is like usury but Allah has permitted 
trade and. forbidden usury,! .... Allah will deprive usury of all 
blessing, but will give increase for deeds of charity, for he 
loves not creatures ungrateful and wicked ... Oh you who believe, 
fear Allah and give up what remains of your demand for usury, if 
you are indeed believers." [Qur'~n 2: 275-278]. 
This lengthy quotation is necessary to show how wicked rib~ (10) 
is regarded: it deprives man of any blessing and any hope of a 
profitable reward in the next world. The next mention is in Sura 
III (Surat al-Imr~n): 
"Oh you who believe, devour not usury, doubled and multiplied, 
but fear Allah so that you may really prosper." [Qur'~n 3:130]. 
The word translated into English as "prosper" is from the 
Arabic root "Falaha" which gives rise to the word "Fal~h", which 
is the "success" that we must aim for in life. By practising 
usury a man's wealth will actually decrease: 
"That which you lay out for increase, through the property of 
(other) people, you will have no increase with Allah: but that 
which you lay out for charity, seeking the countenance of Allah, 
will increase: it is those who will get a recompense many times 
over" . [ Qur "~n 4 : 61] . 
A usurer is seen to have rejected his own faith, and for those 
who "devour men's property wrongfully" a grievous punishment has 
been prepared. 
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In the Hadith we find more mentions of usury, the taking of 
which is compared to committing adultery thirty-six times 
(narrated by Abd Allah b. Hanzalal. The most famous Hadith on the 
subject is narrated by Abu Sa'id al-Khudr~ of the messenger of 
Allah (Muhammad), and it explains usurious transactions: 
"Gold is to be paid by gold, silver by silver, wheat by wheat, 
barley by barley, dates by dates and salt by salt, like by like 
payment being made on the spot." 
If a man practises rib~, it will lead to the ultimate downfall of 
mankind, when poverty will become widespread: 
"Narrated b. Mas'~d that the Messenger of Allah said 'Even though 
usury leads to growth, it eventually leads to poverty.'" (Bah~qi 
and b. Maj~h) . 
With the coming of the revelation to Muhammad, the usury of 
the inhabitants of the Arabian peninsula was seen as one of the 
ills of the former way of life. The usury was not simply 
restricted to individual dealings, but was at the very core of 
the economic system of the J~hiliyya Arabs (11). All commercial 
activity was based on the system of usury, and it is claimed by 
some writers that this economy was dominated by the Jews, which 
was another reason to see corruption (fas~d) in it. Islam came, 
denying this unjust system, and calling for a new basis, where 
goodwill, cooperation and mutual solidarity ruled. The words of 
Allah in the Qur'~n, and of Muhammad in the Had~th, leave no room 
for doubt that the new "Umma" (Community) should be set on an 
equitable and just economic base. This point fits in with the 
first section because it shows that the economic system of Islam 
is at the very core of its teaching. 
After these early remarks based on the words of Muhammad, 
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it is necessary ·to define more clearly the meaning of Riba. 
The Prophet forbade as Riba: 
a} Sellirig of commodities without letting the buyer touch 
them or examine them; 
b) Selling commodities whose defects have been 
c) Selling the cow which has not been milked for a long 
time, to make the buyer think falsely, 
always has abundant milk; 
d) Selling of animals still unborn; 
that the COW 
e) Selling of birds not yet hunted and fish not yet 
caught; 
f) Selling of agricultural produce not yet ripened; 
g) Prearranging with a man to bid a high price for a 
commodity so that others will have to do the same. (12) 
These are just some of the practices which Muharr®ad saw as 
unjust. From the above there are a few basic tenets that seem to 
hold. Firstly it is not lawful to sell an unknown commodity: 
secondly every sale which involves uncertainty in any area is not 
allowed and finally, that any profit which is stipulated at the 
time of the contract is unjust profit. 
In the Shari'a we find two senses of the word Riba: "Riba 
al-Nasi'a" and "Riba al-Fadl". The "Nas~La", the first kind of 
Rib~, comes from the root "NaSa'a", which means "to postpone" or 
"defer". This sort is quite obviously the interest that is the 
underlying basis of all western economies. The point is that 
there is a pre-determined positive return, which is seen as the 
reward for waiting. Another way of looking at it, is that the 
interest is the value of time which man, in this case, sees 
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himself as owning; h6wever in Islam, time is valueless and cannot 
. : :.:. "':=:!. 
be treated as a commodity to buy and sell. If the reward for 
waiting could have been either negative or positive, this sort of 
transaction would be allowed, but "interest" leads to certain 
profit. 
For Islam to free itself from the unjust shackles of western 
banking "Riba al-Nasi'a" should be abandoned altogether. Muslim 
economists argue that loans without interest are the only fair 
loans, as the U.S.A. bore ~itness to in helping Europe get back 
on its feet after World War II. Some have argued that if interest 
keeps up with inflation the net result of no real appreciation is 
permissible, but people (such as Chapra in his "Towards a Just 
Monetary System" (Chapter 2)) reject this theory as a way of 
trying to justify a corrupt system, whereas one should really be 
trying to build a totally new system (13). 
The injunction on Riba al-Fadl (14) comes from the above 
quoted Hadith,that like should be exchanged for like, and only on 
on the spot. In this Hadith six commodities are mentioned, but,on 
the basis of "Qiy~s"(analogy), these are extended to include many 
other commodities. The final two objects mentioned are silver and 
gold, which some people take to refer to all corrimodity money: and-
the last four objects "wheat, barley, dates and salt'' are thought 
to represent all staple food items. However the phrase "like by 
like" can be extended to include every commodity, even though 
some radical thinkers actually believe that only the six 
commodities mentioned are to be governed by the injunctions on 
"Riba al-Fadl". Modern interpr~tation tends to the belief that 
any storable item is meant in this Hadith, and so the "Fiqh" 
(Law) is formed around this theme. 
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Any profit in excess is "Riba al-Fadl": it precludes the 
cheating of a new entrant to the market, false weighting of 
scales (discussed above) and generally unfair trading. The 
Prophet realised that barter transactions were very difficult to 
judge properly, because a quantity of one product cannot be 
calculated as the quantity of another product: therefore he 
encouraged cash transactions, so that the cash gained by the one 
party could be used to buy the original object of the barter. 
This use of cash is necessary for the total eviction from the 
system of "Riba al-Fadl". 
It is true to say that "Riba al-Nasi'a" is well defined, 
whereas "Riba al-Fadl" deals with actions less easy to define. 
However both these ideals are at the core of an Islamic approach 
to life, and are seen as necessary for the continued existence of 
mankind. The lack of definition of "Rib~ al-Fadl" may be seen as 
a positive attribute, because it leads to constant review of what 
is right and what is wrong in Islamic trade circles, and 
eventually therefore, to the practises adopted by the Islamic 
banks. These institutions continue to develop as new ideas are 
put forward, and the system is developing in an innovative and 
more imaginative way. 
The rationale behind striving for a rib~-free economy is 
that this economy would be a totally equitable one, where poverty 
would not exist. Rib~, as well as being corrupted, is a 
corrupter, as it leads to greed and the concentration of wealth 
in the hands of a few. Cheating the system brings no honour or 
good account in the eyes of Allah, who works to rid the world of 
extortion, greed and hoarding. Abolishing interest would arrest 
the reckless borrowing of money by entrepreneurs, who continue to 
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squander their loans irresponsibly because they have done no real 
work to attain them: the system of interest induces laziness in 
people who are not willing to face up to their responsibilities 
to build a better economic climate. 
In the West many people see the concentration of wealth in 
the hands of a few as the way to this healthier economic climate, 
and they seem to excuse their means because the goal they are 
working for is an equitable system. In Islam the method as well 
as the means must perpetuate, if not equality, then equity. 
Wealth is a responsibility to be shared with the rest of mankind 
in a just system. 
Many questions still remain about rib~, and Islamic law is 
open to many different interpretations. The most important thing 
above all else is that it is prohibited by the Qur'~n, and that is 
the final word. However, what the prohibition refers to exactly 
is still under discussion. Are all interest rates forbidden or 
only very high ones? Should interest charges as approved rates 
be permissible? Does rib~ apply to real or nominal interest? Can 
one get round the laws by use of service charges? How can one 
form a profit making base for the economy? All these are 
questions which the mention of riba provoke in the mind of the 
Muslim scholars of our time. 
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1.3 The Instruments of Islamic Finance. 
For the establishment of an Islamic state it is first of all 
necessary to form a Bait al-M~l (15) for this state. This 
financial institution was well advanced by the time of the second 
Caliph, 'Umar b. al-Khatt~b, who had charge of all the monies 
paid into it as Allah's trustee. His duty was to spend the monies 
on the common concerns of all Muslims. The Bait al-Mal is never 
actually mentioned in the Qur'~n, although the sources from which 
funds flow into it are: however it is mentioned many times in the 
Hadith literature. Its aims can be taken as a model for the aims 
of the modern Islamic banks. 
The funds for this Bait al-Mal came from; 
a) Zakat - one of the pillars of Islam which demands that 
each Muslim gives up 1/40 of his savings for the poor; 
b) Sadaqah - involuntary charity from the individual; 
c) ~izyya - a tax levied on non-Muslims in the Muslim 
state; 
d) Khar~j a tax levied on the produce of the landed 
property owned by non-Muslims in the Islamic State; 
e) 'Ushr-the taxation to be paid by the landed Muslims at 
a rate of 10%; 
f) Khums booty from victory which is accorded to the 
state; 
g) Fay' property captured from the enemy without 
recourse to battle; 
h) Dara'ib- taxes levied by the state; 
i) Waqf - revenues from religious trusts; 
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j) 'Ushur revenue collected from the proceeds of the 
trade of the state; 
k) Kira al-'Ard- The profit generated from the government 
lands; 
1) Amwal al-Fadilah - Any income from thP government owned 
natural resources. 
The constituent elements of the Bait al-Mal can be seen as a 
good cross-section of all the dealings carried out in the first 
century after the Hijra (16): these funds are to be distributed 
evenly to help the poor arid needy and to support the state. 
Even though Islamic banks now work in isolated pockets, they 
are working for the day when they shall all be directed by the 
central bank of the Islamic state, which would equate roughly to 
the Bait al-Mal. This overpowering view means that the Islamic 
banks should be seen to be instruments of the central bank; that 
is that by their own instruments they must help to direct the 
economic life of the Muslims in an equitable fashion, with a 
socially respectable attitude. There are seven instruments which 
the Islamic banks have to offer which are worth considering in 
detail here. 
The Mudaraba loan offered by Islamic Banks is well founded 
in Islamic law. It is where two parties combine to form a 
business; one (the Mud~rib) provides the management skills, and 
the other (the Sahib al-M~l) provides the funds or resources. (In 
some schools of thought this is called "Qir~d" but comes to mean 
exactly the same). There are two sets of Mudaraba agreement: 
restricted and unrestricted. If any one of the four factors of 
time-period, place of business, specific line of trade of the 
customers or suppliers to be used is dealt with in the "'aqd" 
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(contract), then the arrangement is a restricted one. In the case 
of unrestricted Mud~raba, the Mudarib is free to act as he 
desires as long as it is with the successful outcome of the 
venture in mind. The profit from the Mudaraba will be shared in a 
just proportion as agreed, only when all costs have been covered 
and the original loan paid back (17). All losses are to be borne 
by the S~hib al-M~l, who loses the principal if the venture fails. 
If the Mudarib in the contract agrees to take all the profit, 
bear all the losses and repay the loan, then the loan is called a 
"Qard Hassan." This sort of a loan can be used by the bank in 
exceptional circumstances of dire need. In this situation the 
bank expects no profit at all, and therefore only offers the 
facility of "Qard Hassan" very rarely. 
The second instrument of an Islamic bank is the "Shirka" 
which implies more sharing of responsibilities, with joint 
ownership being the key to the arrangement. Again the contract is 
drawn up, and usually written down; so that the responsibilities 
of the participating parties are made clear. There are basically 
four sorts of "Shirka" arrangement: firstly "Shirkat al-Muf~wada" 
where the partners (the Bank and its client) are equal in their 
capital contribution, and are jointly ,and severally, responsible 
for the liabilities of their partnership, so each partner can be 
a ''Wakil" (agent) for the business and also stand as guarantor. 
Secondly "Shirkat al-'In~n" where the partners need not have 
an equal share in the capital, and accordingly are not equally 
responsible for the management of the business. Profit and loss 
are agreed in the contract according to the amount of capital 
invested by each party. In the third form of "Shirka", "Shirkat 
al-Abd~n", the partners contribute to the management without 
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contributing to the capital: finally "Shirkat al-Wuj~h" is where 
the partners lend their i'nfluence to the busisness but contribute 
no capital. 
The "'Inan" agreement is the one most widely used, as it 
allows for unequal shares according to 
I therefore the most negotiable form. 
would both bear the profit and loss of 
decisions agreed upon by both parties. 
the contract, and is 
The bank and its client 
the venture, with all 
If a Mudaraba or Shirka works out well, then the bank which 
has given the loan stands to make a profit, and will normally 
sell off its stake after about four or five years. Some schools 
of thought say that profit should only be related to capital 
invested, but the "Shar_i'a" also recognises business effort as 
grounds for earning profit. Every "'aqd" is different and decided 
by mutual agreement, although a bank, if it is involved in many 
such contracts, will probably formulate a basic standard pattern. 
To be able to bear the possible loss of capital ,the bank 
must be prepared to invest in diverse businesses. If it is drawn 
by greed into too many ventures in one field, then it would 
suffer dramatically if that field were to become unprofitable. 
The profit and loss sharing system should lead to more 
intelligent investing, because of the responsibility the bank 
holds in respect to the application of venture capital. The loan 
system in the West means that a bank may be prepared to back a 
venture without good prospects, because it knows that the 
entrepreneur has enough capital behind him to repay the loan. 
This is a temptation which is ruled out in Islam, as such a 
guarantee of return cannot be given because no funds from other 
sources can be used to repay loans on a new venture. Therefore an 
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Islamic bank has to be even more careful in its auditing of 
projects than normal commercial banks in order to assure a good 
return. 
In this system small businesses would have as much chance of 
gaining a loan as big businesses, because the criterium for the 
loan is not the credit worthiness of the client but the expected 
profit rate of the venture. This helps to reduce the 
concentration of wealth in the hands of a few and creates greater 
efficiency in resource allocation. The above arrangements mean 
that banks can assure long term profit, but they must find other 
means to secure short term gains. One method is "Murabaha'' or 
"resale": the bank buys a commodity for the client and the client 
pays the bank for the commodity after three or four months (18). 
The cormnodity may be in the form of a ne'·'' machine, a new building 
or new livestock which is delivered directly to the customer. The 
bank deals with all the paper work and makes a profit as a reward 
for its agency activities. This profit is permissible in Islamic 
law, as trading is deemed honourable and can in no way be viewed 
as usury. 
A bank may be able to organise discount if it buys in mass 
for a few businesses at a time, and so the client may end up 
paying even less for the commodity than if he bought it himself. 
It also saves the client the paper work, as this is all carried 
out by the bank in order to make life simple for him. 
Another method open to the bank is "Ij~ra" or "leasing." As 
in the case of Murabaha the bank buys the commodity and agrees to 
loan it to the client for a period of time. In this contract the 
bank is normally assured enough rent to cover the initial cost, 
and at the expiry of the contract is left with several options. 
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Although the commodity will have depreciated in value it can be 
sold off, either to the original client or a new buyer. This sale 
could be arranged at the time of signing the contract and can be 
seen as a combination of both "Ij~ra" and "Mur~baha". Secondly 
the bank could hire the commodity out for a second or third time 
in order to continue profiting from it. The arrangement is 
obviously favourable to the banks and favourable to the clients 
who cannot be levied for the commodity in their tax assessment, 
just as in the West (19) . 
1.4 Customer Accounts. 
The one customer service that any bank must offer in order 
to compete for customers has not yet been discussed : that is the 
facility to deposit and withdraw money from a personal account. 
It is possible to open a current account which carries no 
interest; from this account one can draw such cash as is needed 
for every day transactions (20) . Another sort of account is a 
"Mudaraba" account, where the returns on the original principal 
deposited will vary according to the profits of the bank. This 
ensures return because the bank is likely to make an overall 
profit because of its wide portfolio, and because of the 
certainty of profit in the "Murabaha" and "Ij~ra" agreements. 
The "Mudaraba" deposits are of many different sorts, 
depending on the agreed maturity of the deposit and the agreed 
notification before a withdrawal can be made. Deposits can 
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function from year to year or for even longer periods,but the 
full agreement must be fulfilled for any profit to be gained. 
1.5 The Advantages of an Islamic Financial System. 
The social and economic advantages of an equity based system 
over an interest based one lie in the community feeling of 
greater responsibility for the welfare of each other. There is a 
duty to ensur~ the just distribution of wealth, and to replace it 
by equity as the great human motivator (21). This in turn leads 
to a fair distribution of resources among the population, because 
of the ability of a skilfu~ entrepreneur, in any field~ to gain 
capital. If a society achieves this wide base, it is assured of 
greater economic stability and growth, which is the aim of an 
Islamic financial system. The "Ij~ra" and "Murabaha" make it 
possible to expand a business without too great an initial 
layout, and so are of benefit to the entrepreneur who starts off 
with very little capital behind him. 
The abolition of interest removes one great source 6f 
bitterness between a bank and its customers, as people struggle 
to pay off high interest rates. If this rate goes too high it 
tends to deter new investment and capital growth, which is 
translated into low growth rates: if the interest rate goes too 
low it penalises savers and provokes the consumer to overspend, 
which leads to high inflation. The western system has to believe 
that there is a middle value which ensures justice for everybody, 
but Muslim economists believe this value is purely theoretical 
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and cannot be achieved: therefore they see the abolition of 
interest as a major step to a more equitable world. 
With no loans being granted unless someone has a really 
sound investment proposition, the result would be an end to 
purely speculative financing. The application of Islamic law in 
finance favours potential not capital, and the more thorough 
auditing necessary (as discussed in section 1.3) gives the bank 
more stability, which can only help the economic growth of a 
country. 
The banking system described above has principles which 
pre-date any modern political thinking and avoids being the 
ideology of one party. In Europe we find the extremes of the 
capitalist system and the Marxist one: both of which Islam is 
seen to reject, because it sees the need for an individual 
economic freedom which is bound by Islamic principles. The fact 
that the economies of the non-Muslim world are directed by the 
political leanings of the ruling party, makes for a system based 
on emotion, whereas a totally apolitical economic system means 
that its actions are directed rationally. 
Socially Islam ensures a caring society, if it is adhered 
to: trade is seen as an extension of caring social conduct. 
Forward dealing, and therefore fraud, become non-existent so 
there would be less injustice and less need for insurance, which 
Islam so reviles. Loyalty becom~s the key to successful financial 
operations, because one needs to be loyal to one's bank to gain 
the advantage of all the instruments it offers, and the bank is 
loyal to you because it is your partner in business. 
On a country-wide scale the abolition of interest rids us of 
the major sauce of inflationary pressure, and so reduces the 
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instability in exchange rates and money supply. The advantages 
are potentially great because the underlying principle to the 
system that Islam predicts, is one of social responsibilty and 
accountability, where risk sharing leads to greater desire for 
enterprise and innovation, and man is not afraid of risk which 
leads to growth. 
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2.1 Introduction to Venture Capital. 
Traditionally there has been an equity "Gap"(l) which made 
it very difficult for new companies with no track-record to 
raise funds for new business ideas. However, there now exists a 
bewildering array of sources of finance in the West to fill this 
"Gap" from an ever-widening range of suppliers, who are willing, 
as venture capitalists, to pump money into business, for either 
start-up or expansion schemes. In the last decade the venture 
capital market has grown tremendously, but has restricted itself 
to certain areas of growth, which means that there is still not 
enough backing for a young entrepreneur with a good idea in seed 
form. 
The main aim of the new venture capitalists at the outset 
was to enable the formation of small and medium sized businesses 
(SMBs). These SMBs have a major advantage over their larger 
rivals, in that they find it easier to adapt to a changing market 
because their size makes them very flexible. In 1970 the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) released a report 
enumerating the benefits of SMBs, and condensed them into seven 
points (2). They said firstly, that where sales outlets and 
production units are small, often the most efficient form of 
business organisation is the small firm and secondly, that it was 
possible for SMBs to flourish in a limited or specialised market 
which would not be worthwhile for a large firm. The report went 
on to say that SMBs provided good competition for multi-product 
firms and could even act as specialist suppliers to the larger 
companies. They are ideal for some independent-minded people who 
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would feel limited in a larger organisation, and they are a low 
cost source of innovation and a traditional breeding ground for 
new industries. The report finally remarked that SMBs were being 
stifled because of their difficulty in finding long-term finance, 
which was due to investors seeking a quick return on their 
investment. 
The idea of venture capital then was to fill the "Gap". At 
this point we require some definition of the term venture 
capital: "A venture capital investment is an equity, or 
equity-related investment in a growth-oriented small or medium 
sized business to enable the investee to accomplish his corporate 
objectives in return for a minority share holding in the business 
or the irrevocable right to acquire it'' (3). The venture 
capitalist provides advice and support in man~ ways in an attempt 
to revitalize the dynamic subsegments of the SMB sector. The 
investment need not be made in return for equity, but can be in 
the form of a convertible debt or long term loan with attached 
options. Typically a venture capital investor is actively 
involved with the evolution of the business and will have a 
representative on the board of the company. This continuing 
involvement sets the venture capitalist apart from the banker and 
the stock market investor, who are more interested in their 
return from interest and the dividend yield. 
The idea of specialised institutions for venture capital was 
born in the United States after World War II, when the American 
Research and Development Corporation (ARDC) was formed in 
Boston (4). This organisation was a beginning, but the movement 
really took off in 1958, when the Small Business Act was passsed 
by Senate and Congress. This enabled the formation of Small 
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Business Investment companies (SBICs) as vehicles for small 
business financing. Progress continued into the early sixties, 
when five hundred and eighty-five SBIC licences were approved. 
This first movement faltered because of unreasonable 
expectations, short-term orientation, excessive government 
regulations, lack of experience and widespread misunderstanding 
of venture investments. From the ashes of this early experience 
was born the modern venture capital industry, which took-off in 
the States in the early seventies. From 1969-1973 $450 million 
was raised in venture capital and the industry has continued 
growing. The major area of venture capitalism is still the United 
States, but the European community is catching up, Britain being 
at the forefront, desiring to encourage SMB growth in the most 
efficient way possible. 
2.2 Risk and rejection. 
Starting up in business, or expanding, is always a matter of 
risk; there is risk in tne choices taken, the management chosen, 
in the inherent lack of liquidity and in the dynamic movement of 
markets (especially innovative markets) . The venture capitalist 
wants to back new business whilst minimising any risk he takes. 
He has to be bold yet sensible in investing in small businesses 
with great growth potential, but he rarely has enough confidence 
to invest capital in an untried idea. The capital needed for this 
is called "Seed Capital'': the analogy can be continued by saying 
that the venture capitalist hopes to nurture the seed to 
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maturity, when it can be set free to fend for itself. There are 
two major reasons why there is a dearth of seed capital: firstly 
there is a great risk that the seed will be killed off early in 
its fight for life, and secondly it is not possible to make a 
large enough equity-related minority investment, which means 
there would not be sufficient return. Therefore, either less time 
must be spent monitoring the project in order to save money, or 
else the venture capitalist must take up a majority equity 
position: the latter option goes against the philosophy of 
venture capitalism, which advocates only a minority holding in an 
array of different companies. 
The first process which a potential investor carries out is 
basic screening. For bigger firms it is necessary to have 
standards by which they stick in order to choose which ideas to 
consider. If a suggestion satisfies the pre-determined criteria, 
it can then be accepted for further examination. In his book 
"Venture Capital: The Complete Guide for Investors"(S), D. Silver 
establishes three laws to guide venture capitalists: firstly 
accept no more than two risks per investment (and he lists the 
five areas of risk as "development, manufacturing, marketing, 
management and growth"); secondly form a little equation using 
four terms, V for value of investment,P for size of market place, 
S for elegance of solution and E for quality of the 
entrepreneurial team. He says that for a good investment V=PxSxE; 
that is the value of the investment should be equal to the 
confidence one has in the firm; finally he says to invest in 
companies with a great market, because, if this is so, the 
importance of the values of S and E is minimised (6). 
The questions that a venture capitalist will ask are 
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manifold. There are sixteen possible points that are worth 
consideration: 
1) Is the business a new venture? 
2) How good is the management team? 
3) Is the company capable of significant sales? 
4) What is the size of the investment requested? 
5) Is something novel about the company? 
6) Is the company entering a new market? 
7) What is the state of the market? 
8) Is the management hungry for success? 
9) Will the management be motivated in the long term? 
10) What is the customer base? 
11) How dependent is the business on its suppliers? 
12) At what stage of development is the company? 
13) How will external factors effect the market? 
14) Is the company subject to radical technological change? 
15) What is the potential size of the investee? 
16) How good is the plan of the request that the investee has 
offered up? 
The last question is very important, as it is necessary to 
structure your ideas very carefully when approaching a venture 
capitalist in order to show a professional, winning outlook. 
Figures from the U.S. show that 30% of all venture companies 
failed within two years, 30% failed at a later date, and only 25% 
were deemed to have done well (7), therefore a venture capital 
firm will place great stress upon, and spend great time in, the 
screening processes outlined above. 
A typical breakdown of all the plans submitted is as 
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follows (8): 
60% - rejected straight away after a cursory glance. 
25% - rejected after a few hours study. 
15% - remaining after initial study. 
10% - rejected after further investigation. 
5% - the companies the venture capitalist is prepared to invest 
in. 
3% unsatisfactory price negotiations. 
2% - investment made. 
This illustrates how competitive the market place is. 
2.3 Stages of Investment. 
2.3.1 Innovation. 
The very first stage is that of innovation, where a loan is 
needed to prove a concept. At this stage it is very difficult to 
enthuse potential investors because of the failure of some new 
technology outlets in the early 1980s. This is the investment 
area that needs to be encouraged, as it offers the greatest 
potential whilst offering the greatest risks. Governments 
sometimes see the need to help in this field, as did the British 
government when it founded the National Research and Development 
Council (NRDC), whose work is described later. Seed capital for a 
product should end at a successful prototype. 
After the innovative stage comes the "business start-up", 
the actual forming of the business. There have been many 
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start-ups in Britain in recent years, but this may reflect higher 
unemployment rather than the flowering of an enterprise economy 
according to a new study by Colin Mason, Lecturer in Economic 
Geography at the University of Southampton. He attributes very 
little of the share of encouragement for start-ups to the 
government's SMB support schemes. He compared his study to a 
report he wrote in 1980 about the 1970s (9). 
Table 2.1 
Decade 
1970s 
1980s 
Percentage of Start-up Businesses Motivated by, 
a) Positive Reasons 
e.g. Identification of 
a market opportunity. 
60% 
14% 
b) Negative Reasons 
e.g. Redundancy or 
failure of a previous 
venture. 
6% 
42% 
The results shown above would suggest that start-up ventures are 
motivated by necessity. There is no evidence to show that 
start-up finance has become easier to get hold of, however the 
businesses formed in the 1980s are making a definite economic 
contribution to society. A possible reason is that people start 
up new businesses from their redundancy money, and only then do 
they look for further capital to expand. 
The NRDC (10), mentioned above, is one of the government 
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sponsored organisations which are supposed to open up business 
opportunities in the U.K. It was founded in order to maximise the 
national benefits resulting from the country's investment in 
research and development through the licensing of patents and 
advice on expansion and exports. Only later did it become a 
source of funds, and is now even willing to share the cost of 
developing any technological innovation that it believes has a 
reasonable chance of succeeding commercially and is in the public 
interest. It is an independent public corporation financed by the 
government, which dicta~es its progress. 
It is split into two departments: Applied Sciences and 
Engineering. 
Applied Sciences 
Businesses. 
Industrial Chemistry. 
Scientific Equipment. 
Engineering 
Mechanical and Civil 
Engineering. 
Production Machinery. 
Computers and Automation. 
Electrical Engineering. 
Some of the above sub-groups take innovations from laboratories 
and universities, and advance funds to bring them to a 
commercially viable stage, when an effort must be made to find a 
willing manufacturer. 
The sub-groups participate in Joint Development Cont·racts 
(JDCs), where the government is usually the major customer and so 
continues to define the specifications of the new entity. 
Advances are made against invoices relating to an agreed 
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percenta.ge of ~expenditure on 1:h~ approved 'progr~mffie. Recoy~r.y is 
provided for by a levy pn turnover at an agreed rate over a 
specified period. This system is called "Revenue Funding" and 
supports individual projects, not the company's cash flow, while 
permitting the company to undertake more new product development 
than its own resources or corporate strategy would allow. 
The NRDC's operations are li,mited ;in that once the product 
or process has been successfully developed and can be 
manufactured, the revenue ceases. It isprecisely at'this stage 
that more funds are neec:led, because often expansio,n is more 
expensive then development. In Britain this is where venture 
capitalists should come into their own. There is now an 
organisation called "The Local Investment Networking Company~' 
(LINC), which seeks to link those requiring finance to those that 
have it. Hopefully this will mean that capital from the richer 
parts of the country may now spread to the poorer parts more 
quickly. 
2.3.2 Second Round Development. 
After the start-up the concern is ready to build up orders, 
and to make modification for production - engineering. The 
company will usually be operating at a loss therefore a second 
round of financing will be necessary. This stage is backed up by 
marketing so that the company can find its own niche, which is 
the potential a venture capitalist should have seen at the 
beginning. 
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2.3.3 Expansion. 
This is the next stage which a venture capitalist hopes to 
promote in the business he has helped to father. The initial 
providers are asked for another contribution in·proportion to 
their original share of the capital committed to the project. 
This stage will probably come shortly before the company is 
expecting to go public, in which case the finances are Btructured 
so that they can be brought level by funds from the public issue. 
The expansion may be preceded, or succeeded, by a rescue bid, if 
the company's fortunes have taken a down-turn, but generally the 
expansion capital should be the last lay-out before the 
realisation of the investment, the processes of which will be 
described later. 
The venture capitalist can choose three basic ways of being. 
involved (11) in the company: firstly he can practise "hands-on" 
involvement, which means he acts as a permanent strategy 
consultant. In doing this he shows little faith in the management 
he has backed, and this approach leads to bitterness between the 
pur·ely erl.t.re-preneurial staTf and the staff of the financier, who 
direct operations. In this case the financing role of the venture 
capitalist can often take a back seat to the directing role. 
Then there is "reactive" involvment, where the venturist 
reacts to any failures within his investment. He retains the 
right to play a role in the directing of affairs, but only if he 
sees faults or warning signs that necessitate intervention. 
Finally there is "hands-off" involvement, where the investor 
busies himself with financial analysis while trusting the 
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entrepreneurial management. Whatever extent of involvement is 
chosen, continuous observation is necessary: from progress 
reports, to a member on the board of the company, or to a 
monitor; the venturist will try to have some control over the 
direction of his money, but he must also form a partnership of 
respect with the management team as a whole. 
All the above actions are taken to avoid failure, but the 
prospect of failure must be seen early to avoid its occurence. 
There are some points to look out for such as late payments, 
losses, late financial reports, poorly prepared reports, the 
unavailability of the entrepreneurs, large thefts, director 
resignations and wholesale selling of shares. A company that 
faces liquidation will be reluctant to publish its reports for 
obvious reasons, and so this will lead to delay. 
There are certain pitfalls (12) which many early venture 
capitalists could not avoid, but now, as the business comes of 
age, the lessons should be absorbed. There was a tendency to 
over-invest because of over-enthusiasm, and to leave the 
agreement too flexible. The deal should be as simple as possible 
with all loans to be repaid at a fixed rate of interest, in 
order to reduce uncertainty. All figures given should be audited 
thoroughly, and it is necessary to give the management an equity 
stake, but not so that they have a controlling percentage. All 
these are basic principles for the venture capital industry. 
When a venture fails, the venturist is left with five 
options: 
a) add more funds; 
b) sell the company at a reduced price; 
c) initiate foreclosure proceedings and leave itself with the 
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option of acting as a secured creditor; 
d) appoint a receiver to run the company; 
e) liquidate. 
All the options mean a loss. 
In contrast, if a venture is successful, the venturist will 
hope to realise his initial investment. He will hope to gain 
additional capital while he is involved in the venture either in 
the form of dividends or as interest on loan capital. On a 
development project it is definitely possible to expect to bear 
income which would not be expected with a seed project. However 
the aim of the venture capitalist is to sell his minority 
investment for a substantial profit. This can be achieved in four 
basic ways; by 
a) an internal sale of shares to employees and other 
shareholders; 
b) an external sale of shares to another organisation; 
c) having the company merged or sold to another company; 
d) floating the shares of the company in a public issue. 
The final way of realising is the most desired, because it 
shows that the venture capitalist has achieved his aim and 
becomes respected as a sound business. A floatation in Britain 
can take three forms: the ''Full Listing" for which a five year 
trading record is required, and which is very expensive because 
of advertising and fees to be paid on entry and annually. Then 
less expensive is the USM(Unlisted securities market),which means 
that your share prices are only quoted once every two or three 
days, but for which only a three year trading record is needed. 
Finally there is the OTC (Over the Counter Market) which is less 
prestigeous and less advantageous. On the OTC, trading is outside 
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the stock exchange, therefore it does not come under as mucl1 
scrutiny as the USM or official list. Costs and methods of entry 
are not so strictly regulated as in the other two markets and 
consequently the OTC is less prestigious, which reduces the 
liquidity of the shares of a company in this market. Despite its 
drawbacks it is a useful alternative for those companies unable 
to fulfill the requirements for the more prestigious listings. 
The OTC is " a higher risk market and is more attuned to venture 
capital situations". (3) 
At this point the venture capitalist can be seen to have 
done his job and can go on with any other ventures he wants to 
undertake. 
2.4 From the Entrepreneur's Point of View (14). 
So far we have discussed the idea of venture capital from 
the point of view of the large investor, now we shall discover 
the other side to the business; that of the entrepreneur. He/she 
has to present a. plan to the venture capitalist but has a 
wide choice of which backer to choose. In picking a venture 
capitalist he/she must first find the one which will give the 
the best service at the most competitive price. The best service 
can mean that the firm wants an entrepreneur specialised in a 
certain field, with the right personality to service the new 
venture. If a businessman/woman wants to have very little outside 
interference in the business, he/she may choose a hands-off 
investor, but if he/she feels very unsure and wants as n1uch real 
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guidance aa possible, a hands-on venturist will b~ chosen. If 
he/she chooses the second ~ort it may be because of a need for 
contacts in the new field to boost business performance. 
The very fact that the business is reliant on venture 
capital means that certain restrictions and limitations will be 
placed on it. The time-scale for development will be very heavily 
dependent on when the venture capitalist is willing to make more 
funds available, if indeed he is willing to do so at all. It is 
necessary to realise that in the partne~ship both sides will be 
relying on each other and must adapt to the desires and 
limitations of the other. One problem could arise when venture 
capitalism comes to dictate to entrepreneurs their method of 
working, and so stifles the genuine risk taken in innovation. 
The agreement between the two parties consists of 
legislation on "involvement", and the make-up of the financial 
package which is intended for the investment. Here is the 
breakdown of a typical financial deal showing how much finance 
comes from each source (15). 
Management Equity. 5% 
Venture Capital Equity. 15% 
Venture Capital Convertible-
Preference Capital. 20% 
Venture Capital Loan. 20% 
Bank(s) Loan. 40% 
The loan will be repayable in instalments out of the cash flow of 
the company. 
The management team can be given an incentive to perform 
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w~ll by arranging that the conversion rights cf the preference 
shareholders are reduced to the extent that certain pre-arranged 
profit targets are achieved: therefore management interest in the 
total equity increases with profitability. On this equity the 
management is liable for tax relief. 
For success a management team must think big and be over 
qualified at the beginning. This is in order to save new 
recruitment at a later date, and so that the venture capitalist 
will see no need for excessive intervention. An investee must 
realise that he will not lose control at his company, and that 
obtain:i.ng the money to realise plans is far more important than 
the percentage share: if the entrepreneur is so worried, the 
share of voting can be totally separate tram the equity share. 
U.K. company law decrees that the owner of more than 509o of the 
shares collectively controls the company, but the law also 
safeguards the minority shareholders against abuse of this 
control. Ownership of more than 25% gives the owner the right to 
veto certain actions which the majority shareholders wish to 
take. In an agreement all share allocations are to be decided, 
and the rights of the minority shareholders are to be protected. 
2.5 Categories of Venture Capital. 
Increasingly a venture capitalist must fit into the two 
categories: large or small. The large ones have £ 50 million or 
more under management and focus on buy-outs and later stage 
developments, whereas the smaller ones have less than 
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£ 25 million and are interested in a particular industry or 
geographical area, and are more prone to make early-stage 
investments. Out of one hundred and seven venture capital 
organisations recorded on the Database of the British Venture 
Capital Association (BVCA) in 1987, 25% were in the first 
category and 60% in the second. Of the £ 4 billion invested or 
available for investment by these companies, almost 70% was 
accounted for by the 25% representing the large firms: the group 
of smaller companies accounted for only 16% of the total 
invested. 
We can deduce that 15% of the companies fell between these 
two categories and were in the medium range. They have between 
£ 25 and £ 50 million to invest and account for 14% of all 
investments (15) . These companies are faced with a choice; to 
find more funds or to change from a broad based to a focused 
fund, which is hard because the management team consists of 
generalists rather than specialists. 
Specialisation can be centred on a particular industry, a 
stage of financing, the terms of investment, the size of 
investment or a geographical area. Sometimes a venture capital 
company may even form a subsidiary to deal in one field, as the 
French government innovation investment scheme (Soffinova) did 
with their subsidiary, "Battinova", which deals in the building 
trade. 
It is easier to gather together experts in one field than to 
have one representative for each different area. The assembled 
experts can formulate a standard agreement as a basis for all 
agreements in the specialised field; an agreement which fits the 
needs of any of the five categories of specialisation named 
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above. 
In the U.K. venture capital business, there are basically 
five different sorts of funds; 
1) clearing bank related funds; 
2) institutionally backed funds; 
3) government owned funds; 
4) corporate and private sector funds; 
5) Business Expansion Scheme (BES) funds. 
These will be dealt with one by one, except for the BES fund 
which will be explained later in this chapter, along with tax 
incentive schemes. 
The main source of clearing bank funds is called "3i". It 
started in 1945 as on organisation set up by the Bank of England, 
which enlisted the major clearing banks to provide long-term 
finance for business: this was known as the Industrial and 
Commercial Finance Corporation (ICFC). Then in the early 1980s it 
set up a technologically-oriented arm, "The Technical Development 
Capital", which in 1983 became known as "The Venture Division of 
Investors in Industry" ( commonly known as "3i"). Other clearing 
banks do participate in venture capital, but usually in 
partnership with a merchant bank ( such as is the case with 
Midland Montagu) or another finance house. 
The second group consists of funds set up by, and financed 
by, one of the public institutions such as British Rail or the 
National Coal Board. The third set of funds are government owned: 
at central government level the British Technology Group (BTG) 
was created by the merger in 1980 of the National Research and 
Development Council (NRDC) and the National Enterprise Board 
(NEB), to undertake the financing and the commercialisation of 
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technological and scientific development in U.K. universities and 
research institutions. Since 1982 there have also been local 
government enterprise boards who have contributed to the venture 
capital industry. 
The fourth category of corporate and private sector funds 
accounts for roughly 1% of the U.K. venture capital funds, with 
such companies as Shell and BP contributing as well as private 
foundations,such as that set up by the supermarket 
Sainsburys ( 16) . 
chain 
Another way of categorising venture capital firms is into 
those that invest their own funds and those that organise the 
deals on behalf of other parties. The latter (the 'Dealmaker') is 
ct gell.t:e we wlll 110L deal wlLh l1er·e, as Lhe velll:.ure cctpll:.ctl we ar·e 
looking at requires risks to be taken by all those involved for 
it i~o have any relevance to an lslamic system. An example ot the 
former group is Hambros Bank Ltd., a leading merchant bank in 
London. Since the late 1960s it has been organising direct 
investments through an informal but permanent syndicate. Hambros 
usually finances a major part of the deal (roughly 30%), and the 
rest is divided in equal proportions among the other investors, 
such as pension funds. The arrangement is such, that it is up to 
Hambros to identify the investment, und no member of the 
syndicate can refuse to go along with a specific deal and still 
remain a member of that syndicate. 
Next we come to the question of how the venture capitalist 
is financed, and again we see two clear patterns (17); those that 
are debt financed and those that have raised their funds 
primarily in the form of equity. The example of The Industrial 
and Commercial Finance Corporation (ICFC) will be used to portray 
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a debt financed concern, while the example of the French 
organisation "La Societe Financiere d'innovation" (Soffinova) 
will be used for the equity financed one. 
As mentioned before the Bank of England was a major force in 
the organisation of the ICFC, and subscribed to 5% of the 
£ 40 million initial share capital, while the clearing banks 
subscribed to the rest. Formed in 1945, it had found its own 
niche, providing long-term fixed-interest, debt and equity 
capital to private companies by the late 1940s. It had a virtual 
monopoly in this field and so grew to have a portfolio of 
£225 million. Since their share capital is only £ 55 million, and 
a major part of its portfolio is made up of interest bearing 
investments, it is clear that the ICFC had to rely on long term 
debt to finance its operations. 
Recently it has begun to face opposition from the banks 
offering longer term loans, but the ICFC has the advantage of 
fixed interest rates even though its costs are higher. The ICFC 
is prepared to make a fixed interest long term loan to an SMB, 
even if it is not insured, in return for the right to acquire a 
minority stake in the company. 
"Soffinova" was created in 1976 with about one hundred 
shareholders (mainly French and foreign banks) . (It is to be 
remarked upon that one of the smaller shareholders is "Advent", a 
venture capital organisation closely connected to a Boston based 
company, T.A. associates, which advises the Soffinova group. This 
fact bears witness to the domination by the U.S. of the world 
venture capital market). By the end of 1976 it had screened one 
thousand five hundred projects and was investing F Fr 32 million 
in seventy of them. Their format leads to a firmer base for 
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growth and has become the format which is a major creative force 
in~the European.venture capital industry. 
The single~sponsored venture capitalists, which abound in 
Britain, are :.mainly_ extensions of the merchant banks. The oldest 
one- Qf this group , is Charterhouse Development Ltd. (18), a 
subsidiary wholly owned by the Charterhouse Group Ltd. For fifty 
years it ,has provided minority equity or equity-related finance 
to private companies: it became involved in so many majority 
investments after .the war that in 1958 a holding company was 
formed, of which Charterhouse Development is now a subsidiary. 
The very fact that there is so much risk involved means that 
most institutions prefer to become shareholders in situations 
where they receive an i1mnediate reward for their risk.s. This was 
tried on . a pan-European level by the European Enterprise 
Development (EED), formed with the avowed intention to limit 
itself to marketing equity investments in return for minority 
shareholdings. 
The EED ran into great difficulties as it channelled 90 % of 
its equity capital into four investees, which became partly or 
wholly owned by it. This led to a debt of US $ 7 million in 1974, 
and so. urgent action was required: they managed to raise $5 
million in equity and obtuincd a $ 2.5 million unsecured loan. 
They also organised $2 million from new shareholders and a 
revolving credit line of $9 million, to be repaid from the 
proceeds raised from the sale of its investees. 
On a national basis, a multi-sponsored venture is much more 
viable because of specialised loans such as in France, where 
companies can immediately deduct from their taxable income 50% of 
their investment in a Societe financiere d'innovation 
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(Soffinova) . The multi-sponsored format makes it easier to 
provide secondary or tertiary finance, while it serves to spread 
the risk. The trend must move more towards this format in order 
to avert an over-competitive market with an excess of unqualified 
staff. 
One method which is of major significance in the USA is 
"corporate venturing" (19), which has provided large companies 
with "a window on technology and advancement " by investing in 
smaller specialised concerns which respond more quickly to a 
changing market, as remarked in the DTI report of 1970. A failure 
to recognise the potential in corporate venture funds has left 
the U.K. behind the U.S. in the field of new technology. (Figures 
show that 40% of new technology in Lhe U.S. is from corporate 
venturing.) 
The main method is that of "sponsored spin-out", where a new 
company is set up and run by managers drawn from the original 
larger group. The equity investment is provided by three groups: 
the management team, the parent company and the venture 
capitalist. One example of a spin-out involves the British firm 
ICL; in 1986 it spun out one of its innovative technologies 
employing large numbers of micro--processors working 
simultaneously on a computerised problem. "3i" helped to 
establish the "spin-out" (called Active Memory Technology (AMT)), 
so that ICL benefits by keeping in touch with the modern market 
while not having the burden of all the risk. 
In Britain, corporate venturing is expanding, as the 
government, in the form of the National Economic Development 
Office (NEDO), has set up a corporate venturing centre to handle 
large corporate subscribers, and a regional network is being set 
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up for smaller companies, so from now on early-stage 
equity-related backing should be easier to obtain. 
2.6 Management Buy-outs (20). 
The term "Management Buy-out" (MBO) (21) refers to the case 
where a company is acquired by its management and outside 
investors, by using a high proportion of debt secured against the 
assets of the company. Many people argue that although this is a 
process in which many venture capitalists participate, it i~ not 
a part of the venture capital industry. Their argument is that 
most MBO deals are not equity-oriented deals in which the 
investor seeks to add value to the company, but are instead, 
highly leveraged deals which are basically exercises in financial 
engineering. However it is worth discussing such deals because of 
their relevance to the way an Islamic system could work. 
Lately there has been a shift in corporate thinking which 
has led many large companies to divest themselves of unwanted 
entities as a process of deconglomeration. The depression and 
high interest rates made it desirable for the large businesses to 
concentrate on their central core in order to survive. An 
improved cash flow can then be used to streamline operations and 
invest in new technology and recovery strategies. This 
rationalisation can even be a way of finding capital to fund 
development in new areas in which the company sees potential. 
The workings of an MBO are thus (22); a management group and 
investors put up some money and use the company and its assets as 
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collateral to borrow a large sum of money to buy the outstanding 
equity. The management will be expected to put up a small amount 
of the finance to show their committment, and the fact that they 
are part owners will spur them on to work better. They are among 
the group of equity investors who are joined by three other 
partners, or sets of partners in the deal. Finally there is the 
"dealmaker" who assembles all the parties, negotiates the finance 
and structures the deal; then there are the senior lenders, who 
supply most of the capital needed, and finally the subordinated 
lenders join the agreement. 
The dealmaker can be involved in the finance himself or can 
be purely an administrator. The nann io that lhe dealmaker takes 
charge of a 'pool' of capital collected together from all the 
sources: the pool can be "conventional" or "blind". A 
"conventional pool" means that the investors have a say in the 
recipient of their cash, whereas in the case of a "blind pool" 
the investors let the dealmaker decide everything in order to 
save time. At a later date it will be the deal-maker's job to ask 
for further funds from the initial investors. Accounting firms 
such as Peat Marwick have put forward valid claims to being the 
best sort of dealmakers (23), as they have an overall view of the 
financial world, and so are becoming more and more involved in 
MBOs. 
The pure dealmaker, with no financial interest, gains 
roughly 1% of the selling price and 20% of the capital gains made 
by the equity pool, when an investment has been realised. If a 
deal falls through, then he is liable for all the fees 
accumulated and consultancy fees. His most conunon difficulty is 
in matching the different goals and desires of all involved, 
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while his every move is being heavily influenced by the senior 
lenders, who are normally the big con®ercial banks. 
The senior lenders usually provide 50% - 90% of the MBO 
price against fixed assets, with other assets used as 
collateral. In the U.S. commercial banks are not allowed to hold 
equity, therefore interest rates are very high and can sometimes 
be crippling. The senior lender can demand to see all documents, 
and has such power that he can attach conditions such 
restrictions on additional borrowing, and the repayment of his 
loan in full before any other investors are paid back. 
The subordinate lenders are senior to the equity investors 
but junior to the senior lende r:s (24) . Their loan::; are ::;ecCJrcd net 
against assets, but against projecteu ca:olr flow in t:Lue -v-enture 
capital style. They participate in the equity hoping for a very 
high return because of the high risk. The loa1r 1~ glven in return 
for both interest income and significant participation in the 
equity of the investee on advantageous terms (often referred to 
as "Mezzanine financing"). 
MBOs now account for roughly one in five of all financings. 
In the UK £ 3 billion was invested in MBOs compared to 
£ 26 million only nine years ago, and the figure is expectRd to 
rise to£ 6 billion by the end of the eighties. Jn 1988 Peat 
Marwick reckoned there were 210 MBOs involving£ 2.33 billion, 
and so the trend carries on. Management buy-outs, encouraged by 
the government's privatisation policy of the bus companies, the 
shipyards and British Rail etc.,will continue to gr-ow in number 
in the 1990s. 
Lately the management teams have begun to dictate terms to 
the venture capitalists (25), with the result that the proportion 
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of loan finance in the deals is becoming higher and higher, while 
the amount of equity held by the venturist is decreasing. This 
does not please the purist venture capitalists, who are now 
turning to "Management Buy-ins" (MBis). The risks are higher, 
because an outside management team, unfamiliar with the business, 
is backed by the venture capitalist. In this case it is usually 
he who seeks out the target company and puts together a financial 
package, then he brings in new managers to run the business. 
"3i", which has financed 55% of MBis so far in the UK, has been 
overwhelmed by interest in its new MBI unit, set up in the sun®er 
of 1987. 
2.7 Government Support For Venture Capitalism. 
The first European country to realise the need to encourage 
venture capitalists by offering them privileges was France (26) .. 
In return the venturists had to abide by certain guidelines, and 
the minimum conditions were the following: 
1) Within six years they will have invested 80% of their 
capital in innovative situations, where the criteria to 
decide whether a project is is innovative or not are decided 
by the government. 
2) They will not invest more than 20% of their capital in any 
one situation. 
3) They will turn their portfolio over by 33% every 3 years. 
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For all this they are allowed to deduct 50% of their investment 
from their taxable income immediately. Some people feel the 
agreement is too restrictive and have thus stayed outside this 
lucrative scheme. 
In 1983 the British government introduced the Business 
Expansion Scheme (BES) in a Finance Act, with the goal of 
facilitating accessibility to risk capital, by giving tax relief 
at the marginal rate of tax for investments up to £ 40,000 per 
year. To qualify for BES relief, the investor must be a UK 
resident and may not be connected with the company: the money 
must be invested in ordinary shares, which must be held for at 
least five years (27) . The amount of the investment must be a 
minimum of £ 500 and a maximum of£ 40,000 per individual (or 
couple) (28); this money may be invested in as many investments as 
the investor wishes. As for the company invested in, it must be 
resident in the UK, the shares must not be dealt with on the 
stock exchange or the USM, and it must be a single company 
unconnected with any others. It has to be engaged in a qualifying 
trade: these trades do not qualify commodity dealings, 
leasing, banking, insurance, legal or accounting services, 
farming and property development. What is more, all-the above 
conditions must continue to be satisified for three years after 
the share issue. In March 1986 (29) the Chancellor introduced new 
legislation in a Finance Bill, so that the BES, which was 
originally intended for only four years, could continue 
indefinitely, and BES shares issued after March 1986 became 
exempt from capital gains tax on their first disposal. 
The scheme benefits everyone concerned, and the five year 
limit on selling shares relieves the pressure on the entrepreneur 
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of having to produce short-term profit at the expense of his 
long-term plans. In practice the BES has been very successful as 
is shown in the figures for its first year (1983-4), when between 
£ 80 and £ 85 miLlion (30) was invested in small companies under 
its rules, and more than 10,000 investors (4% of the top two 
rates of tax-payers) participated in over 400 company 
investments. 
Both the French and British schemes show how governments can 
encourage healthy expansion and development by 'incentivising' 
the investee and the investor at the same time. This is one way 
of filling the "Gap" mentioned at the beginning of this chapter ; 
now there is a real appetite for growth sponsored by the central 
government. 
2.8 The State Of the Venture Capital Industry and its Future. 
The venture capital industry in Britain is now very well 
organised under the auspices of the BVCA, which was formed in 
1983 to coordinate the activities of its members. It comprises 
one hundred and seven members with fifty associate members, and 
is chaired by Mr. John Nash. It reveals many interesting figures 
and trends, and advises the government on start-up schemes and 
other venture capital matters (31). 
It estimates that there is£ 4.5 billion worth of venture 
capital ready to be invested in the U.K. 1987 was a very healthy 
year w:Lth £ 1.03 billion being invested in 1,300 companies, and 
in the first six months of 1988 £ 550 million was invested. 
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Fund-raising was slower in 1988, and if all funds meet their 
targets the final figure of funds raised should be £ 705 million. 
This is evidence that the market boomed in 1987 and is now 
pausing for breath and reassessment. There is still a lot to 
learn from the U.S., where there are over 1,200 venture capital 
companies investing roughly $ 2.6 billion per year. A study 
released by the U.S. General Accounting Office concluded that 
"The venture capital process can greatly contribute to the 
nation's economy and can significantly improve productivity in 
the 1980s"; they have been proved right so far. 
2.9 The Relevance of Venture Capitalism to the Islamic System. 
Many of the points made above are relevant to the Islamic 
financial system; the role of a venture capital investor equates 
roughly to the role an Islamic bank could play, except that the 
Islamic bank would have no recourse to any slight loan 
investment. Some things are exactly the same, such as the rules 
for business success, which necessitates sound, convincing 
planning and an entrepreneurial team qualified and hungry for 
growth. To judge the merits of a proposed investment, a large 
auditing and decision-making section would be necessary in the 
bank in order to minimise the failure rate and to check 
continually on investments. 
One thing that has become clear lately is that syndicates 
are able to support businesses more competitively than 
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single-sponsored ventures. Just like a venture capitalist the 
Islamic banker has a role to play as an equity participating 
dealmaker, however government support will be needed, if we are 
to set any store by the U.S. and European experience. 
In the Arabian peninsula there is a necessity to broaden the 
economic base for survival. This can only be achieved by 
encouraging economic development and business formation. Maybe it 
is time for the big family-run corporations to divest themselves 
of some of their concerns for the good of the country. Could we 
see the Islamic banks involved in MBOs in the next decade as the 
businessman desires a 'window on technology', 
future'? 
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3.1 Kuwait: History and Social Values. 
The surveys in the first two chapters must now be viewed, 
for the purpose of this thesis, in the context of the Kuwaiti 
economy. In order to do this the reader must first gain some 
knowledge of the history of Kuwait and its economic performance, 
especially since the discovery of oil which transformed Kuwait's 
economy from a subsistence one to a very affluent one. However an 
understanding of the character of the modern state of Kuwait can 
only be developed by delving back to the eighteenth century. 
Until this time Kuwait had been by-passed by the world of 
trade, because it could not compete with the south Iraqi port of 
Basra with its more economically significant hinterland. Then 
from 1710 it was taken over by the tribe of "'Utab" from the 
"'Unaiza" confederation, who took control from the Ottomans, and 
developed it as a terminus for trade from Syria. When the "'Ut~b" 
split up in 1760, the "Khalifa" faction went to Bahrain while the 
"Sabah" section stayed on as rulers to form the modern state of 
Kuwait. In 1776 the East India Company set up a base there, 
partly for conunercial advantage, and partly because the Gulf was 
seen as part of the geographic process that controlled the Indian 
trade which was so important to Britain (1). 
Till the late nineteenth century Kuwait was ruled in 
stability by the Al-Sab~h family, when it became the centre of 
international focus for two reasons: firstly the awakening of 
Ottoman desire to reassert itself; and secondly the German plans 
to include Kuwait in the Berlin - Baghdad railway. From this time 
on Mubarak , the then ruler of Kuwait, looked to the power of His 
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Majesty's Government in Great Britain for protection. After the 
outbreak of the First World War Kuwait became a British 
protectorate in exchange for a series of exclusive economic 
concessions in Kuwait (2). 
When oil was actually discovered there, Britain therefore 
was in a very strong position to exploit it. In 1934 Britain 
formed the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) to search for oil, and in 
1938 oil was discovered at Burg~n. However the first export had 
to wait till 1944 when the second world war was almost settled : 
the oil industry quickly replaced any other nascent industries as 
it was very lucrative. Till 1961 the growth was tremendous, there 
was an overwhelming influx of immigrant workers, and Kuwait 
sought independence. In 1961 this last goal was achieved and 
immediately Iraq attacked; Kuwait was saved the returning 
British forces, and the independent Kuwait was now ready for 
self-determined development. A welfare system was set up, a 
constitution penned, a civil service manned, and the Kuwait Fund 
for Arabic Economic Development (KFAED) formed: Kuwait was at 
last asserting itself. 
It has developed into a consumer economy dependent on one 
commodity, oil_,_ ~-Jhich finances the importing of many necessary 
goods. The move towards industrialisation has been hampered by 
the lack of a market, and this has led to the bizarre situation 
where, because of foreign investments, GNP comes to exceed GDP. 
Some diversification has been carried out, but the lack of urgent 
need has made progress difficult (3). 
Social change has been both the target and the result of the 
government's development programme. However, throughout the 
upheavals of the last fifty years the links with the past have 
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remained very strong, so that family and tribe play a key role in 
the cohesion needed for a modern state (4) In this, the second 
most populous Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state, the 
government has done all it can to provide for the welfare of the 
society; it has created what is arguably a model welfare state, 
where health care, education and housing are free for all 
Kuwaitis and most non-Kuwaitis. In 1976 the government published 
the social security law, which ensures strict application of the 
principles of social justice, and provides for all citizens of 
the state adequate protection in employment, assuming the ability 
to lead a normal life (5) . 
All adult education services are government funded and lead 
the field in trying to bring Kuwaitis into all sorts of jobs, in 
order to decrease the reliance on immigrant labour. One such 
establishment is Kuwait's Institute of Banking Studies, which has 
made it a matter of policy to develop financial and managerial 
skills. At present they have one thousand people attending 53 
courses, and a spokesperson for the institute recently said: 
"The proportion of Kuwaitis is very much increased compared with 
1982-83. We are also getting better qualified people entering the 
profession with an enthusiasm to learn new things so they can 
perform better" (6). 
There are now 13,000 students at the University of Kuwait, 
and the number is expected to double by 1995, because 60% of all 
Kuwaitis are under fifteen years of age. However the shortage of 
qualified Kuwaitis remains a major problem in all spheres, 
especially among the female population. In 1985 the deputy to the 
General director of the Public Authority for Applied Erl11cation 
and Training, Mr.'Isa Al-Rifai put the situation into perspective 
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when he said: 
"Of course our aim is to maximise the Kuwaitisation of all 
economic sections of the country, but this will not happen 
overnight" (7). 
The influx of immigrants has changed the society, giving it 
more awareness of its role among the Arab nations; this awareness 
has been heightened by the sizeable Palestinian representation. 
In 1946 the population was taken to be 90,000, but had risen to 
1,000,000by 1975 (8). Ina country with 17,818 km square of 
land area there are four main areas of population: Kuwait City, 
Hawalli, Ahmadi and Jahra. The last census in 1985 was split into 
these four areas and made a further split between Kuwaitis and 
non-Kuwaitis. 
Table 3.1 
1985 Census 
Kuwait City 
Hawalli 
Ahmadi 
Jahra 
Total 
Population 
Kuwaiti Non-Kuwaiti Total 
60,272 107,478 167,750 
257,153 685,297 943,250 
147,582 157,080 340,662 
213,794 65,672 279,466 
679,601 1,015,527 1,695,128 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Ministry of Planning. 
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From this Table we can see that the population total of 1,695,128 
was made up of 40% Kuwaitis and 60% non-Kuwaitis; the latter 
containing 22% Palestinian, 40% Egyptian, 15% other Arabs and 10% 
Asians (9). 
In 1980 it was calculated that in the non-Kuwaiti sector, 
93.2% of the men were part of the labour force, as were 29.6% of 
the women. At the same time in the Kuwaiti sector, 66.8% of the 
men and 10.3% of the women were economically active. Some of 
these non-Kuwaitis remain in Kuwait, but the majority return home 
depriving Kuwait of their expertise and their spending power. The 
main source of employment for Kuwaitis is the civil service 
which, in June 1984, employed 135,310 people, 38.1% of whom were 
Kuwaiti. However, on the whole, there has not been enough 
Kuwaitis working in the consumer productive industries such as 
manufacturing and construction (10). 
There is a need to promote a balanced labour force in order 
to maintain social stability and political harmony. The optimum 
structure is one that realises a balance between Kuwaitis and 
non-Kuwaitis; one way to achieve this would be the easing of the 
constraints on gaining citizenship. For the 22.9% . of the 
non··Kuwaiti Arabs who have been living there for over fifteen 
ycaro, the path to citizenship should be smoother than it is now. 
By doing this Kuwait would develop a larger workforce proud of 
its home state, and more willing to make it a success (11). The 
five year plan (instituted in 1985) aims to lift Kuwaiti 
participation in the economy from under 20% to 23.7% by 1990, in 
order to ensure continuing growth and success into the next 
century (12). 
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3.2 Problems of the Kuwaiti Economy in the 1980s. 
It is generally accepted that the 'boom' years are over, and 
this will be shown later in this chapter when growth ratios are 
detailed. There has been a recession during wl1ich the private 
sector has been restructured to be more competitive. The 
government, having for so long adopted a total 'laissez-[airc' 
attitude, now intends to have a higher profile in private 
business: it now offers industrialists long-term loans, low-cost 
utilities and tarrif protection whilst encouraging more trade 
with other GCC countries. 
The need for the economy and for its components to 
reorganise came about because of the destabilising problems of 
the last four years. The oil price collapse, the unstable dollar 
(on which all oil prices depend) and the disastrous Kuwaiti stock 
market crash in 1982 all affected business confidence, which has 
also suffered because of the Gulf War. 
After a couple of years of restructuring we now see leaner, 
meaner public and private sectors, and a diversifying economy 
where non-oil industries play-a-larger ~art. In the early 1980s 
there was an oil glut because no nation wanted to sacrifice 
short-term profit for long-term pragmatism. The result is that 
the present low price of oil has forced the Kuwaiti and other 
Gulf governments to make cut-backs in development projects, in 
salaries for government employees, and there have been delays in 
paying of contracts. All this led to depressed business activity, 
bankruptcies and an exodus of immigrant workers, which crippled 
the system. The government has been forced to spend less than was 
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needed for a full growth rate and so much development has had to 
be curtailed. 
The Gulf War caused many divisions in the Arab world, but 
inside Kuwait it has led to a pulling together, an inner cohesion 
which will stand the country in good stead. During the eight 
years of the war shipping activity in the Gulf was slack due to 
tension, but the flow of oil was not really affected. What was 
hit was the re-export trade which accounted for only 3% of 
imports in 1987 against 30% of imports in 1985 (13). The war has 
also affected oil prices as Iraq is now determined to make up for 
its war losses. It has angered many Gulf states by producing too 
much oil, a fact which will be seen more clearly when we look at 
the structure of the Organisation of PetL·oleum Exporting 
Companies (OI:'EC) (14 J 
The year 1987 saw many poLicies and programmes drawn up to 
face the challenges emerging from domestic and foreiqn 
developments of recent years. Support was given to the 
development of new and old industries, and as a result the GDP 
rose, as did the level of activity, especially in the non-oil 
sector. After a decline of 10.2%, 3.7% and 1.5% respectively for 
the yeArs 1983, 1984 and 1985, the non-oil GOP (ot current 
prices) rose by 7.5% to KD 3,156.2 million in 1986. These figures 
will be further defined when we discuss the non-oil sector in 
more detail. 
The most remarkable sign of inner turmoil was the crash of 
the Kuwaiti unofficial stock market, the "S~q al-Man~kh". It had 
emerged in the 1970s due to financial surpluses and the inability 
of the domestic economy to absorb them. People had invested large 
sums abroad but they wanted a horne market. At first they ploughed 
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their money into real estate, but the surplus continued to grow, 
and so they moved into stocks and shares in order to gain a quick 
return. The private investors took sh~res in companies which wPre 
of no real value; money was wasted which the government should 
have channelled towards productive investment. The governrnent 
failed to realise the need for constraints and controls, and did 
not even form a regulatory stock market committee to oversee all 
transactions. Companies did not have to prove their profitability 
to anyone and so to gain a listing was too n~sy, which resulted 
in a market that was floating on air. 
'J'he S~q al-Man~kh dealt in shares from companies inside and 
outside the Gulf, and in t-ransactions where post-dAted chPquPs 
were answered by instant de1ivery. In some cases people were 
buying and selling shares in J....L- 2 --L1lt=J_L own COillfJctllY ctllU o[Len .i.11 Cil.Sh. 
This mr1rlc> for a high liquidity rate 0nd a sharp rise in prices. 
In August 1982 the rot started as a couple of investors 
failed to make payments, which in turn set off a chain reaction of 
defaults. The banks were left with many bad debts the 
coLlateral for which is worthless because of the dummy companies 
formed on the unofficial stock market. A trail of debt amounting 
to KD 27 billion was created from 29,000 post-dated chPques, 
which took two a half years to sort out. Two government 
schemes were instituted. The first was an equity purchasing 
scheme on which the government spent KD 756 million of general 
resources in order to keep prices on the stock exchange up, and 
KD 500 million was spent to reimburse small investors. In the end 
only eighty eight companies were declared bankrupt including some 
major concerns such as the money changing company of Jawad and 
Haidar Abu Al-Hassan (15). 
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The second government scheme was the ''Difficult Credit 
Facilities Settlement Programme" (DCFSP) announced on the 10th 
August 1986. It has had a favourable impact, not only on the 
debtors, some 90% of which have reopened, but also on the 
creditors such as the commercial banks. The KD bond market also 
suffered in the crash : in 1981-2 as share prices were doing well 
the bond market lost its appeal, and after the crash it lost any 
appeal at all (16). 
The crash has been expensive for the government in the 
short-term, and now there is a lot of confidence building to be 
done for the long-term. Foreign banks are more reluctant to deal 
with Kuwait so the Kuwaiti Dinar has suffered in an already 
depressed oil market. In an effort to stabilise the country His 
Highness the Amir of Kuwait Sheikh Jaber Al-1\hmad Al-Jaber 
Al-Sabah has suspended the National Assembly (the democratically 
elected representative body) and has appointed his own men to the 
ruling body. He seems more determined to keep a tighter hold on 
economic development plans, which has necessitated a regression 
of the nascent political system. More controls are needed, along 
with guidelines for new industry: the economy is in the process 
of being streamlined for survival. 
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3.3 The Oil Industry in Kuwait. 
We have briefly referred to the fact that the ccon,)rny of 
Kuwait is dependent on oil, the product which has brought 
affluence and growth. We must now look into the structure cf the 
oil industry in Kuwait, and ho·..: it fits into the global energy 
system. 
The Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) was formed in L934, 50% belnq 
owned by the Gulf Oil Company (GOC) and 50% by the Iranian Oil 
Company (which later became BPI . In the original agreemer)t the 
KOC was given the exclusive rights for exploration, production 
ar.d markctir.g of 1\.u·...-aiti oil for seventy--five years, e;-:clucl.i.nq 
the neutral zone in the very south ot Kuwait, which was under 
Saudi Kuv;a.i.ti joint rule, and was to be e;-:ploi ted Ly Aud.rro .L 1., an 
funerican company. The agreement provided a fixed payment of three 
rupees (the former monetary system) per long tonne of crude to 
Kuwait in addition to a slight return for tax exemptions. ThLs 
all changed in 1951 when the 'Tax law' was int:roducPd, ~mel oil 
companies were subjected to income tax at 50% of profits: as a 
consequence government resources r:ose greatly and had reached the 
princely sum of $30,000,000 by 1953 (17). 
Then two year:s later: the system of 'Posted Pr:ices' was 
introduced, and oil was taxed on the posted price per: barrel 
rather than the actual price. This was merely for tax reference 
purposes, so that if oil prices fluctuated taxes remained the 
same. A system of royalty payments was worked out amounting to 
12.5% of the posted price. 
The next major step was the 1959 initial Arab Oil Congress 
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in Cairo, after the big companies ( 18) who ruled the oil 
production in Kuwait and her neighbours decided to cut prices, a 
move which badly affected the economies of the said countries. As 
a result the Organisatioin of Petrolenm Export.ing Countries 
(OPEC) was formed to protect oil-producing countries against 
their foreign exploiters. The original members were Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, Iraq and Venezuela: in the 1960s Qatar, Indonesia, 
Libya, Abu Dhabi and Algeria joined the original five as did 
Nigeria and Ecuador in 1971 and 1973 respectively. 
The aims of the original five were: 
a) to restore oil prices to the level immediately preceding the 
reduction of the late 1950s; 
b) to eliminate the quantity discounts given by concessionaries 
to their parent companies; 
c) to gain a better deal for themselves. 
Kuwait was a major force in the OPEC administration at its 
inception, and still is today (19). 
A major breakthrough by the OPEC countries was in 1970, when 
Iraq, Libya and Algeria agreed to coordinate their efforts to win 
a fair deal from the major oil companies. The Suez canal was 
closed down, and so 95% of the oil from the three above countries 
was inaccessible to the West and the oil companies that held 
power in the industry. Libya led the field and won an increase in 
prices, and all the others followed suit. At last the power of 
the big companies had been broken by a unified effort, 
worried the western powers (20). 
and this 
Vienna had already witnessed a meeting of OPEC (at which 
producers demanded higher prices) when the 1973 Arab-Israeli war 
started, pushing Arab nationalism again to the top of the agenda: 
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the producers looked for more control over their revenues. On the 
16th October 1973 the tremendous price rises were announced in 
Kuwait, and the next day all countries deemed sympathetic towards 
Israel were boycotted. The Arab nations had wanted to do this 
after the six-day war in 1967, but they lacked the cohesion then. 
It was true that they had joined together in 1968 to form the 
Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), but 
they lacked any power to make a real impact. Kuwait, Libya, Saudi 
Arabia, Algeria and Iraq were the founder members and sought to 
put combined pressure on 'unfriendly' countries. The OAE'EC 
headquarters were set up in Kuwait, which, by its position in 
these two major organisations, now had the power to influence 
world events (21). 
In the early 1970s Kuwait had already raised its oil prices, 
and income tax was also raised. In 1972 Kuwait took a further 
step in the way of self-determination, when it limited the KOC's 
output to 3,000,000 barrels per day (bpd), in order to preserve 
oil, and to ensure that there were no price-lowering surpluses. 
On the 1st January 1974 the government of Kuwait turned to 
equity participation, taking over 60% of the KOC, leaving 40% to 
the two original firms, ~ulf and BP. Royalties ~ose from 17.5% to 
20% and income tax from 55% to 85%. Then exactly one year later, 
Kuwait terminated the Gulf and BP concessions: the Kuwaiti 
government now had full control over its revenues (22). 
In the meantime since 1934, different oil-related industries 
had grown up in Kuwait. In 1960 the Kuwait National Petrol(um 
Company had been formed for the purposes of refining and 
marketing; in 1957 the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company (KOTC) was set 
up for transport services and in 1967 the Petrochemicals Industry 
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Company (PIC) was formed. In the vital year of 1980 these four 
were joined under the umbrella organisation, the Kuwait Petroleum 
Company (KPC), with each subsidiary being represented on the 
board. To complete the picture the Kuwait Foreign Petroleum 
Exploration Company (KuFPEC) was formed in 1981 and joined the 
umbrella organisation (23) . 
PIC 
(Est. 1967) 
KNPC 
(Est. 1960) 
KPC 
(Est. 1980) 
KOC 
(Est. 1934) 
KOTC 
(Est. 1957) 
KuFPEC 
(Est. 1981) 
As a member of OPEC, Kuwait, with all other members, reached 
the height of its power in the 1970s, when it had total dominance 
over the world market; a dominance which has now been cut to only 
50%. It has tried to regain its power by once again making oil a 
more precious commodity by restricting its output, but the 
ceiling levels it imposed on its members have been openly 
flouted. It has been a victim of its own success, because it 
managed to keep prices high for so long that an oil glut was the 
result. 
Since 1986 OPEC has had a hard time, because when one of its 
members starts over-producing all its members follow suit. In 
October 1988 the OPEC president, Rilwano Lukman, admitted that 
the cartel was producing 21 million bpd against a target of 
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17 million bpd. It faced the prospect of oil prices sinking as 
low as $ 5 per barrel. This would have crippled countries such as 
Kuwait, who aim for a steady price of around $ 20, which is low 
enough to attract buyers while not damaging revenues. Kuwait now 
insures itself against the unpredictability of oil prices by 
diversifying, and by moving downstream in the oil market. 
Revenues to the OPEC countries from oil in 1988 will be down 
9.5% from the previous year to$ 110,000 million: the figure is 
only just higher than in 1986 when the oil price crashed. So we 
can see that oil is not the money-earner that it once was, in 
fact oil revenues in Kuwait decreased by 16% and 29.2% in 1985/6 
and 1986/7 respectively. Kuwait itself has been decreasing its 
production, but has still been exceeding the limit imposed on it 
for the last two years (24). 
Table 3.2 
Kuwait's Crude Production in Millions of Barrels per Day 
OPEC Quota Actual Total 
--------------1------------------------------------
1986 1987 1988 
0.996 1.2 1.1 l.l 
Oil revenues have dropped consistently since 1981, although 
they still accounted for 45% of the GOP, 85% of total export 
earnings and 45% of general State revenues in 1986. After ~he 
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price crash, however, the revenue for investments was 119% of oil 
revenues. 
Kuwait has moved more and more into downstream activities of 
which the first which will be discussed is refining. In 1986 this 
area of exports started to take over from crude oil, and at 
present more than 50% of Kuwait's oil is being refined at home. 
The refineries are now being modernised and the great hope is the 
Mina Abdallah refinery, where there are now facilities for making 
fuel oil, naptha, turbine kerosine, high speed diesel, marine 
diesel oil, green coke and sulphur. This trend towards refining 
is justified in a quotation from Mr. Bader al-Baij~n, general 
manager of the Major Projects Group: 
"The modernisation of Mina Abdullah is part of an overall 
expansion and updating of crude processing facilities in Kuwait 
However the most significant idea behind the move is shifting 
the market more towards the finished product, where profit 
margins are higher and market demand more reliable". 
He went on to say that this goal is being helped by the 
KOTC, who now transport 65% of Kuwait's oil, and the PIC, who lay 
down the pipelines (25). Exports of refined products have been 
increaB~ng since 1981 and that trend lookB likely to continue. 
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3.4 Retail Operations in Kuwait. 
In 1983 the KPC acquired the downstream as~ets of the Gulf 
Oil Corporation (GOC) as it headed for less reliance on the crude 
products. It acquired two thousand European service stations and 
two operating refineries, and has grown immensely since then. By 
clever marketing, it has established a niche in the market 
alongside such companies as Shell and Esse, while maintaining a 
permanent staff of only fifty-five based in London. 
Under the name "Q8", chosen for its eye-catching humour 
factor, and the emblem of two sails (representing Kuwait's 
sea-faring past), they undertook to reformulate all types and 
grades of lube oil in order to keep ahead of the rest. They have 
faced teething problems, such as how much stock to hold, and how 
to deal in seven European currencies instead of just the U.S. 
Dollar. 
With a new service station lay out and new uniforms (with 
"Q8" emblazoned on them), the image is full of vitality and is 
sure to protect Kuwait from ever again depending on the volatile 
prices of crude oil. "Q8" wants to expand its operations and to 
cover more and more countries in the near future: the company is 
young and has a lot of potential to fulfill (26) . 
There is ever more research into alternative sources of 
energy, but so far no one has come up with a fuel more suitable 
than oil. Kuwait, with oil reserves of ninety-two million 
barrels, has enough for two hundred years if oil retains its 
position as the most important source of energy. 
- 77 -
3.5 Kuwait's Non-oil Economy. 
With an idea of the oil industry in Kuwait we can now look 
at the areas of the economy where oil plays no part. The 
traditional agriculture and fishing now form a tiny part of total 
revenues. The fact that only 2% of Kuwait is cultivated is the 
major problem, but the lack of good quality irrigation water does 
not help. There is very little scope for expansion in these two 
areas, which, combined, account for 1.3% of GOP and 0.6% of the 
labour force (27). Most of Kuwait's food is imported, witnessed 
by the $670 million bill for 1984. Self sufficiency ratios of 60% 
for eggs, 27% for poultry, 20% for tomatoes and 18% for milk do 
not augur well. 
On the industry side the quest for development goes back to 
1952 when the National Industries Company (NIC) was formed as 
part of the Ministry of Works, in order to generate new resources 
for national income and a new base for industries to be formed. 
The company began by purchasing the Saudi Arabian lime brick and 
cement factories, which are connected to the construction and 
housing industry, which will be discussed below. 
Kuwait has done quite well in petrochemicals, which were 
first produced by oil companies in July 1963, in order to utilise 
the gas given off as a by-product of oil extraction. However this 
industry is now facing a hard time as it has been starved of gas 
by the reduction in oil production. In the period 1982-86 it lost 
$ 70 million, and required a fresh capital input of $ 108 million 
to set it right again. As oil prices fell so did the price of the 
gas (liquid petroleum gas (LPG)), so there is now less motivation 
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to improve the country's gas utilisation capacity, 
consequently the petrochemical industry has taken a 
and 
step 
backwards. Although not part of the oil industry, it is dependent 
on the production of crude and is therefore affected by low oil 
production (27) • 
There are other problems to overcome, such as the lack of 
desire of the Kuwaitis to form a viable workforce. The government 
has tried to encourage new industry by tarrif protections and by 
requesting that government departments give priority to procuring 
local products, but there has been little success. The main 
problems are the lack of an indigenous market, and the lack of 
desire of Kuwaitis to participate fruitfully. How can 
diversification be achieved with the high labour demand that it 
necessitates? The present policy of worker immigration must be 
curtailed, but that will lead to a shortage of labourers, 
jobs the Kuwaitis are reluctant to take over. 
whose 
There are areas which are ripe for development such as 
information and communications, housing and trade (after the Gulf 
war) . The GOP for the non-oil sector continues to grow by about 
3% per year, but still falls way behind the GOP of the oil 
sector. 
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3.6 The Construction Industry in Kuwait. 
Construction is an area that has developed quite 
considerably, encouraged by the National Housing Association 
(NHA) set up in 1974. This is a government sponsored agency, 
which has the goal of ensuring that all Kuwaitis have a place to 
live. As the idea of a whole extended family under one roof is 
becoming less fashionable, more young couples want to have a 
house of their own. The NHA distributes housing as it becomes 
available, by means of a lottery among those on the top of the 
waiting list, and for those who want to build their own houses 
long-term loans can be obtained from the Savings and Credit Bank 
(see chapter 4 - "The Specialised Banks"). 
Most of the work is carried out by local contractors, as 
part of the NHA policy to involve the private sector whilst 
maintaining control over standards and prices. The NIC is a major 
client supplying cement, tiles, and bricks for the standard 
government design villas, with five bedrooms and enough space for 
a family of eight. According to a recent study carried out at the 
Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research, more than 62,000 new 
homes must be built by the year 2,000, if demand conlinues at its 
current rate. The government is expected to return to a policy of 
high-rise housing because of a problem of space: the five year 
plan, 1991-1996, will see more high rise buildings in areas such 
as Kuwait City, and new towns established in the South at Khiran 
and in the North at Subiya. 
There is major construction underway, such as the Amiri 
Diw~n, a contract worth KD 70 million to provide offices for the 
- 80 -
Amir, Crown Prince and the Council of Ministers. This is being 
managed by two companies; one Kuwaiti, The Kuwaiti Project 
Analysis and Control Systems, and the other is American, Turner 
International Industries. There are plans for further development 
of the waterfront, a University campus extension, a postal 
services complex, a headquarters for the KPC, and an Olympic 
sports complex. All these should provide work and revenue for 
local private contractors (28) 
Although some projects have had to be shelved due to the 
economic deceleration, the construction industry seems to be 
expanding. In 1987 the number of building licences grew by 80%, 
encouraged by the government increasing its budget for 
construction from KD 724.9 million in 1985/6 to KD 750 million in 
1986/7, in an attempt to mobilise the private sector in this 
sphere, which is one of the success stories of Kuwait's recent 
history (29). 
3.7 Trends in Kuwait's Trading Performance. 
Having looked inside Kuwait, now is the time to examine its 
economic relationships with other countries. Later Kuwait's 
substantial investments abroad will be dealt with, but first her 
imports and exports will be examined. 
Kuwait takes very seriously its policy of non-alignment, and 
looks to deal equally with East and West, with European and 
non-European, although past links with old colonial powers still 
exist. In 1987 imports fell slightly to KD 1,314 million due to 
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reduced activity in the re-export sector (see below), although 
other areas are quite healthy. The five major sources of Kuwaiti 
imports were as follows: 
,Japan 21.2% 
U.S.A. 10.8% 
w. Germany 8. 1% 
U.K. 8.0% 
Italy 6.2% 
Japan is traditionally the largest source as it is also the major 
receiver of oil exports (30). 
The predicted total value of imports for 1988 was 
$90,000 million, 12% lower than the value of in1purl:c; in 1982 (at 
current prices) because the ~ountry can afford less than it could 
in the 'boom' years (31). Evidence of this is that in the early 
1980s, the port of Shuwaikh handled 7 million tonnes of cargo per 
year, whereas for the period March 1985 - March 1986 this was 
down to 4.5 million tonnes. There has been a slight recovery, but 
total tonnage is still down on the peak period of 1982 (32). 
As for exports in 1987, the total value climbed 11% from the 
previous year to KD 2,306 million, whereas from 1985 to 1986 
there had been a 33% decrease. Oil exports, which accounted for 
90% of the whole, rose in value by 13%, because of increased 
prices and volume. The non-oil sector continued its downward 
trend, started in 1982, because of the decline in the value of 
re-exports and non-monetary gold exports by KD 16 million and 
KD 4 million respectively. The major receivers of exports from 
Kuwait in 1987 were as follows: 
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Japan 17.3% 
Italy 9.6% 
Singapore 8.3% 
Holland 8.2% 
Taiwan 6.9% 
Again Japan leads the field, giving evidence of its severe lack 
of fuel resources and its dire need for raw materials (33) . 
Re-exports have fallen as a consequence of the Gulf war 
which made Kuwait an unacceptable transit point. In 1985 30% of 
all Kuwaiti imports were for re-export; now the figure is only 
3% (34). Having said all this, it is predicted that figures for 
1988 will show that Kuwait is the only OPEC country to have 
avoided a current account deficit: in fact the surplus will total 
US$ 3,500 million. 
The Arab countries, as developing countries, feel they are 
not given a chance to develop their export trade to its full 
potential because of "European tar/i:tfs and the protectionist 
attitudes which dominate in Europe" ( 35) . They still hold 
grievances and are looking for more opportunity to expand. They 
look- to the OECD countries, whereas there is- very litt-le ·rrade 
with Arab or GCC countries. 
This leads on to another point; the potential for more 
cooperation among the Gulf countries. Prior to 1968 the status of 
'British Protectorate' ensured uniformity in economic practice, 
with the Rupee being the common currency of the Trucial States 
(those with which Britain had signed a truce) . Kuwait played a 
key role in the development of these Trucial States, channelling 
aid into the Gulf Permanent Assistance Committee (GuPAC) set up 
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in Kuwait in 1962. She signed her first economic agreement in 
1964 with Iraq, which other GCC states have only recently 
imitated. In 1966 GuPAC was replaced by the General Authority for 
South Arabian and Gulf States, where Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are 
the main protagonists (36) . 
In the period 1966-1972 there were great attempts to form a 
federal union of the Trucial States and Bahrain and Qatar. This 
failed, but out of the discussions was formed the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), which have their own internal governments but a 
coordinated foreign policy. Meanwhile Kuwait was working with 
Iraq to exploit Iraq's sulphur deposits, but the project had to 
be halted because of the inevitable border disputes. 
The period 1972-1977 was the most promising for the Gulf but 
all the promises of cooperation have come to very little.. The 
different states are basically divided in two: those who favour 
economic and social cooperation such as Kuwait and the UAE, and 
those who want to concentrate on military and security matters 
led by Oman. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain act as mediatfors between 
the two sides, but it is very difficult to make any progress(37). 
The starting point for this discussion of the Gulf was its 
Jnteznal trade, which is surpr~&ingly small. The total va~ue of 
Kuwait's trade (import and export) within the GCC reached 
KD195.1 million in 1987, or 5.4% of Kuwait's total trade with the 
outside world, with industrial products making up 85% of total 
trade. 
In the field of exports from Kuwait to other GCC countries 
there has been a real decrease in value from KD 95.1 million in 
1986 to KD 73.1 million in 1987 this is because of the 
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Table 3.3 
Acts of Cooperation in the Gulf till 1977 
1969 Interchange of students to provide cultural and technical 
exchange. 
1969 Interconnecting roads built. 
1969 Chambers of Commerce in Kuwait and Bahrain joined to form a 
union to encourage the private sector. 
1971 Kuwait-Bahrain Bank incorporated. 
1972 Delineation of off-shore boundaries. 
1972 Settlement of border disputes, including the neutral zone 
between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 
1973 Kuwait-Bahrain : economic, educational, media agreement. 
1973 Qatar UAE: agreement guaranteeing the free movement of 
capital, labour and products. 
1975 Attempt at currency coordination, but the strength of the KD 
and the instability of the other currencies ensured failure. 
1976 Kuwait-UAE economic Agreement. 
1977 All seven Arab Gulf States meet (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Qatar, Iraq, Oman, UAE). Agree on the principles of 
a Gulf Common Market. 
1977 Joint Kuwait-Saudi Arabian committee to advise on cement, 
glass, iron and steel. 
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expansion in other GCC countries of conunercial sea ports and the 
establishment of free trade zones such as the Jabal 'Ali zone in 
Dubai. As for imports from GCC countries, they have risen from 
KD 81 million in 1986 to KD 122 million in 1987 (38). 
In December 1987 some economic decisions were taken by the 
Riy~dh sununit conference confirming the determination of the GCC 
countries to progress towards a Gulf Conunon Market. 
include; 
1) the unifying of levels of customs tarfilF, 
Steps 
2) protecting national products from foreign competition, and 
3) utilising the productive capacity of the Gulf in the most 
efficient way. 
If their efforts prove effective, they would leave the Gulf in a 
much stronger position, but we can only wait and see. 
3.8 Kuwait's Investment Policy. 
There exist in Kuwait, alongside the many banks and 
specialised financial institutions, several companies specialised 
in investments. The four major ones are: 
1) The Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) I 100% government 
owned; 
2) The Kuwait Foreign Trading Contractor and Investment Company 
(KFTCIC), 96% government owned; 
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3) The Kuwait Investment Company (KIC), 65% government owned; 
4) The Kuwait International Investment Company (KIIC) 
Privately owned; 
There are many other smaller investment companies which 
specialise in stock market trading, foreign exchange operations, 
investment advice and real estate investment. 
The abundance of investment companies is evidence of the 
surpluses of oil money which the private and public sector wanted 
to invest. A lot of money was placed in the Euro Dollar market 
and in the European banks, which together form the biggest centre 
for re-cycling Kuwaiti money. 
The KIA was formed in 1982 by Ami:_ri decree as part of the 
Ministry of Finance, to manage government funds and to take 
charge of the General Reserve Fund (GRF) . It has nine members as 
well as the Ministers for Oil and Finance and the governor of the 
Central Bank on its board,· and profits from domestic and 
international investments. It has a branch in London which deals 
in diverse investments such as stocks, bonds, venture capital and 
real estate in Europe, the U.S.A., Japan and the Far East (39). 
One high _profile area of - investment is Spain, where-the 
Kuwait Investment Office (KIO - The European section of the KIA) 
acts through its Spanish affiliate Torras Hostench, a paper 
manufacturer, in which it holds a 45% stake. The KIO plans to 
divest Torras Hostench of its paper manufacturing concerns and to 
turn it into a holding company. To achieve this end the KIO took 
a 15% stake in a major Spanish media group "Ediciones Zeta". The 
KIO has also recently taken a controlling interest in a Belgian 
paper manufacturer "Cellulose des A.rdennes", with Torras Hostench 
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buying 50.1% of "CeLlulose des Ardennes" shares. On top of these 
equity investments, the KIO announced an $ 11.5 million stake in 
"Trilla", Spain's largest injection moulded plastics producer, 
through its Dutch subsidiary "Koones" {IJO). 
In the banking world the KIO has made important purchases, 
admitting that it had a 6% share in Spain's largest commercial 
bank "Banco Central", which it swapped for a 48.8% share in a new 
joint-venture holding company called "Cartera Central": this is 
in conjunction with another shareholder "Construcciones and 
Contratas SA", which owns 51%. Recently the KIO has drawn up 
plans to sell its 48.8% share of the 10.3% joint shares it 
participates in at the Banco Central. It will sell all the shares 
to its joint investor, "Construcciones and Contratas SA", for 
$ 362.4 million, and will also divest itself of its own singly 
owned 2.1% share of the equity in Banco Central to the same firm. 
The intention is to finance the investments of the KIO's 
Spanish holding company Torras Hostench SA and to push further 
into the real estate sector, where the KIO already owns a company 
called "Prima Immobiliariasa", which is already involved in many 
ambitious projects in Madrid and the rest of the country. All 
these moves followed a request by the Bank of Spain that the KIO 
should reduce its involvement in the banking sector: its only 
bank shares are now the 1% it owns of Banco Santander. This 
completes the picture of the broad base of Kuwaiti investment 
abroad before we look at the case of BP. 
The KIO built up a 21.9% stake in BP by investing 
£ 900 million when the shares were offered to the public (41). 
This act saved the British government much embarrassment, because 
the BP shares were not going well at all and were proving very 
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difficult to get rid of. When British shareholders became 
suspicious that Kuwait would exert too much influence over 
company policy in favour of itself and other OPEC countries, the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) was called in. The MMC 
ordered the KIO to cut its stake to 9.9% because its 21.9% stake 
was against public interest. The Arab British Chamber of Commerce 
called the measure "draconian'' and cited it as a proof of British 
protectionist attitudes (42). Some people inside Kuwait such as 
the economist Jassar Al-Sa'adam said that the steps taken by the 
British government put into question the wisdom of investing the 
state's reserves in oil companies, rather than diversifying away 
from the oil sector (43) . On the British and Kuwaiti sides there 
is great embarrassment, and the Kuwaiti Oil Minister, Sheikh 
Al-Khalifa Al-Sabah has been criticised in and out of cabinet for 
the unwise moves that he himself orchestrated. As a result, a 
three man committee has been set up by the Ministry of Finance to 
assess future investment policy. 
In the final section of this chapter the reader will observe 
investments as part of the national budget, but suffice it to say 
here that there is $ 80 billion of Kuwaiti money (public and 
private)_ gaining value abroad (~4J . In the early 1980s ~his money 
was generating more income than Kuwait's oil. Although this way 
of making money is contrary to Muslim law, Kuwait continues to 
profit by it. 
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3.9 Summary. 
Kuwait is politically a very stable country with very little 
record of civil unrest, which is surprising considering the high 
proportion of non-Kuwaiti nationals in the 
population. 
Table 3.4 
Population % of Expatriate Labour 
(million) Population force 
(thousand) 
1. 84 60% 670 
I. 
1. 84 million 
% of Expatrates 
in labour force 
81% 
Source: Economist International Unit 1988 Survey. 
There is a heavy dependence on workers from the Indian 
sub-continent which may have a detrimental effect in the future. 
The great source of hope for Kuwait is the more active role women 
are playing in business, and, according to Mr. Blackley of the 
Co~nercial Section at the British Embassy in Kuwait, they are 
"the great hope of the future" (45). 
The oil and government sectors together contribute 67.2% of 
Kuwait's GOP, which is evidence of the reliance on one industry 
upheld by a massive public administration. The GOP as a whole 
has risen over the past couple of years after an unsuccessful 
period in the early 1980s. 
- 90 -
Table 3.5 
Sectoral Contribution to GOP 
1.0% 
11.1% 
Oil and Mining 
Construction 
38.0% 
3.1% 
Agriculture 
Manufacturing 
Trade and Hotels 7.8% Finance and Insurance 4.4% 
Transport and Communications 5.4% Govt. and others 29.2% 
Source: EIU Economic Report 1988-89. 
Table 3.6 
Total GOP ($ million) and GOP Per Capita ($) 
Y~ar 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
-----------1--------l--------l--------l--------l--------l--------
Total 21,579 21,045 21,558 19,3<10 17,258 18,835 
Per Capita 14,386 13,490 13,145 11,511 9,696 10,236 
Growth Ratel 
(Nominal) -13. 9~ -2.5%--1 +2.4% -8-,7% -15.6% 
Source: EIU Economic Report 1987-88. 
GOP looks set to improve in the next few years after the present 
programme of reorganisation. 
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Kuwait's account surplus decreased to its lowest level for 
at least ten years to$ 4,414 million in 1987 (latest figures 
available) (46). This was because of a much smaller increase in 
exports than had been expected, coupled with a sharp decline in 
investment income. Both these factors negated the positive 
effects of a decline of $ 534 million in imports. 
Table 3.7 
External Balance ($ million) 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
-------------------1----------------------------------------
Trade Balance 4,584 5,603 4,712 1,910 3,546 
Exports 11,173 12,156 10,374 7,123 8,315 
Imports (6,889) (6,553) (5,662) (5,303) (4,769) 
Balance on Services! 703 770 103 3,428 868 
Services 2,254 2,148 1,676 4,694 2,128 
Private Transfers (865) (963) (1, 044) (1, 084) (1, 102) 
Official Transfers (686) (415) (529) (182) (158) 
Source: EIU Economic Report 1987-88. 
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The key to understanding Kuwait's economy is the 
government's financial policy. Revenue from government owned oil 
fields accounted for more than 90% of total revenues between 
1970-1983, so it can quite clearly be seen that government 
expenditure is always connected to oil income. 
There are three categories of government spending: 
1) Current -wages and salaries to government employees. 
2) 
3) 
Development 
Investments. 
Other a) 
Capital formation in the form of Industrial 
Contribution to the Reserve Fund for Future 
Generations (RFFG) 
b) Direct Transfer of wealth to native Kuwaitis. 
c) Direct Transfer to foreign governments and 
organisations. 
As for income from government investments abroad, it is not 
included in the fiscal budget, but is accounted for separately as 
a flow of income adding to the already existing stock of reserves 
in the "Reserve Fund for Future Generations" (RFFG) . This means 
the official government revenues are always underrated, but 
government expenditure is overrated by the amount of the transfer 
to the RFFG. Simply stated, reported surpluses are 
under-estimated and reported deficits are over-estimated. 
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Table 3.8 
Public Finances ($ million) 
1982/83 1983/4 1984/5 1985/6 1986/7 1987/8 1988/9 
Government 
Revenues 9,039 10,893 9,100 8,006 6,055 8, 118 7,247 
Government 
Expenditure 11,283 10,375 10,625 10,603 10,006 10,115 11,350 
Surplus 
(Deficit) (2, 24 4) 518 (1, 525) (2, 597) (3, 951) (1, 997) (4, 103) 
Source: EIU Economic Report 1988-89 
The budgeting policy of the government artificially boosts 
or reduces government spending when oil revenues rise or fall. 
The government has seen its role as ensuring income distribution 
rather than encouraging growth and development. It fosters false 
worries to divert some of the attention from the dependence on 
oil so that peoples' questioning minds are mis-directed. 
The early 1980s witnessed the vulnerability of Kuwait's 
economic growth, as oil revenues continued to decline. Much 
government money was spent on things which should have been left 
to the private sector, such as construction and agricultural 
projects. Three major reasons have led to a decline in government 
expenditure which led to a slow down in the whole economy: 
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1) The country is close to saturation level in infrastructure. 
2) A decline in oil revenues. 
3) Government policy of directing increased subsidies to 
Kuwaitis involved in small industrial projects which will 
flower in the near future. 
In the present period of restructuring and reorganising the 
governme?nt should apply fiscal and direct control po.l icif's. On 
the lst April 1989, an airport tax of KD 2 was introduced for 
every person leaving Kuwait: although this is a minor tax 
accepted by the people because of the insignificant dent it puts 
in their finances, it may be the first step in the process of 
fnrming a responsible fiscal system to ensure Kuwait's economic 
survival and growth. 
- 95 -
Notes. 
1. Sco.rcc, ''The Evolving Culture of Kuwu.it''. Page 21. 
2. Ibid. Page 22. Also 
Khouja and Sadler, "The Economy of Kuwait.". Page 17. 
3. op.cit.. "Khouja and Sadler". Page 27-29. 
4. C.C. Cooke, "Kuwait.: Miracle in the Desert". Page 15. 
5. op.cit. Khouja and Sadler, 
"The Evolution of the Welfare State". pp 31-35. 
6. Middle East Economic Digest (MEED). 30/1/89. 
7. Interview with Dr. S~m~ Khal~l, Professor and Chairman, 
Economics Department Kuwait Unversity. 27/3/89. 
8. op.cit. Khouja and Sadler. Page 37. 
9. Economist Intelligence Unit., 
"Kuwait Country Profile 1988-89". pp 5-6. 
10. Middle East Economic Digest. 30/1/89. 
"Kuwait A Model for Development". Page 23. 
11. Economist Intelligence Unit, 
"Kuwait Country Profile 1988-89". Page 57. 
12. Dr. S.M. Al-Sab~h, "Kuwait: Anatomy of a Crisis". Page 5. 
13. Middle East Economic Digest.. 22/1/88. 
"Kuwait : Special Report". Page 21-34. 
14. Investor's Chronicle, 28th October - 3rd November 1988, 
"Cracking Opec's Cartel". 
15. op.cit. Dr. S.M. Al-Sabah. Pages 7 & 12. 
and lvJiddle East Economic Digest, 19/12 I 85. 
Pages 152-153. 
- 96 -
16. Economist Intelligence Unit, 
"Kuwait Country Profile 1988-89". Page 24. 
17. op.cit. Khouja and Sadler. Page 77-80. 
18. Ibid. Page 71. 
19. Ibid. Page 70. 
20. Ibid. Page 82. 
21. Ibid. Page 72. 
22. Ibid. Page 83. 
23. "Kuwait Digest" October/December 1988. 
Vol. 10 No.10. Page 4. 
24. Economist Intelligence Unit, 
"Kuwait : Country Profile 1988-9". pp 15-21. 
25. Ibid. 
26. "Kuwait Digest" April/June 1988. Vol.16 No. 2. 
pp 2-7 "Kuwait Petroleum International Ltd.". 
27. Economist Intelligence Unit. 
"Kuwait : Country Profile 1988-89". Page 12. 
28. Middle East Economic Digest. 22/4/88. Special Report. 
pp 21-34. 
29. Economist Intelligence Unit, 
"I<:uwait : Country Profile". 1986-1989. 
30. "The Economic Report, 1987". The Central Bank 
of Kuwait. Page 79. 
31. Middle East Economic Digest. 9/9/89. "Weak Oil Prices". 
32. Ibid. 
33. op.cit. "The Economic Report 1987". Page 77. 
34. Middle East Economic Digest. 22/4/88, 
"Kuwait : A Model for Development". Page 21-34. 
- 97 -
35. "Journal of Arab Affairs", Summer/Autumn 1988. 
Statement by the Honourable 'Umar N~r Al-D~n, 
Minister of Finance and Economic Planning in Sudan, 
Governor of the Bank of Sudan. 
Statement on behalf of the Arab Central Bank Governors 
at the Joint Annual Discussion of the IMF and World Bank, 
Berlin. September 1988. 
36. op.cit. Dr. S.M. Al-Sabah. Page 37. 
37. Ibid. Page 38-44. 
38. op.cit. "The Economic Report 1987". pp 75-81. 
39. Kuwait Digest. April/June 1988. 
"KIA- Diversified in Every Way". Page 21. 
40. Middle East Economic Digest. 2/12/88. 
"KIO Consolidates European Holdings" 
41. Middle East Economic Digest. 5/8/88. 
"Trouble Ahead at BP". Page 27. 
42. OPEC Bulletin. November/December 1988. 
Page 62. 
43. Economist Intelligence Unit. 
Economic Report No.4 1988. Page 6. 
44. Ibid. Page 9. 
45. Interview with t"lr. Blackley. Commercial Section of the 
British Embassy in Kuwait.12/4/89. 
46. op.cit. "The Economic Report 1987". pp 54-61. 
- 98 -
CHAPTER 4 
The Kuwaiti Financial System. 
4.1 The Role of the Central Bank. 
4.2 Control of the Domestic 8conomy hy the Central Bank. 
4. 3 The CoHuneLclal Banks of Kuwait. 
4.4 The Specialised Banks of Kuwait. 
4.5 The Investment Companies. 
4.6 The Money Changers. 
4.7 The KFH in the Kuwaiti Financial System. 
Notes. 
- 99 -
4.1 The Role of the Central Bank. 
Under the jurisdiction of the Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK) 
are four groups of financial institutions:-
i) the commercial banks, 
ii) the specialised banks, 
iii) the investment companies, and 
iv) the money changers. 
All groups have a part to play guided by the CBK, which was 
founded in 1968. 
The CBK is owned by the government and acts as iLs banker, 
all government profits being handled by it. Its main functions 
are the issuing of currency and legal tender money, the forming 
of credit and monetary policies and the supervision of all 
banking in Kuwait. Only in 1979 did it become a lender of the 
last resort to the commercial banks, becoming totally a 
government tool. The role of agent for the government precludes 
dealing with-any private customers, as it remains a regulating 
bank. 
On the assets side, CBK foreign assets have fallen quite 
dramatically since September 1978 (1) . At that point foreign 
assets were worth KD 1,201.9 million, but the figure had been 
reduced to KD 476.9 million by November 1988 (2) . The major 
reduction in foreign assets has been in "Investments and Deposits 
in foreign currencies", the September 1987 figure being KD 960.3 
million, whereas by November 1988 this had been more than halved 
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to KD 415.8 million. This drop in foreign a~~et~ was because the 
Central Bank went ahead with its borrowing scheme, despite the 
fact that government revenues had increased and spending 
decreased. This meant that there were plenty of spare Kuwaiti 
Dinars, therefore the Ministry of Finance cut back its deposits 
of foreign currency with the Central Bank - deposits which would 
otherwise have been converted into Dinars to help pay government 
expenses. 
This decline in foreign assets has been offset by the 
Central Bank local bonds in Kuwaiti Dinars and public debt 
instruments, which will be discussed shortly as one of the ways 
that Lhe CBK controls liquidity in Kuwait. However, as remarked 
before, loans in the local market and deposits with local banks 
were reduced, which has left the total assets (and therefore 
liabilities) of the CBK 25% down, if we compare the figures for 
the 30th June 1987 and the 30th June 1988 (3). This is also 
because of the withdrawal of Ministry of Finance credit 
facilities worth KD 200 million in 1987. 
On the liabilities side the 25% decrease is due to two major 
changes. Firstly, in the financial year 1986/87, the bank was 
liable for an amount which represented the face value of 
outstanding bills issued by itself and purchased by the local 
banks, however in th~ financial year 1987/88 the bank ceased 
issuing these bills (4). The second major change was that at June 
1988 there were no deposits from local banks at the Central Bank, 
whereas the year before there had been KD 537 million (5) . In 
1987 the Central Bank had, deposited in local banks, KD 469 
million, and so was a net taker of deposits, whereas in 1968, it 
was a net depositor having only KD 97 million in local banks. 
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As banker to the government, the CBK managed 
KD 1,097,612,627 worth of public funds and in contra accounts, 
against KD 626,414,105 for 1986/87 (6) Also with regards to the 
government, the CBK issued certain public debt investments 
totalling KD 2,327,510,000 on behalf of the government, of which 
KD 1,394,510,000 was still outstanding at June 30th 1988 (7). 
4.2 Control of the Domestic Economy by the Central Bank. 
During the last few years the Central Bank has exerted 
intensive efforts to enhance domestic economic activity and to 
restore stability to the banking system. This has been by dint of 
several procedures such as the "Difficult Credit Facilities 
Settlement Programme" (DCFSP), the issuance of public debt 
instruments on behalf of the Ministry of Finance and the amending 
of the discount and interest rates in the banking system. Added 
to this were the CBK's efforts to regulate liquidity levels and 
to maintain a stable exchange rate and money supply. 
The ''DCFSP" was announced on lOth August 1986 to tackle the 
problem of non-performing loans left after the S!:::.q al-Manakh 
crisis. Up till the first half of 1988, the Kuwaiti banks were 
able to implement the settlement of most of their difficult 
credit facilities. The fact that it was possible for 1,007 out of 
1,083 settlements, already delivered to debtors, to be 
authenticated at the Ministry of Justice, is proof of the success 
of the "DCFSP''. It has made both debtors and banks face reality 
after the madness of the early 1980s; the boards of directors of 
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the banks have been cleared out because of the regulation that no 
bankrupt person can be the director of a bank, 
directorship has breathed new life into the system (8). 
and new 
The debt burden will ttffect bank profitability for years to 
come, just 
investments 
as it will ~ffect the grandiose, unreasonable 
undertaken by the old boards of directors (9). The 
completion of the "DCFSP" in December 1987 improved confidence in 
many loans made by the banks, but there is still a long way to go 
before confidence is fully restored. 
During 1987/88 the Central Bank began to issue public debt 
instruments after an absence of some time. Law Decree No.SO of 
1987 authorised the government, within a period of not more than 
ten years, to have a public loan with a value not exceeding 
KD 1,400 million (10), by issuing treasury bills and bonds, or by 
direct borrowing from financial institutions. They went through 
with this plan, even though it was clear that oil revenues would 
cut the overall deficit. 
The purpose of the issuance of these instruments was to 
exercise some control over open market operations, and influence 
interest rates in order to maintain stability in the money 
markets. The publTc debt instruments--were to have maturit-ies of -
between three months and several years in order to help structure 
interest rates. 
These instruments provided the banking and financial 
institutions, listed at the beginning of this chapter, with new 
guaranteed investment outlets in order to develop the money and 
capital markets in the country. The local financial institutions 
were provided with good financial instruments, giving reasonable 
yields, which helped them diversify the uses to which they put 
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their financial resources and improve the quality of these 
resources. This aim was successfully fulfilled, witnessed by the 
extent of secondary market activity in treasury bills among local 
banks. 
By June 1988 the CBK had offered sixteen issues of public 
debt instruments, totalling KD 2,327.51 million, and the balance 
of public debt instruments totalled KD 1,394.51 million. The 
success story must be tempered by the realisation that when 
announcing the over-subscription of treasury bills in 1988, the 
Central Bank omitted to point out the fact that it had flooded 
the market with liquidity before every issue, being so keen for a 
successful subscription. 
As for domestic bond issues, which had been resumed in 1987 
after a break of nearly four years, they were curtailed in 
October of that year to make way for the Central Bank issues. 
Recently at the end of 1988 the National Bank of Kuwait, the most 
successful of all the banks, was allowed to lead-manage a 
KD 10 million three year bond flotation for the Kuwait Real 
Estate Bank, one of the specialised banks. 
In 1976 the Central Bank was empowered to fix the maximum 
rate of interest--subject to approval by the Minister of-Finance. 
The Central Bank sets a discount rate for Dinar transactions on 
which the rates of lending and depositing are based. In the past 
few years interest rates have been kept low , in order to help 
the banks and the business community recover and stabilise. As 
the discount rate was reduced in 1987 from 5.5% to 5%, this had 
the effect of reducing the cost of funds obtained by local banks, 
and thereby reducing the cost of financing domestic productive 
economic activities. The balance of discount operations grew 36% 
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from November 1987 to June 1988, from KD 259 million to KD 351 
million ( 11) . 
However this created problems, as international interest 
rates climbed in 1988, so huge sums were deposited in Dollar 
accounts abroad in one month deposits. In September 1988 when the 
Dollar firmed, it was taking less Kuwaiti Dinar to buy back the 
Dollars, and so investors picked up 2% on the buy-back exchange 
differential, which is one of the reasons why there was the fall 
in the CBK's foreign assets pinpointed above. In the commercial 
banks, foreign currency deposits soared to KD 1.2 billion, almost 
doubling, while other deposits fell considerably: in fact it was 
said that some commercial banks were actually refusing large 
Kuwaiti Dinar deposits. 
On the 11th December 1988 the discount rate WQS rnisP.rl ~o 
7.5% in order to balance the system. This affected the lending 
and deposit rates thus, because of the law introduced in 1976: 
Lending Rate for 1 year or less = discount rate + 2% = 9.5% 
Lending Rate for more than 1 year discount rate + 2.5% = 10% 
Deposit Rate for 1 month to 90 days = discount rate = 7.5% 
Deposit Rate for 9L_to __ 180 days = discount rate + 0.5% = B%_ 
Deposit Rate for more than 180 days = discount rate + 1% = 8.5% (12) . 
The increase was in order to restore the credibility of Dinar 
deposits, but it caused uproar in the banking sector because of 
the outstanding debt, but the government and the Central Bank 
feel the need to compete in the international market. 
As for consumer loans extended in Kuwaiti Dinar to finance 
the purchase of consumer and durable goods, the Central Bank 
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decided, as from 15th November 1987, that this should have a 
maximum limit of 6%, provided that the loan maturity is not more 
than four years. This maximum limit has remained stable in order 
to activate trading activity and encourage growth. 
The Central Bank has made great efforts to regulate 
liquidity in the banking system, mainly by use of treasury bills 
and bonds. Before 1987 the government saw no need to finance 
expenditure by such methods (because of the surplus oil 
revenues), which meant that the Central Bank had no influence 
over liquidity levels. Now, with the public debt instrument 
system instituted, the CBK has almost withdrawn its 1973 
invitation to commercial banks to hold favourable interest rate 
deposits with it. 
At the time of writing the last CBK Annual report available 
was that for the financial year 1987/88 (13) 1 which showed 
evidence that from June 1987 to December 1987 the CBK was a net 
KD borrower from the banking system, in order to absorb a 
liquidity surplus. However from then until June 1988, the CBK 
became a net lender to local banks in order to provide them with 
sufficient liquidity. This was because the balance of discount 
operations at The-- CBK grew by KD 92 million, - Hhereas CBK bills-
and deposits with local banks decreased by KD 152 million. 
Furthermore, the balance of local banks' holding of CBK bills and 
their deposits with the CBK diminished to KD 710 million, while 
their balances with the CBK decreased by KD 69 million. All this 
reflects the CBK interest in supporting liquidity in the banking 
system. 
From the above passages it can be ascertained that the CBK 
has sought to meet the requirements of domestic economic 
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activity, whilst retaining stability in the banking system. It 
has also managed to regulate the financial system regarding the 
rules for regulating the management of third party portfolios, in 
order to introduce a more responsible system, totally answerable 
to the government. It is always looking to improve efficiency by 
new controls in order to restore stability to the financial 
institutions of Kuwait. 
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4.3 The Corrunercial Banks of Kuwait. 
In Kuwait there are seven corrunercial banks. All are wholly 
Kuwaiti owned as foreign banks are not allowed to operate in the 
country. 
Table 4.1 
The Commercial Banks of Kuwait 
Name Year of !No. of Branches 
Incorporation. I in Kuwait. 
-------------------------------+---------------+---------------
The National Bank of Kuwait. 195/ 48 
The Corrunercial Bank of Kuwait. 1960 35 
The Gulf Bank. 1960 31 
Al-Ahli Bank of Kuwait. 1967 17 
The Bank of Kuwait and the 
Middle East. 1961 19 
The Burg~n Bank. 1966 12 
The Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait. I 1977 
Source: CBK 1987 Economic Report. 
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At the end of 1987 (the last year financial figures were 
available on an overall scale), the aggregate balance sheet of 
the commercial banks realised an increase of 6.3%, to bring it up 
to KD 9,894 million (14). There was a major growth in assets as a 
result of the claims of commercial banks on residents , which 
showed marked growth. For the financial year 1987/88 these 
claims grew by 14.2% to KD 6,257 million, whereas the year before 
they had only grown by 6.8%. The major part of this, roughly 60%, 
was concentrated in the form of the public debt instruments 
discussed above, and land acquisition bonds, while the remaining 
40% of the claims we~e in the private sector. The claims on the 
private sector were attributed to an increase of 9.7% of credit 
facilities offered to the industrial and real estate sectors, 
financial institutions and for personal facilities. For example 
the credit facilities extended to the industrial sector rose by 
31.9% (15). 
There were also increases in their financing of Kuwaiti 
imports, and local investments in bonds and shares. In 1987 there 
was also an increase in foreign assets, which the CBK has tried 
to reverse by increasing interest rates as noticed above. On t~e 
liabilities side, the growth in the--balance--shee~ was -represented 
by an increase in sight deposits, quasi-money and shareholders' 
equity, even though government deposits fell. 
In 1987 Kuwait's commercial banks turned the corner towards 
recovery after the S~q al-Manakh crisis. All of them were able to 
reward shareholders with dividends ranging from 8% to 22%, 
whereas the year before only the NBK had managed this feat. 
Questions remain about the quality of all the banks' assets 
and the level of their reserves. The "DCFSP" has restored 
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confidence after its completion in December 1987, hut it _is 
generally assumed that more provisioning will be ner0ssary. 
Reserves of some of the banks still fall below the Central Bank 
requirements, so these will have to be made up from future 
profits, putting a drag on dividends. 
The National Bank of Kuwait is the oldest of all of Uw 
banks, and is generally regarded as the most successful. lt is 
the leader in personal banking services with thP highest numbPr 
of branches in Kuwait. Its confidence is well noticed in its bond 
issues of 1987 and 1988. In 1987, before the Central Bank bonds 
came to prominence, the NBI< lead-managed a KD 30 milU on bond 
i .SSIIP fnr thP World Bank (l 6), and then in 1988 they were the 
first Ku~~iti b~nk tn le~rl-m~na<JP ~nnther hond issue after the 
' '' .LU.Ll. on by "- --'-- ·--- 1 \....-t:!liLLOJ.. n-. ..... 1~ UO!Jh 1/Jha.t is 
remarkable is, that in a survej• in the ma<Jazine "The BankPr:-" in 
March 1984, the NBK was pinpointed as the only one of the Kuwaiti 
banks not heavily underpinned by govermk:nt support. Its pr:-r:>fits 
in 1987 remained ahead of its rivals, with net profit only 
slightly less than that of all its rivals put together. 
Next in the order of merit for- personal banking is the Bank 
of Kuwa i_t_ and t-.he ~1i dd l e Rast. (RKME), which originated out of tho 
old British Bank of the Middle East; 57% of its shares (KD 29. 8 
million) ( 17) are owned by the government. The share of the 
government in the NBK is only 1%, which makes its success all the 
more remarkable. 
The Burg~n and Commercial Banks, being two of the less 
successful ones, completed structural reviews in 1987, when the 
Burg~n Bank was the only one to record a fall in performance. It 
appointed a new chairman and a new Managing Director, whose 
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influence has yet to be seen. The CornmP.rcial Bank, however, 
reappointed their manager, trying to restore confidence in him. 
In early 1989 the Gulf Bank of Kuwait (GBK) appointed a new 
chairman and managing director for its board of directors; he is 
Dr. 'Abd Al-'Aziz Sultan Al-'Isa, one of the owners of the 
prominent local consulting engineering partnerships, the Kuwait 
Engineers Office (KEO) . His new bank increased profits by 9% in 
1988 to KD 7.7 million, and so was able to reward shareholders 
with total dividends of 12% (split between 5% cash and 7% bonus 
issue) . Total assets have only increased a little as has the 
bank's loan portfolio, indicating steady, rather than spectacular 
growth (18). 
The fj na l one of the commercial banks whose record v1ill be 
highlighted here is Al-Ahli Bank of KuwJit. This is because it is 
the only bank to have reported a decline in profits since the 
"DCFSP''. This reflects the view of the Central Bank that it is 
time to wean the commercial banks away from their protection. The 
fall in profits of Al-Ahl! Bank, from KD 5.09 million in 1987 to 
KD 4.28 million in 1988, has necessitated a considerable change 
in top management and heavy investments in new technology, as it 
was falling behind all the other banks. 
Maybe we could see Al-Ahli Bank falling out of the market 
altogether in what many people see as an overbanked local arena. 
Surely as the Central Bank retracts its over-protective hand, 
which coddles the commercial banks at present, there will be some 
casualties, but the system as a whole will become stronger and 
more self-dependent. 
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Table IJ.2 
The Gulf Bank (All figures in KD million). 
Year 1986 1987 1988 
---------------------+------------+------------+------------i 
Net Profit IJ.36 
Cash Dividend % 
Bonus Issue % 9.00 
Loans 98ti.44 
Total Assets 1,811.08 
Deposits 1,647.69 
Shareholders' Equity! 160.81 
Return on Assets % 0.24 
R.eturn on Eqlli.ty % 2.71 
Equity/Assets % 8.88 
7.06 
11.00 
913.80 
1 0 ') 0 1 c. 
.L 1 U..JU. _LJ 
1,637.11 
192.04 
0.38 
3.68 
10.45 
Source: GBK Annual Reports 1986-1988. 
- 112 -
7.70 
5.00 
7.00 
930.55 
1 Pa7 <a 
.L IV.../' •.....;-" 
1,700.50 
196.89 
0.41 
3.91 
10.38 
4.4 The Specialised Banks of Kuwait. 
There are three so-called specialised banks in Kuwait: 
Table 4.3 
The Specialised Banks of Kuwait. 
Name Year of No. of Branches 
Incorporation in Kuwait 
-------------------------------+-----------·--··--+------------------
Savings and Credit Bank. 1960 2 
Kuwait Real Estate Bank. 1973 4 
Industrial Bank of Kuwait. 1974 
Source: The Economic Report, CBK 1987. 
These banks have been incorporated in order to finance 
certain sectors of the economy, as is evident from their names. 
They concentrate most of their investments overseas: for example 
in 1987 foreign assets totalled KD 242.3 million (11.8% of total 
assets), and domestic investments totalled KD 89.4 million (4.3% 
of total assets) . They specialise in offering credit facilities 
to local residents and in 1987 this service accounted for 65.7% 
of all assets, a 5% increase from 1986. 
During the last few years it has become clear that 
specialised banks have depended mainly on their own funds (in the 
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form of shareholder's equity) to enhance their financial 
positions and to secure wide safety margins against the risks of 
investment. At the end of 1987 shareholder's equity represented 
50.8% of total liabilities, a rise oE 10% since 1982. This leaves 
the specialised banks very inflexible and ponderous, but they are 
nevertheless very resilient and have not suffered in the past few 
years as much as the commercial banks. 
4.5 The Investment Companies. 
In the last chapter, three independent investment comp-1nies 
were highlighted as the major ones next to the governmellL owned 
Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) . In the full list published by 
the Central Bank in 1988, there were twenty-two investment 
companies subject to the supervision of the CBK. The first was 
the Kuwait Investment Company, established in 1961, and the 
latest, Al-Mub~rakia, was founded in 1987. The mid 1970s saw a 
great growth in the number of these companies, as thirteen were 
incorporated in that era of overflowing cash surpluses. Only in 
January 1987 did the Minister of Finance pass a decision 
regulating Central Bank supervision over these companies, whereas 
before they had only been subject to certain articles in the 
third chapter of law No. 32 of 1968 concerning "currency, the 
Central Bank of Kuwait and the organisation of banking business, 
as per decisions issued by the Minister of Finance" (19). 
The 1987 decision required a special register for the 
investment companies at the Central Bank, and the CBK board of 
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directors was empowered to set the regulations to be observed by 
the companies. They were particularly worried about 
credit-worthiness and maintenance of a ratio of own funds to the 
company's financial obligations towards a third party. Since 1987 
the CBK has supervised the companies' ability to face risks on 
extended loans and the value of their investment portfolios, as 
well as setting rules for the bonds to be issued in favour of the 
investment companies. There are also stipulations over lending 
limits, and a central bureau has been set up to monitor all the 
activities of the investment companies. At last they have been 
brought under central control as the CBK seeks to monitor the 
development of the Kuwaiti economy more closely than ever. 
Again the proportion of foreign assets in the aggregate 
balance sheet of the investment companies is vF>ry high, 
representing more than half the total assets. They had been in 
decline since 1982, but in 1987 they saw the first increase in 
their aggregate balance sheet for 6 years. During that period the 
issue of KD bonds witnessed great activity, while foreign 
resources decreased. However the main thing to note is how much 
these investment companies base themselves on KD investments in 
customer portfolios;- KD- investment-s accounted for _ 99. 2__% of all 
portfolios, indicating a tangible shift to investment in KD, 
which can only go to help the local economy. 
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4.6 The Money Changers. 
Money changing activities are the last financial activity 
under CBK control, because of their importance in effecting the 
cash flows into, and out of, Kuwait. The CBK needs to obtain 
information on the volume of foreign transfers transacted by 
these money changing companies. These companies also need to be 
kept in check to make sure they do not practise the business of 
banks. 
In 1987 the aggregate balance sheet of money changing 
companies was KD 78 mill~on, showing that they are by far the 
smallest group of financial institutions under CBK supervision. 
The thirty-nine companies so far registered have a smalJ but 
significant part to play in regulating the Kuwaiti economy (20). 
4.7 The KHF in the Kuwaiti Financial System. 
Wi-th- the Centra-l Bank now- taking mor.e control_ o'L~r the 
official Kuwaiti stock market, the tightening up of the economy, 
managed by the Ministry of Finance under the guise of the CBK, 
looks to be developing very well. Certainly since 1984 there have 
been great leaps forward in overall supervision. 
In March 1989 there was much rumour that Mr. J. Al-Khar~fi, 
the Minister of Finance, would take a well earned rest, in order 
to devote himself to his considerable business interests. His 
post was expected to be taken by Mr. Salem 'Abd Al-Aziz Al-Sab~h, 
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who held the post of Central Rank governor. His place in the 
Central Bank was taken by another member of the Al-Sabah family 
(20), Mr. Ahmed Al-Sab~h, who was governor of the Burg~n Bank. 
As in the political system, the financial system is now 
under very tight state-control, as a reaction to the laxity of 
the early 1980s. In the political system there should maybe be 
more flexibility, but in the financial system this central 
control is what was called for. One can only hope that the 
concentration of financial muscle in the hands of the governing 
family will not lead to abuse of the power entailed. 
In 1978, when the Kuwait Finance House became the first 
Islamic financial institution in Kuwait, times were easier for 
the coU11Lry'::; financieLS. Now, i:-1 \·:hi:lt is clearly "lfl overbanked 
market, customers and funds are thac much to 
Although the KFH draws devout Muslims to its ranks, it also needs 
to draw the people less intent on adhering to the letter of the 
Shari' a. This can only be done by securing better profits and 
higher profit-shares for its customers. 
The KFH is an 'all-purpose' bank which has many different 
hats to wear. As the only Islamic financier in Kuwait, it has to 
compete against two set::; of regulated financiers: it has to 
compete against the comrncrcial banks in their specialised fields, 
and with the investment companies in managing investments and 
investment port folios ( 22) . 
However, where the KFH has an advantage over all its rivals, 
is in that it is a participant in direct trade, not as a 
supplement to its banking and investment activities, but as an 
inherent part of the philosophy it has adopted as the core of 
Islamic banking. 
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The new responsibilities that the CBK has assumed, means 
keeping a close watch on interest rates, balancing the needs of 
depositors and deposit takers. The discount rate may rise and 
fall, and the KFH is at its mercy without being in any way lir1ked 
to it. The flouse is in competition with the other banks and must 
therefore offer attractive profit sharing rates. If interest 
rates depended on the profitability of the country, that would 
mean that the KFH's fortunes would consequently rise or fall at 
roughly the same rate as the conventional banks. However the 
decision on interest rates is taken not so that they react to the 
country's profitability, but so that they presage it - interest 
rates are no longer re-active but pro-active. This has grave 
consequences for the KFH, which has freedom to compete only 
within the jurisdiction of thP Shari'a inside a society where it 
is rPgulated for but not nurtured. 
The fixing of interest rates may cripple the commercial 
banks and the fin~ncial system, as many Muslim economists say it 
already has done in the West. In this case the KFH would survive 
as a detached but shining beacon. For the present, however, it 
must try to compete, which curtails the effort to plan for the 
lon<J-tenn bec2use of the need [or short-term profits. 
The government supports the KFH and has nominal control over 
its policies, but the crux of the matter is whether its role 
should be to cushion the KFH (as the only Islamic financial 
institution under its wing) against the vagaries of the Kuwaiti 
economic system, so that the KFH works in a flattering vacuum, 
untouched by the fortunes of the 'secular' banks, or should the 
KFH be left to fend for itself? 
The reality is that the House must now adapt itself to a 
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post S~q al-Man~kh Kuwait, where banks are rno.ce closely moniton?d 
and accountability is the word on everyone's lips. The caution 
that this attitude engenders is dangerous for a pioneering unit 
such as the KFH, because it needs to be brave and therefore begs 
for tolerance in a society that: is pr:epared to let its financial 
institutions suffer, so that they either go under or emerg~ 
stronger. 
In the system described above the KFf-l will have to Eight for 
customers and also for a respectable rise in profits within the 
ever harsher Kuwaiti climate, while keeping in mind that the 
Shari'a is the most important part of its survival kit. 
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5.1 Accounts and Services Offered by the Kuwait Finance House. 
Just like any other bank servicing the needs of private 
customers, the Kuwait Finance House has to attract customers by 
offering them a safe place to keep their money, where they can 
always retrieve it or where they can leave it to grow. 
Consequently the Kuwait Finance House offers different deposit 
accounts to its customers according to their needs. 
The current account service is where a customer deposits his 
money and expects it to be one hundred per cent liquid. The 
amount represents an interest free loan (Qard Hassan) from the 
client to the KFH. The current account money can be invested by 
the KFH if the client authorises it, but he/she will not be 
liable for any loss. There is an age limit on this account - the 
depositor must be at least twenty-one years of age and he/she is 
not allowed to be overdrawn at any time. In reality this account 
works very much the same as in any corrunercial bank as far as the 
customer is concerned. 
Then come the investment accounts which are conducted on a 
Mudaraba basis, where the client is the Rabb al-Mal and the KFH 
is the Mud~rib, so all profits are shared. In meetings at the 
bank it was explained that, on the whole, with investment 
accounts, the KFH takes 20% of the profit while the client takes 
80%; they claim this is a much fairer deal than the commercial 
banks, where it is normal for the client to gain only 10% of the 
profit which the bank has made with his money. Of course the 
share of profits depends on the type of account chosen, the 
duration of the account and the amount invested (1). 
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In an "Investment and non-investment savings accounL" the 
client, aged eighteen or over, pays in the money and is 
issued with a savings accounl book to show the movement and 
balance of the account. This service i~ the most important source 
of funds to the KFH, because it is very liquid but still makes d 
reasonable profit (2) The profit is calculated on the lowest 
balance for each month - it is normal for 60% of this account to 
be invested, but if the client stipulates that he/she does not 
give the authority for the Bank to invest the money, the Bank 
is bound to obey. As seen in Table 5. 1, this sort of account 
attracted more than half of all KFH deposits in 1988. 
The general consensus about the above two sets of deposits, 
and especially the current accounts, is that a bonus is allowed 
to the depositor as a carrot dangled in front of him/her, but 
this practice may not be repeated regularly as then it equates to 
a secured return. 
Next are the accounts which yield profit (or loss). and 
these are known as the "investment deposits". The fixed time 
investment~ deposits are where a depositor leaves his money with 
the bank for a period of not less than one year. They are 
renewable at the client's request, but if a renewal is not 
demanded then the deposit is cancelled, and the amount is put in 
a suspense account in favour of the client. The minimum is 
decided by the management, but can be held to be no less than 
KD 500, and no amount can be added to, or withdrawn from the 
account before its maturity; but of course, another similar 
account can be opened at any time (3) . 
The unlimited time investments work much as the fixed time 
investments apart from the fact that they yield a slightly higher 
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rate of return (see later), and they are automatically renewed at 
the end of every year. To cancel the continuation process three 
months notice must be given. 
On top of these it is pnssihJe to open accounts in the 
currency of West Germany(DM), the U.S.A.($), the U.K. (Sterling), 
Japan (J. Yen) and Saudi Arabia (S. Riyal) . Fixed time deposits can 
be a short as three months. 
The 1988 total of KD 918,990,366 repL·esenLs 15% of the 
Kuwaiti deposit market (4) - a very good share for a bank which 
started only ten years ago. It is important to note the one blank 
space in the table on the next page, when limited period 
investment accounts were discontinued because they had p~oved the 
least attractive of the accounts; however they were restarted 
because of customer demand. 
Ocher important obse.1:vations are that the total deposits 
have risen every year except 1984, when even the KFH was affected 
by the S~q Al-Manakh crisis, when ready cash was needed by 
customers. However in 1985 the KFH recovered more quickly than 
most banks and has continued its maturing process. It attracts a 
lot of customers who were wary of putting their money in interest 
bearing banks, but still a lot of people keep accounts with the 
KFH and also with one of the commercial banks. 
In 1988 over 50% of all deposits were in investment and 
non-investment saving accounts, showing that this remains the most 
popular way of deploying money on a casual basis for the normal 
customer: the account is simply the most flexible, and 
flexibility is a characteristic which appeals to every client of 
any bank. 
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Table 5.1 
Current and Investment Accounts 
(AJ l r~mo1mt.s in KD mill ion) 
Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Current Accounts 79.61 69.11 123.41 133.41 107.81 143.31 
Investment and Non-1 
Investment Saving 
Accounts 332.81 383.11 411.21 428.81 493.31 503 
Investment Accounts! 
(Limited Period) 4. 4 I 1. 11 0. 11 0. 11 6.51 
Investment Accounts! 
(Unlimited Period) I 281.11 257.61 189.71 196.51 239.41 266.21 
TOTAL 697.81 641.91 724.41 758.81 840.51 919 
Source: KFH Annual Reports, 1983-1987. 
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When dealing with the House's investments it will be noted 
approximately how much of each deposit account is invested and 
how much is kept liquid, but here the overaLl liquidity held by 
the KFH will be highlighted. Liquid funds arc held for 
precautionary purposes and yield very little or no return at all. 
Most commercial banks keep a 20-30% liquidity, but Islamic banks 
require an even higher liquidity, because they do not have the 
o~Lion of l1oldiny easily movable money in an interbank market 
such as trusts for commercial banks. In fact the KFH holds enough 
cash reserves to cover more than its current account 
liabilities IS). The fact that there is no Islamic capital market 
to depend on means that the KFH must show great caution in 
liquidity to investment ratios. Lately the Islamic Development 
Bank has formed its own special deposit funds for Islamic banks, 
which might be the crystal around which will form a complete 
Islamic inter-bank market. 
In this section it has been shown how the Kuwait Finance 
House carries out its account services, and it is very noticeable 
that the KFH likes to forge ahead by facilitating the life of the 
customer in this field. There is an easy system of cheques, 
although, because this is the Middle East, a lot of people still 
prefer cash, as use of a cheque incurs a charge. Standing orders 
function as they do in a conventional bank, as does the Automatic 
Teller Machine (ATM) system. The newest addition to the services 
offered is the Visa Card (6). 
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5.2 The Visa Card at the KFH. 
The KFH Visa card is called "Al-Tamwil" card which means 
literally "The Financing ca.rd". It works much like any ordinary 
Visa card except that the KFH does not charge interest on late 
payments and limits are set according 
accountability of the customer. 
to the financial 
Below is a comparison of the application forms for the Visa 
Al-Tamwil card and the Visa Barclaycard in Britain {7) {8). In the 
area of "Personal Details" the KFH needs to be mor:e vigilant 
because of the varying nationalities that are resident in Kuwait, 
theretore it asks tor nationality, passport number, ID number and 
the nw1~er of years of residence. In both cases details are 
required about the applicant's work and how much he/she is paid, 
but the KFH includes a section for the person to outline his/her 
"Educational Qualifications." This is evidence of the high value 
that Kuwait puts on education, and of the fact that the standard 
of education of a person is considered directly relevant to 
his/her dependability. The British application form is less 
specific in terms of annual income but more so in terms of 
"[.lonthly ExpencliLure", because in the British system most people 
have a mortgage to pay, which often reveals the financial state 
of a person. Both application forms ask for all bank details but 
the main difference here is that for an "Al-Tamwil" card the 
applicant must have a bank account at the KFH. The differences 
are minor but significant, as is the fact that on the KFH 
application form a large space is left for "Remarks {Properties, 
Reputation and Branch Manager Reccomendation) ."This is proof 
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that the gaining of credit in an Islamic bank is much more 
severely regulated than at a normal commercial bank. 
The terms and conditions of use are basically the same, with 
both organisations issuing the usual disclaimers, but the KFH 
puts great stress in section eight that "Deposits, goods, all 
accounts and any amounts related to the card holder in the House 
(KFH) are considered mortgaged as a security for payment of due 
amounts against him for any reason." 
In addition the KFH outlines the charges the card holder 
will have to pay in Kuwaiti Dinars: 
"A - Joining fees, paid one time on accepting the application. 
B - The card holder subscription fees paid one time every year 
when specified by the House. 
c 
D 
Expenses and amounts resulting from use of the card 
including any telegraphs, telexes, telephone calls or the 
like. 
Expenses and charges incurred in requesting the card 
holder to settle his account." 
From the department dealing with the card, figures on how 
many customers had obtained cards and how much they used their 
cards were impossible to obtain, as they were understandably very 
secretive. The only way one can judge the success of the 
Al-Tamwil card is by asking the customers, who on the whole 
seemed pleased to have an internationally useable instrument such 
as the Visa card. With enthusiasm from the customers it is very 
difficult to see how this new instrument of the KFH can fail. 
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5.3 The Credit Department. 
The Credit Department is a department in the House which 
functions on many different levels and has to coordinate many 
activities. For purposes of investment the credit department 
issues letters of credit for Murabaha investment, but here we are 
looking at the credit department as a way of replacing the loan 
system operated by the established commercial banks, which base 
themselves and their business on interest. 
There are four services offered in what is termed the 
Department of Documentary Credits. Firstly the ordinary cash 
documentary credits, secondly Mur~baha sales, thirdly documentary 
bills for collection and finally the the issuing of letters of 
guarantee. Each one of these will be described, and the whole 
system will be evaluated after the reader is familiar with the 
internal machinery. 
5.4 Cash Documentary Credits. 
The KFH provides the opportunity for cash documentary 
credits coupled with the receiving and delivering of imported 
goods. Below are the stages of a cash documentary credit deal, 
where the important factor is that the House shares 
responsibility for the goods with the client who desires these 
goods. 
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Stage 
1: The client approaches the bank for a credit facility. 
2: The credit department decides on the credit limit of the 
client. 
3: Client applies for a letter of credit (L/C). 
4: The House reviews the client's credit facilities and his/her 
L/C application. 
5: 1/C sent to foreign bank which notifies the supplier of the 
intended goods. 
6: The goods are covered by Marine insurance. 
7: Before transportation the client's requested amendments are 
carried out if the seller agrees. 
8: The goods are transported to Kuwait. 
9: The documents are received by the KFH and are all given 
serial numbers. 
10: The client is notified of the arrival of both the goods and 
the documents. 
11: Delivery of the documents to the client and deduction of the 
value of the goods from his/her current account (9). 
The Kuwait Finance House, typically, takes on a lot of the 
responsibility for the transaction as agent, guarantor and 
initial provider of funds for the transaction. For its role as 
agent the KFH charges a 0.5% commission on the value of the 
documentary credit. However, as guarantor of the importer to the 
seller's bank, no charge is taken. Neither is there any charge 
for providing a free loan (Qard Hassan) to pay the supplier's 
bank: a loan which is only paid back when the client has 
appropriated both the goods and the documents for those goods. 
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5.5 Murabaha Sales. 
This next section deals with the Murabaha sales which are 
split into two sorts; external and internal. The extPrn~l 
Murabaha sales involve importation from abroad, whereas internal 
Murabaha sales involve goods in the local market. In an e:-:Ler.n<d 
sale the client informs the KFH of the goods he/she warrLs lu 
purchase and agrees with the KFH on the profit it will charge 
when the goods are sold to the client. Each stage of the 
transaction will be shown in the same way as with the cash 
documentary credits. 
Stage 
1: The client approaches the bank for a credit facility. 
2: The credit department decides on the credit limit. 
3: The customer specifies the goods he wants to buy. 
4: The KFH reviews the specification and prices of the goods. 
5: Review of client's credit facilities. 
6: Approval of importation of goods. 
7: L/C opened in favour of the beneficiary. 
8: Goods insured against transport risk. 
9: Receipt of shipping documents for the 1/C. 
10: L/C value determined by the KFH. 
11: Signing of sales contract with client and settlement of 
value by means of cheques. 
12: Delivery of documents to the customer coupled with 
authorisation from the KFH. 
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The mark-up profit charged by the KFH is agreed upon when the 
goods are sold to the client even though the subject will have 
been broached before. 
In order to ensure payment, the KFH took advice and gained a 
Fatwa from their own Shari'a committee to the effect that, 
because they had to compete with other banks they could extract 
from the client a legally binding promise to take the goods after 
the KFH had received them. This compulsion is allowed now but in 
a perfect Islamic system it would not be necessary: maybe it is 
very hard to justify under Islamic law, but it is a practical and 
pragmatic step. 
If the goods required are on the local market, the KFH makes 
its own study considering the economic feasibility and the social 
benefils ln purchct::;lng the goods. The KFH buys the goods, and the 
client then buys them from the House, paying on a Murabaha basis 
on pre-arranged terms, either in installments or a lump sum on a 
set date ( 10) . 
In an interview with Mr. W. Qat~mi, assistant manager in the 
credit department of the KFH, it was explained that the Murabaha 
deals discussed above did not compare very well with the services 
offered by commercial banks in 1988, because interest rates for 
loans fell to as low as 6%. However these Murabaha deals are the 
mainstay of the credit department and exhibit the necessary 
attributes of social responsibility necessary in an Islamic 
system. 
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5.6 Documentary Bills for Collection. 
The next section describes a very simple service offered by 
the KFH whereby it acts as an intermediary. The process is as 
follows ( 11) 
Stage 
1: The KFH receives the documentary bills and shows them to the 
importer. 
2: The importer either accepts or refuses to receive the bills. 
3: The KFH informs the overseas supplier of the importer's 
decision. 
4: If the importer accepts the bills he/she pays their value 
either at once or by installments. 
5: The KFH receives the sum from the importer and transfers it 
to the supplier's bank. 
6: The KFH charges a service fee to cover the expenses incurred. 
There are no complications in this area where the KFH is 
facilitating international trade in a very smooth fashion. 
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5.7 Letters of Guarantee. 
The KFH can issue letters of guarantee for its clients and 
either blocks the client~s account with the value of the 
guarantee, or witholds collateral to cover the value of the 
guarantee. In a book of Fat~w~ (legal decisions) published by the 
KFH there is one question tabled asking whether the taking of a 
fee is permissible for a letter of guarantee? The universal 
decision is no; but the Fatwa says; 
"I know of no Faqih (learned man) who allows the taking of a 
fee for guarantee, but if the customer entrusts the bank to take 
charge of his interests , a charge is permissible either relative 
or settled." (12) In reality the KFH charges a service charge on 
all letters of guarantee, which is in no way dependent on the 
value of that letter. 
5.8 Aims of the Department of Documentary Credits (13). 
The Kuwait Finance House hopes to build a team in the credit 
department with the necessary attributes of "durability, 
diligence, commitj{ment to work and the capacity to satisfy 
customers.'' By using to the full the newly installed computer the 
department is ever looking abroad (as are all agents in the 
Kuwaiti economy) for expansion. The goal is to expand exports and 
trade between Islamic countries, 
international banking sector 
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and to cooperate with the 
to increase the network of 
correspondents abroad. They are concentrating especially on those 
countries which import from the EEC, and in this they are 
determined to link up with the Jeddah based Islamic Development 
Bank (IDB) . 
In all this they realise that they form essentially a 
service department which offers a personal service to the client, 
and therefore must be flexible enough to cater for individual 
needs and requests. It is of vital importance that people stay in 
this department for a long time in comparison with their 
colleagues in other departments, because so much of the dealing 
is on a personal basis. This leads an employee to feeling that 
his work in the department represents an obstacle to the 
promotion, that would be offered to him if he worked for the same 
amount of time in another department. There is a lack of 
incentive schemes for employees of the credit department which 
leads to disillusionment: this must change. 
5.9 Volume of Transactions Handled by the Credit Department. 
It is very difficult to find figures on the actual amounts 
handled, but it is possible to make general assumptions from the 
amount of "Letters of credit, acceptances and guarantees on 
behalf of customers" which are the unsettled transactions of the 
credit department. 
- 136 -
Table 5.2 
Growth or Decline of Letters of Credit, acceptances and 
guarantees on behalf of customers. (All amounts in KD). 
Year Amount Percentage Difference 
From Previous Year 
---------l-----------------1-----------------------------
1983 35,902,160 +22% 
1984 26,918,164 -33% 
1985 27 f 6771 181 + 3% 
1986 25,117,364 -10% 
1987 28,732,516 +14% 
1988 33,508, 170 +16% 
The two years of decreasing Letters of Credit (1984 and 
1986) are mirrored in the annual reports by the slackening 
business in deposits which the bank noticed in the same years, as 
people affected by the poor economic state of the country had 
very few funds to disburse. 
Table 5.3 
Growth or Decrease in Deposits From Previous Year. 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
+47% 
-17% 
+13% 
+ 4% 
+11% 
+ 9% 
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1984 was a poor year for the whole of the Kuwaiti economy, 
and it is evident from the above two tables that the KFH is still 
recovering. As the House grew, deposit growth was expected to 
slacken off as a natural result of maturity, but not in such a 
dramatic fashion as is given evidence of above (14). 
5.10 The Future of The Credit Department. 
In the interview with Mr. Qat~mi it became clear that he was 
of the opinion that the optimum way for the credit department to 
function would be on a Musharaka basis as opposed to a Murabaha 
one. This would require the bank to take more risk, which it is 
often reluctant to do. In fact Mr. Qat~mi was put in charge of 
studying the possibility for Musharaka deals in the credit 
department, and he was recently in Egypt to study such deals 
already carried out there by Islamic banks. He attended a seminar 
on the subject and saw the workings of many deals. 
He indicated that the credit department had considered four 
Mush~raka deals, but that these had been discounted for different 
reasons, and one was still being considered. Firstly one person 
had come with the idea of importing marble for a building project 
the deal was tempting because the company was very good in its 
field and the project promised a good profit margin. However, the 
company had a lot of bad debts and could not be trusted enough, 
so eventually a Murabaha deal was decided on. The other three 
projects involved the import of cars; one of which failed because 
the proposed partner of the bank adjusted the prices in order to 
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avoid customer tax, so he was considered too dishonest to deal 
with. In the second case the potential business partner was out 
of the country when he had arranged a meeting with the board of 
directors to d.Lscuss the deal; this was considered as Cl 
discourtesy and proof of unreliability, so the deal was dropped. 
The fourth plan is still pending a decision at the time of 
writing , so no details about it could be given out. 
Musharaka represents the sharing of responsibilities which 
is the crux of Islamic economics, but it is a very risky way of 
dealing, requiring the bank to be on a solid base before it takes 
on such risk. Mr. Qat~mi agreed that no deal can be riskless, but 
there needed to be more ways of insuring against loss in Islamic 
banking before it could fulfill its ideals. More interaction 
between the Islamic banks and close cooperation in monitoring 
customers would help to solve the problem, but in reality it is a 
matter of confidence; each partner in a Musharaka deal must have 
confidence in his co-partner and confidence in the project - it 
can be seen as a business marriage. 
There are weaknesses in the credit department, the main one 
being that there is no way of financing small personal loans for 
which a customer must go to a commercial bank at present. 
It was strange to note that at the KFH the credit department 
finds it very difficult to give short term extra finance to cover 
the early teething problems of any venture. This is a weakness 
which must be dealt with if there is to be any progress. However, 
to be positive the credit department works strictly within 
Islamic morals, refusing to deal in any un-Islamic items which do 
not benefit society, such as alcohol and cigarettes. Just over 
half the Letters of Credit are for foodstuffs: an essential for 
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life, therefore a very fitting commodity for an Islamic 
institution to deal in. In the highly organised credit 
department, with more innovation and trust, it will be possible 
to ensure the success of Islamic banking. 
5.11 Foreign Dealing. 
The KFH seeks to offer to customers an international service 
and in 1983 (15) reported one hundred and forty-eight 
correspondent banks covering most of the globe. In addition the 
Foreign Transfers section in the banking hall provides clients 
with exchange and transfer facilities. It issues and accepts 
foreign transfers in most major currencies, purchases and sells 
foreign currency notes and travellers cheques drawn on 
international banks. In this it works like a normal bank. 
There is also a dealing room where the KFH provides foreign 
currencies to cover their transactions, and it also deals with 
buying and selling foreign currencies in the local and 
international markets. All these latter deals are carried out on 
spot basis according to Islamic law. 
One experiment which was tried in 1981 was the provision of 
exchange facilities on the Hajj. The execution was left to Mr. 
Zuhair B:!:_b~, who was at that time the branch manager in 
Fahahil (16). He had decided to go on Hajj, so the management 
encouraged him to open offices in Mecca and Med:!:_na, at the 
appropriate times, for customers of the KFH. He was issued with 
SR 1,000,000 and a letter which gave him the authority to draw 
- 140 -
money from the Al-Rajhi bank in Saudi Arabia. The service offered 
was advertised and an office was taken in the medical centre, 
because the venture was only semi-official. It was a badly 
organised affair with all the pressure being placed on the 
shoulders of one person, who had to carry great stocks of cash 
with him. This awkward arrangement was never repeated because it 
was deemed too difficult and impractical to form a permanent 
reliable service on Hajj. However, this is proof of how the KFH 
is always looking to extend its customer services. 
Finally, in 1988, the KFH began to offer the possibility of 
opening accounts in five foreign currencies: namely the U.S. 
Dollar, the sterling Pound, the Deutsch Mark, the Japanese Yen 
and the Saudi Riyal. Deposits and withdrawals are to be made by 
means of cheques or bank drafts or are conducted in KD. Being a 
relatively new service, the figures are not included in the 
current accounts, so no exact figures can be given. 
5.12 Summary. 
"80% of our job here [at the KFH] is the same as any other 
financial trust." (17) 
This applies especially to the banking section which is 
split into the seven administrations of: 
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a) The Banking Hall. 
b) Documentary Letters of Credit. 
c) Financial Controls. 
d) Foreign Exchange. 
e) Credit. 
f) Computer Services. 
g) Branches. 
This organisation has been very successful in instilling 
confidence in the depositors, so that in this area it is bigger 
than the Burg~n Bank and the Bank of Kuwait and the Middle East. 
It has attracted many people who would not have used banks at all 
before the rise of this Islamic institution, as it provides them 
with all the facilities of a bank, but they need have no qualms 
about dealing with a riba-based institution. 
As its computer network spreads the Kuwait Finance House 
will become more efficient by being able to offer all its 
services at each branch. The branches now cover every area of 
Kuwait, and Mr. Zuhair B~b~, when interviewed, 
were no immediate plans to build any more. 
said that there 
The faults in the credit department have been underlined 
above, but the major one is that there is very little use made of 
the Musharaka instrument. One can only hope that the teething 
problems in this field will be overcome, but this will take great 
courage and innovation from the top management. In this area 
there are certainly lessons to be learnt from the Western Venture 
Capital Industry (See Chapters 2 and 9) . The Banking section will 
continue to grow in strength, if the KFH does not become 
complacent because of its success. 
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16) op.cit. Interview with Mr. Z. Bibu. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The Real Estate Sector of the KFH. 
6.1 Introduction. 
6.2 The Real Estate Department. 
6.3 The Real Estate Projects Department. 
6.4 The "Al-Muthanna"· Residential and Commercial Complex. 
6.5 The Head Office. 
6.6 The Outlook for Construction in Kuwait. 
6.7 The Real Estate Management and Maintenance Department. 
6.8 The Real Estate Portfolios. 
6.9 The Future of the RED at the KFH. 
Notes. 
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6.1 Introduction. 
Now having dealt with the way in which KFH offers services 
to its customers, it is necessary to see how the House makes best 
use of its money to ensure high return. In this chapter the Real 
Estate sector will be examined, and in a subsequent chapter the 
trade and investment sectors will be dealt with. 
The KFH realised early the potential in the real estate 
market, and in the annual report of 1979 it was noted: "The 
period 1975-1978 witnessed an increased demand on housing and 
that demand was unduly matched by short supply ... " ( 1) . The 
vacuum had been spotted and the House realised a potential growth 
area because of the ''private sector's reluctance to continue 
investment in real-estates, especially in the first half of 1979, 
when the licences and gross space licensed dwindled against the 
same period of the previous year."(2) 
At this stage construction in progress only amounted to 
KD 571,410 (3) 1 but this figure was to rise rapidly to 
KD 51,140,663 in 1985 (4) • In 1979 construction in progress 
accounted for 0.75% of total assets, but in 1985 this figure had 
risen to 6% showing how important the KFH considered real estate. 
In the last annual report the figure was down to 2%, as there has 
been a slow down in the real estate boom of the early 1980s. This 
is an indication of the fact that the House is putting less 
reliance on this sector than before, although it continues to 
have heavy commitments. 
In the 1980 annual report, when covering its investments, 
the major subject discussed is real estate, as the House 
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advertised that it was beginning to widen its interests by 
getting involved in the buying of large estates to divide into 
parcels for sale purposes. The next year the reader of the annual 
report notes that the KFH has entered the field of construction 
whole-heartedly, and that after the construction, the management 
and rental of the new buildings was undertaken (5) 0 
In 1989 the Real Estate Division was spli.t into three 
different areas which depend on each other. Firstly there is the 
"Real Estate Department", which deals with the evaluation, 
purchasing and selling of land: next is the "Projects management" 
division, which copes wit.h the bu.i l ding from pre-planning to the 
completed article; u.r.d finally there is the "Management and 
~1aintenance Department", whi<..:h tak.e::> ca..ce uf lects.i.ny ctrH.i upkeep 
ot all properties. There is a natural progression and overlap 
between all three sections which will become clear below (6) 
6.2 The Real Estate Department. 
This department is described as the "mother" (7) department, 
as i.t gives rise to the necessity for the other departments. Its 
primary jobs are to purchase land for resale and for construction 
purposes, and to provide real estate for the maintenance and 
management division. The area involved ranges from real estate 
plots, to office buildings, to appartment blocks and to large 
land plots yet to be upgraded and specified by the government(8) o 
For customers with ready liquidity, real estate can be sold 
for cash, but for those that lack liquidity it is possible for 
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the customer to pay a downpayment of 20% - 30% of the purchase 
price, and the rest can be made up in installments. This is the 
normal "Bai' Al-Ajal" arrangement or "deferred payment" (9). 
There is also provision for sale by Mur~baha, where the 
customer desires some real estate that the KFH does not own. 
After studying the market worth, the House will buy the real 
estate in order to resell it to the customer if he/she still 
chooses to buy it. Payment may be made in cash or in 
installments. The aim in such dealings is to provide people with 
the opporunity to acquire land or real estate according to their 
own desires; because the KFH is such a big dealer, the prices it 
offers will naturally be very competitive. 
The competition is very strong in this field as all banks 
give credit loans, with the Real Estate Bank offering the best 
deal in terms of interest rate and experience in the field. There 
is also a company called the International Financial Advisors 
(IFA), which has an overall balance sheet of KD 410,000. They 
build to the customer's specifications and are able to get loans 
at an interest rate as low as 6 %, which enables them to sell the 
completed article for a percentage profit (10) . 
Competition has led to the necessity for participation 
deals, where the KFH Real Estate Department participates with 
local companies or individuals. The share in participation 
ventures varies from deal to deal, and at completion the Real 
Estate Department is usually given the job of selling the real 
estate. 
In the accounts the income directly related to the Real 
Estate Department is impossible to calculate exactly. Income from 
this department and the Real Estate Projects Department have 
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never been given separately but were included under the heading, 
"Net income from property, conunercial and construction 
operations." In the 1988 report the issue has been further 
obscured by giving the income "from the banking, property, 
conunercial and contruction operations", whereas before "Income 
from banking operations" was a separate figure(l1). This state of 
affairs is very confusing and is evidence of a mild covering over 
of the tracks, but for what reason it is not totally clear. 
The one figure which can be judged is that for "Trading 
Investments in Property", which accounts for all the real estate 
held by the KFH at the end of the year. The main problem here is 
that until 1983 this figure included real estate held outside 
Kuwait, but in 1984 the auditors decided to include the latter 
asset under "Other Investments", which led to a great discrepancy 
in the figures. However, in the next year, 1985, real estate held 
outside Kuwait was re-instated in "Trading Investments in 
Property". Now the "Trading Investments in Property" components 
have been settled since 1985. If in the 1984 report this settled 
set of components had been specified, it would have shown that 
the value of the KFH real estate assets were KD 450,871,917 , 
which is the highest total so far achieved. Since then the 
overall value has fallen because of the S~q al-Man~kh crash and 
depreciation, to the 1988 total of KD 389,219,525. "Commercial 
Investments and Stores" have always been the largest single item, 
but it was particularly noticeable that in 1988 "Land and 
Buildings" (meaning divided flats and buildings) took a larger 
share of the total; 28% in 1988 as compared to 21% in 1987. This 
is an area in which the KFH is consolidating, rather than 
ambitiously expanding after the euphoria of the early growth. 
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6.3 The Real Estate Projects Department (RPD). 
The Real Estate Projects Department (RPD) is where the KFH 
has concentrated its investment in the early part of its life. 
The RPD can undertake a construction right through from 
pre-planning to completion, supervising feasibility studies, 
design and execution of projects. It has the skills to develop 
both commercial and residential buildings in order to "introduce 
various opportunities for growth and development .... to serve 
their clients.''(12) The project can be left totally in the RPD's 
hands and is only handed over after the power has been connected, 
and the free-maintenance period has been determined. 
The total cost of the project is calculated (including 
design, execution, supervision and management) and agreed upon 
with the client, who may be the KFH itself; then the profit 
margin of the RPD is decided on. Below, the progress of the 
department will be followed and two projects will be singled out: 
the commercial and residential complex "Al-Muthanna" and the new 
Head Office of the House. These two were chosen because of their 
sheer size, and the ease with which it is able to follow every 
step until the successful outcome. 
Already in 1979 the RPD was participating in ten investment 
and commercial projects, while it was still learning the trade, 
and it was not until 1981 that a full service was offered. In 
this year the fixed assets of the House rose by about 1400% as 
KD 3,978,000 worth of freehold land was acquired for development 
purposes, and the worth of construction in progress continued to 
r i s e to KD 1, 6 3 1 , 1 6 0 ( 1 3 ) . 
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The next three years till 1985 were years of tremendous 
growth, with a decision being taken in 1982 to build residential 
complexes in Jabriya (14) 
and other parts of the country. Work 
proceeded on twenty-seven investment buildings at a worth of 
KD 9 million, but as the price of land was declining there 
was also a move into residential investment. All this took place 
in Kuwait, but in 1984 we have the first mention of a 
construction investment outside Kuwait, as a deal was concluded 
with the Bahrain Islamic Investment Company to build a 
residential complex in the diplomatic area of Bahrain for around 
KD 7 million (15) . In that year the RPD started tendering out its 
services to help manage and finance projects for others, because 
it had gained the experience. The 1984 figure for construction in 
progress was a massive KD 37,881,669 including storage space and 
showrooms at Farwaniya to be used by the House's trade sector. 
The S~q al-Manakh crisis brought no halt to the expansion of 
the department; in 1985 five new sites and buildings were chosen 
for commercial buildings, while eight buildings and complexes for 
Kuwait and elsewhere came to the design stage. Success bred 
success, as two new KFH branches were completed at Shiab (16) and 
Sal_miyah (17), and th-ree more were under construction. 
In 1986 all the commercial buildings were completed and 
handed over to the Real Estate Management and Maintenance 
Department (See next section), four more branches were completed, 
and the Al-Safwa supermarket was opened for the Trading 
Department (18) . In addition a total of twenty-five more 
investment buildings were planned for construction in 1987 for a 
cost of KD9,750,930. These were heady days for the RPD, but it is 
at this point that things started to slow down because of the 
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dearth of commercial development. 
The years 1986 and 1987 saw the start of the cooperation 
with the Supreme Housing council in order to help solve the 
Kuwaiti housing problem ( 19) . This policy fits in very well with 
the social responsibilities of the RPD as part of an Islamic 
Institution, which is supposed to foster economic and social 
equity. The RPD was contracted to build two hundred houses in the 
Al-Qurain project, according to government specification (20) . 
In the affluent society that Kuwait had become, personal 
freedom had gained more importance and the old family values, 
although still intact, were changing (21). A private house was 
now a necessit.y for married youngsters, and the counL.Ly wcts well 
enougl1 enuowed Lu cuutply with their desires. In 1987 more 
cooperation with the Public Housing Authority was envisaged, and 
although the 1988 figure for construction work in progress was 
only KD 26,890,586 (22) (well below the halcyon days of the early 
1980s), a bigger percentage of this was concentrated on 
residential investment rather than commerical. 
6.4 The "Al-Muthanna" Residential and Commercial Complex. 
Any Kuwaiti, when asked about the KFH, will immediately 
mention the "Al-Muthanna" Residential and Commercial complex on 
the corner of Fahd al-Salim and Hilali Streets. It is situated in 
a very prominent position in the town centre about half a mile 
from the main banking area near the Meridien Hotel. The bottom 
two layers are for shops and even a branch of the KFH, while the 
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upper floors are very desirable city-centre af!/artments. 
The plan to build the "Al-Muthanna" complex was mentioned in 
1979 when the intention was announced to invite international 
tenders to bid for the project in 1980. Work started in November 
1981 after the site had been prepared and a construction contract 
awarded for KD 24.7 million. Up until this time, and for the next 
year, the value of the complex was listed as part of "Investment 
and other assets'', but after 1983 it was considered a big enough 
project by itself to figure in the assets accounts on its own. 
The structure was completed a few months behind schedule but 
opened in 1985 with a final value of KD 29,241,306(23); an amount 
which has depreciated slightly to KD 28,223,276 in 1988(24). The 
deal is that the KFH takes all the profit for forty years, and 
then the complex is handed over to the government. By this time 
the KFH will have profited greatly from its initial investment. 
This, as explained by Mr. Zuhair 'Abd al-Rahim Bibu (25) is "a 
sort of Musharaka deal with the government, as both sides take 
the responsibility for profit or loss. 
The KFH can be seen as taking a more entrepreneurial role 
than the government, as it was the House that organised the 
attracting of business to let the space in "Al-Muthanna". The 
sort of shops they attracted were catering for a highly 
sophisticated, westernised clientele, with the main 
bookshop/newsagent "The Kuwait Bookshops Co. Ltd." being a slick 
American type of organisation. "Al-Muthanna Electronics Centre" 
is a spin-off of the trade department of the KFH, and fits in 
very well with the brightly lit state-of-the-art interior 
design. 
One of the biggest coups for the complex was the decision by 
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the Fr~ench chai11 sLDce "Prisunic" to open d stocc~ on the 
Mezzdnlne floor of Lhe building. Prisunic was chosen because of 
the high standard of its own brand of children's clothing which 
is of gceat importance in Kuwait (26). The advertising for 
"Al-Muthanna" and for Prisunic in particular has assured the 
success of the whole operation. 
Table 6. 1 
Value of the KFH Investment in "Al-Muthanna". 
Year Value (KD rnllllon) 
----------------1-----------------------
1980 0.24 
1981 3.77 
1982 6.82 
1983 11.87 
1984 24.56 
1985 2 9. 24 
1986 2 9. 16 
1987 28.90 
1988 28.22 
Source: The Annual Reports, 1980-1988. 
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6.5 The Head Office. 
Situated on Abdallah al-Mub~rak St, the KFH head office is a 
monument of Islamic architecture, highly acclaimed all over the 
world. It is an impressive modern building that harnesses 
centuries old designs, reflecting the way that the House plans to 
breathe new life into old theories in its financial activities. 
Construction was started in 1983 and the building was ready 
for the KFH staff to move into in mid-1986. As a freehold 
property it is listed under Fixed Assets or "Property, Plant and 
Equipment'', and at the time of writing represents KD 13.7 million 
of a fixed a~sets total of KD 18.4 million, that is 74%. 
All other freehold properties, such as branches of the House 
are depreciated over 7-20 years, but the Head Office is 
depreciated over 30 years, because it is such a highly acclaimed 
building. The KFH had great foresight in building such an 
impressive structure and their investment will certainly pay off. 
6.6 The Outlook for Construction in Kuwait. 
The competition in Kuwait in the field of real state 
projects is quite intense, with five major companies holding most 
of the power. The RPD has now declined to take these "big 5" 
head-on, and is preferring to further promote its healthy links 
with the government and with its house building programme. Mr. 
Yusuf 'Abdallah Al-Hatim (27) stressed that there were no big 
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projects planned for the near future, but the overall strategy 
was to make inroads abroad. 
Expansion into the Gulf is a distinct possibility, but plans 
for working outside the Gulf area are merely being mooted at the 
moment. The problem is lack of knowledge of the market, but once 
that obstacle is overcome there is no reason why the RPD, with 
its hard-earned expertise, cannot export its skill and ability to 
bring to fruition successful investments in many areas of the 
world. 
6.7 The Real Estate Management and Maintenance Department. 
The Real Estate Management and Maintenance Department 
(REMMD) carries out three basic jobs. 
a) Preparation of contracts for leasing, management, 
supervision and maintenance of all real estate of the KFH 
and other clients. 
b) Receipt of all complexes and buildings and undertaking of 
all aspects of their management, maintenance and 
supervision. 
c) Management and maintenance of real estate of clients against 
service fees. 
The management side is responsible for lease contracts and rent 
collecting, recommending changes where it sees necessary. The 
maintenance side takes care of plumbing systems, electrical 
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faults, ensuring the efficiency of the mechanics of a building 
while keeping an eye on the security and safety systems presPnt. 
Both sides have a wide network of offices, and the whole 
organisation seemed very competent in aiming to please the 
customer. 
The first mention of any business to do with the REMMD comes 
in the annual report of 1983, where it is stated that the KFH 
leases one hundred and twenty buildings at what it stresses are 
reasonable rates, and they point to a 33% rise in net rental 
income from 1982: this is in fact erroneous information as the 
rise was actually from KD 2,311,810 to KD 4,092,959 which 
represents a 77% rise; why this discrepancy should arise is 
unfathomable. In the next year, 1984, it is noted that the REMMD 
has begun to tender its services out to look after buildings 
other than those belonging to the KFH; so it is really from that 
year that the present department began to take its present shape. 
Net rental income (NRI) has risen every year with the 
increase per year now seeming to steady out at between 20% and 
30%. The only time NRI has actually decreased from the previous 
year was in 198S as a knock-on effect of the S~q al-Manakh 
crisis. Even in this year NRI only decreased--half as much as 
Total Income (TI), as the big fall really showed in the real 
estate and investment transactions. 
In 1988 NRI was 17% of TI, a figure which has been rising 
since 1982, because the KFH understands that rental income is 
very secure income and provides a virtually risk-free 
transaction. 
Of course the rental income shows the figures for only part 
of the REMMD because more than half the department's work is the 
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managing and maintenance of other people's property. This field 
in Kuwait is a very competitive one, because the great numbers of 
foreign workers are not allowed to own property, therefore they 
are obliged to rent. As in Britain many Kuwaiti~s buy property 
solely in order to rent it out, but there are three main sources 
of competition. Firstly there is a company called KREMINCO which 
owns sixty buildings and sells its services through different 
companies and ministries; because they only own sixty buildings, 
they can afford to offer five star service. Also in Kuwait there 
exists an institution, dealt with in the Shari'a, which takes 
care of a dead man's remaining property when his family can cope 
no longer; this organisation has d J.ot of buildings in Kuwait 
witlcl1 lL reuL::; out and shares the profit: among the deceased's 
family. Finally there is the Bait Al-Zak~t, which buys property 
to rent in order to teed the protit into the Islamic social 
security system of Zakat. In the last case it is an ironic 
situation, because the KFH pays its Zak~t to the Bait Al-Zakat to 
disburse, therefore it is effectively feeding one of its own 
competitors. 
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Table 6.2 
The Relationship Between Rental Income and Total Income. 
(All amounts in Kuwaiti Dinar Million) 
YeariNet Rental I Total INRI as I Rise (or fall) I Rise (or fall) 1 
IIncome(NRI) IIncome(TI) 1% of Tllof NRI f.rom lof TI from 
!Previous YeariPrevious Year! 
------t-----------t----------t-------t-------------t-------------1-
19781 0.28 0.92 30.5% 
197 91 0.69 4. 67 15.0% +146% +301% 
19801 1. 25 14.54 8.5% + 81% +211% 
19811 1. 92 34.01 5.5% + 53% +134% 
19821 2.31 52.11 4.5% + 21% + 53% 
19831 4.09 42.08 10.0% + 77% - 20% 
19841 4.38 41.35 10.5% + 7% 2% 
19851 3.60 26.69 13.5% - 18% - 35% 
19861 4.62 31.24 15.0% + 28% + 17% 
19871 5.68 35.22 16.0% + 23% + 13% 
19881 7.34 43.30 17.0% + 29% + 23% 
Source:The Annual Reports 1979-1988. 
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6.8 The Real Estate Portfolios. 
In addition to the above services the KFH has issued four 
real estate portfolios, the last being issued in 1988. In the 
1988 Annual report these portfolios were highlighted as one of 
the "new products" that were still in the development process. 
The fact that all four portfolios are fully subscribed by KFH 
customers shows that there is room for expansion in the field. 
The total value of the portfolios is KD 34,375,953 spread 
amongst 4,229 subscribers. Below is a breakdown of how customers 
have subscribed. 
Table 6.3 
Breakdown of Amounts Subscribed to in the Real Estate Portfolios. 
Number of Subscribers Amount of Subscription 
-------------------------1·------------------------------------
30 More than KD 50,000 
325 Between KD 10,000 and KD 50,000 
2,733 Between KD 1,000 and KD 10,000 
1, 137 Less than KD 1,000 
The thirty people with more than KD 50,000 subscribed actually 
own KD 13,429,442 of the shares or 39.2%. THe KFH has itself 
taken a 3.6% overall stake in the portfolios (28). 
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The value of each portfolio was hard to obtain, but from the 
aggregate total it is possible to assume that all the portfolios 
are worth roughly KD 10 million, but in the absence of more 
information it is impossible to say how profitable they are. 
However they must be doing well because the KFH plans to open up 
more such portfolios in the near future. 
6.9 The Future of the RED at the KFH. 
Property is regarded by the House as its safest long term 
asset with a depreciation system which is fairly conservative. 
However they have had to lessen their dependence on real estate 
because of the slump in its prices in the Gulf. The S~q al-Man~kh 
crisis weakened them even further, so that the past four years 
have seen a development away from real estate with more emphasis 
being given to trading. 
Although the KFH always has to justify its operations by 
sharing profits, it can do this whilst showing regard for social 
-values and equity. In-most oC its real estate involvements th-e-
House has been considerate of social values, participating with 
the government to complete all Kuwait's housing developments. 
There is one section of the Real Estate Department which is 
given over totally to researching into new directions in order to 
keep ahead of the field. This research section was responsible 
for seeing the potential market in real estate portfolios, whose 
success has been steady if not dynamic. At the moment studies are 
being carried out on vacant flats, single or double, of which 
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there are said to be about one thousand vacant at the moment; 
these flats would be perfect for redevelopment. Research is also 
carried out as to the composition of people who deal with the KFH 
in real estate matters. It has been established that groups such 
as ambassadors and students are unaware of the services offered 
by the KFH, so they must be singled out for special attention. 
The whole department is looking to widen its clientele and its 
services; it can only be hoped that it does not lose sight of the 
fact that what it is providing is a sort of public service for an 
Islamicising society. 
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1. KFH, Annual Report 1979. Page 27. 
2. Ibid. Page 29. 
3. Ibid. Page 34. 
4. KFH, Annual Report 1985. Page 16. 
5. KFH, Annual Report 1981. Page 12. 
6. See Explanatory Brochure. Printed by the KFH about the Real 
Estate Division. 1988. 
7. Interview with Mr. Yusuf Abdallah Al-H~tim, Head of research 
in the retail division of the KFH. 10/4/89. 
8. In the Real Estate Division the KFH cooperates with the 
government as much as possible, and endeavours to fit in 
with the government's overall plan. 
9. See Explantory Brochure on all the KFH's activities. Printed 
by the KFH, 1984. Page 15. 
10. op.cit. Interview with Mr. Yusuf Abdallah Al-Hatim. 
11. KFH Annual Reports 1987 and 1988. 
12. op.cit. Explanatory Brochure 1984. 
13. KFH, Annual Report 1981. 
14. Kuwait City emanates from the point on the shore where the 
impressive Kuwait Towers now stand. Each sector is bounded 
(in a wave like pattern) by ring roads, which are numbered 
first ring road, second ring road etc., until the sixth ring 
road. Jabriyah lies between the fourth and fith ring roads. 
15. KFH, Annual Report 1984. Page 13. 
16. Third Ring road. 
17. Fifth Ring road. 
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18. In Farwaniyah on the very outskirts of the city very close 
to the airport and near the KFH 
headquarters. 
trading department 
19. op.cit. Interview with Mr. Yusuf Abdallah Al-Hatim. 
20. See Note 8. 
21. Interview with Mrs. Fadia al-Zu'bi- journalist. 1/4/89. 
22. KFH, Annual Report 1988. Page 20. 
23. KFH, Annual Report 1985. 
24. KFH, Annual Report 1988. 
25. Assistant Manager in charge of Human Resources. 
26. Article by Dr. R. Wilson. 
27. See note 7. 
28. Figures quoted in correspondence with Mr. Yusuf 'Abdallah 
al-H~tim, 11/7/89. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The Kuwait Finance House's Investment and Trade Departments. 
7.1 Introduction to the Investment Department. 
7.2 The Turkish Connection. 
7.3 The Search for New Fields for Investment. 
7.4 The Social Responsibility of the Investment Department. 
7.5 The Future of the Investment Department. 
7.6 Introduction to the Trading Department and its Car Sales. 
7.7 Murabaha in the Trading Department. 
7.8 Other Trading Department Services. 
7.9 The Trading Department's Contribution to the KFH body. 
Notes. 
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7.1 Introduction to the Investment Department. 
The Investment department in the Kuwait Finance House often 
quotes as its aims, the aims of everybody involved in investment, 
such as a high return on investments and the forming of new 
channels for investment in the short, medium and long terms. 
However the House also sees itself ,involved in an overall plan to 
encourage investment between Islamic countries and to promote 
Kuwaiti exports on the foreign markets. 
Islamic investment is phrased thus; 
The aim of promoting 
"Surveying the Islamic countries for establishing a network 
of Islamic financial institutions whereby Islamic economic ideas 
can be promoted and ties among Islamic countries and institutions 
can be strengthened."(1) 
This is a practical step as the local investment market is 
now very unrewarding; therefore a move to countries where the 
Kuwaitis have a good understanding of the local culture seems an 
obvious move. The problem is that an investor always desires a 
stable political environment for his investment, which many 
people at the KFH believe is difficult to find in close proximity 
to Kuwait, in the countries where investment was needed, such as 
Iraq or Jordan. 
There is definitely a desire to invest abroad, but the 
alarming lack of cooperation between the financial institutions 
in Kuwait (which still depend on government initiatives in the 
foreign markets) has hampered efforts. In this section all the 
international developments in the investment field will be 
discussed, while sometimes relating their success to the home 
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market in such instruments as investment portfolios. 
The KFH has sought to increase the investment instruments 
available and, in this field, has shown the innovation which is 
necessary for the continuing development in Islamic finance. 
Their participation in many companies of an Islamic nature is 
quite bold, with holdings in affiliated companies outside Kuwait 
ranging from 0.2% to 50% of their capital. 
With the Islamic aims of the House being emphasised by 
phrases such as "the strong desire to establish Islamic banks and 
companies" and "a desire to hold equity participations in 
concerns with Islamic inclinations"(2), the KFH, as the biggest 
of the fifty five Islamic banks, has supported the formation of 
many other Islamic institutions. 
In the form of equity stakes the KFH is presently involved 
in five Islamic banks; the Dubai Islamic Bank, the Bahrain 
Islamic Bank (8.7% share of the capital), the Tadamon Islamic 
Bank of Sudan (5% share of the capital of $20 million), the 
International Islamic Bank in Luxemburg and the Kuwait-Turkish 
Finance House (50% share capital) . The last mentioned institution 
will be discussed later as a special case. The other institutions 
that are participated in are the Bahrain Islamic Investment 
Company, the Islamic Insurance and Re-insurance Company (5% share 
of capital of $50 million), the Islamic International 
Audio-Visual Company (10% of capital) (3) and the Paints and Dyes 
Company ( 10% share in capital of 2 million Egyptian Pounds) ( 4) . 
This is a very varied portfolio but it is necessary to 
mention the failed participations such as that in the Bangladesh 
Islamic Bank in Dekka and the Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan. This 
is a pity especially after the efforts that were needed to 
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persuade the Bangladeshi government to grant a licence for an 
Islamic bank. However, as one official at the KFH explained, it 
is very difficult to carry out what is essentially a financial 
experiment in such an economically traumatised country, whose 
thoughts are on survival rather than innovation. 
In 1984 there was talk of opening an International Islamic 
Bank in Kuwait in conjunction with the Central Bank of Kuwait and 
the Islamic Development Bank. The plan fell through as the market 
was not ready for such a bank. Some people mooted that the KFH, 
while discussing the new venture, discouraged action because this 
would have presented them with Islamic competition in the local 
and foreign markets. This is a dubious explanation for the plan 
not being carried through, because the KFH management realise 
that competition is a good way to encourage growth of ideas (5) . 
They have pinpointed this problem that there is very little 
competition to gain the custom of Kuwait's Islamic investors, but 
the aim of the top management is for the KFH to become so well 
established that its position is unassailable, before any 
competition is introduced. 
A prime mover in many of the Islamic institution 
participations is the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) based in 
Jedda. The IDB was established in 1974 by thirty-seven Islamic 
countries, and the number of member countries has now swelled to 
forty-two. According to its statutes, it was established along 
the same principles declared by the Organisation of Islamic 
Conferences: to promote cooperation and strengthen ties between 
member countries in all aspects of life with special emphasis on 
economic development and financing. This it does by the 
co-financing of projects, trade financing, equity participation, 
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promotion training, research into Islamic banking and by 
encouraging cooperational coordination between Islamic banks. 
It has been a sort of model on which the nascent Islamic 
banks have based themselves, 75% of its assets are in Murabaha 
deals with still a negligible amount in Mudaraba deals. Its 
equity participation, which can be counted as Mudaraba dealings, 
is only 5% and is concentrated in the Islamic financial 
institutions. It assimilates deposits from outside banks 
motivating its depositors for the long term, so that the capital 
is available for participation investment. It is a leader of the 
Islamic banks whose eventual role will be discussed later in this 
study. 
Recently the KFH has had two major investment participations 
involving the IDB. The first was in 1987 when it participated 
with many other Islamic institutions in the IDB trade portfolio 
of $65 million and the second is the recently opened Kuwait 
Turkish Finance House (KTFH) (6), which is a very interesting 
development on the investments side. 
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7.2 The Turkish Connection. 
The names, nationalities and shareholdings of the founder 
members of the KTFH are as follows: 
Table 7.1 
Name of Subscriber Shares Subscribed 
Turkish Lira(Mi1lion) % 
The Kuwait Finance House 7,500 50 
Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi (7) 4,500 30 
The Islamic Development Bank 1,350 9 
The Kuwait Institute For 
Social Security 1,350 9 
Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi (8) 150 1 
Ninety-six Individuals 150 1 
TOTAL 15,000 100 
Source:The Articles of Corporation of the KTFH. 
F~om the above table it can be seen that 59% of the original 
share subscription is taken by Kuwaiti institutions, 31% by 
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Turkish institutions, 9% by a Saudi institution and 1% by 
individuals. All the six contributors above are represented on 
the board of directors which includes three Turks and four from 
the Gulf. The two KFH representatives on the board are Mr. Ahmed 
Bazi' Al-Yasin (Chairman of the board of directors, KFH) and Mr. 
Adnan Al-Bahar (General Manager, KFH). 
The general manager of the KTFH is Mr. Fehmi. Akin, who was, 
until recently, manager of the Feisal Financial Institution, a 
subsidiary of the Geneva based Dar al-Mal al-Islami headed by 
Prince Feisal of Saudi Arabia. Mr. Akin left in controversy as 
Prince Feisal's two foreign trade marketing companies are under 
investigation from the Turkish authorities for tax 
irregularities. He claims innocence and maltreatment, and 
therefore resigned at the end of 1988. His experience in Islamic 
financial practices bodes well for the new company. 
The staff were brought in from various fields; for example 
Mr. Huseyin Avci, who is a Canadian trained computer programmer 
with no experience of the financial world, but whose computer 
know-how and knowledge of western markets will be valuable to the 
KTFH later on. However many of the staff such as the project 
manager were drawn from Islamic banks and other banks in Turkey. 
The Bank opened on the 31st March 1989 and operates through 
its head office in the Medicikoy area of Istanbul, where the main 
banking centre is. It does not plan on expansive growth of 
branches as it will work through the network of the Turkiye 
Vakiflar Bankasi branches, of which there are three hundred in 
Turkey. Current accounts are available in Turkish Lira, German 
Marks or U.S. Dollars, and account holders have access to a 
cheque book and card. There are also profit and loss sharing 
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accounts for betw8cn one month and five years, and the amount 
invested must be at least TL 250,000, DM 1,000 or US$ 500, and 
these accounts operate as in the KFH. 
Inside Turkey there is an intention to look for projects to 
finance without deciding on a specified field of investment, and 
maybe later a specialised niche will be found. The Islamic banks 
already working in Turkey have invested in the retail end of the 
car market, but Mr. Akin has rejected the idea that the KTFH 
would follow suit even though the experience of the KFH trade 
department could have been used to their advantage. 
For the holders of the fifteen hundred accounts opened in 
the period March to June 1989, the Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi and 
the KFH are acting as lenders of the last resort. However in most 
other areas the KTFH is trying to be as independent as possible, 
such as in finding its own correspondent banks. With some 
connections, suggested by the KFH, they have managed to form 
associations with one hundred foreign banks including most 
countries, but notably excluding Iran and Iraq. 
On the import-export side, 
connections with the Middle East, 
the KTFH is trying to further 
and especially Kuwait. Five 
years ago Turkey exported only foodstuffs to Kuwait and occupied 
thirteenth place in the list of countries from which Kuwait 
imported its food. By 1988 Turkey had risen to first place in 
that list and was also improving in other fields of export, so 
that Turkish exports to Kuwait grew to US $ 300 million as 
opposed to Kuwaiti exports to Turkey of US $ 150 million (9) . By 
attracting Kuwaiti trade the idea is that it will also attract 
Kuwaiti investment, which is now centred on Europe and the USA. 
Turkey also desires to use Kuwait as a re-export point to send 
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Turkish goods to many other Gulf countries. The KTFH sees the 
Kuwaiti connection as vital, because the relationship with Turkey 
is a relationship of partners who complement each other superbly. 
On a wider scale Turkey has a lot to offer to other Islamic 
countries, as it possesses the population and industry base 
which is lacking in so many Islamic countries, with the exception 
of Egypt. By participating in 40% of the share capital of a 
trading company being set up in Bahrain by the Kuwait Finance 
Corporation, the KTFH is contributing to the development of 
trade between Islamic countries, especially those on the Gulf and 
in North Africa. 
One further point to make about the Turkish connection is 
that it may facilitate the entry of Kuwaiti finance into the post 
war Iraqi construction business (10). Although this has been slow 
to take-off there is still the potential for substantial future 
gains. 
With Kuwaiti backing Mr. Akin is looking to a rosy future 
when Turkey becomes part of the single EC market in 1992. He 
hopes his institution will be in better shape to contribute to 
European growth because of Middle East investments and finance 
related muscle. He sees Turkey as very much a bridge between the 
Eastern and Western cultures, which, because of its demographic 
situation and historical background, it always has been. Aiming 
for a depositor base of about TL 120 billion by the end of 1989, 
Mr. Akin foresees that the KTFH will soon be in a strong position 
to influence the economy of Kuwait and in turn the economic 
liaisons between two very different cultures. 
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7.3 The Search for New Fields for Investment. 
The new channels mentioned at the beginning of this section 
refer to the way in which the KFH has challenged the staid system 
of investments by beginning some courageous experiments. Firstly 
mention must be made of the company International Turkey Systems 
(ITS), which is 100% owned by the KFH. It has the sole licence to 
market Tandem computers in the whole of the Gulf. The company's 
profit is noted in the table of investments (see Table 7.2) and 
is listed under "subsidiary companies", but the actual accounts 
of the company are deemed of no interest to the reader of the 
Annual Reports. However it can be seen that profits are quite 
steady and in 1986, 1987 and 1988 have represented 20%, 18% and 
12% respectively of overall income from investments for the KFH. 
There has not been too much growth but rather consolidation in 
the ITS. (See Table 7. 2) 
In 1985 Investment portfolios were introduced with the idea 
of improving customer returns. Again it was difficult to 
ascertain exact figures, but the profitability of these 
portfolios was said to be inbetween that of the shares and the 
deposit accounts. Two sorts of portfolios are offered; firstly a 
portfolio in which at least US $ 10,000 or SR 50,000 must be 
invested by each investor with maturities ranging from three 
months to one year. The second type is looking for people to 
invest more for a longer period so the minimum investment is 
US $ 0.5 million or SR 2 million with maturities up to two years. 
The KFH sees this all as part of the ever widening services 
offered. 
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There is also the so called 'Tanker Fund' where the 1\:FII 
consulted with the the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company (KOTC) to buy a 
share in some tankers; one a very large crude carrier (VLCC) and 
another of the Swissmex variety. Mr. Jassar ( 11) in the 
investment department admitted that this was a very risky 
investment, where the KFH is acting as the major financier of a 
group including the KOTC itself, Citicorp and the Norwegian 
shipping concern Fred Olsen and company. The investment fund was 
finally launched in 1988 and enables investors to own stakes in 
the oil tankers bought. The fund is known as "KFH Olsen Tankers" 
and is registered in the Cayman Islands. So far it has raised $30 
million of which $7.3 million is subscribed by the KFH itself. A 
half shace has been bought in the VLCC and the Swissmex tankers, 
both of which are second hand. The ships are managed by Fred 
Olsen, and profits are to be generated from both chartering fees 
and capital gain. After five or six years the KFH will sell the 
tankers for a profit and should have shown itself an inventive 
and capable investor. 
The timing of the launch of the tanker fund was perfect as 
the KOTC needs more tankers, yet has recently been put off buying 
new tankers of its own because of the 100% rise in prices quoted 
by the major shipyards. In October 1987 Samsung the South Korean 
5l~ipbuilders quoted a price of US$ 28 million for a 120,000 dwt 
tanker; in 1989 this has risen to US $ 51 million. The VLCC that 
the KFH has, increased in price by the same margin to cost 
US 85 million in the South Korean shipyards and US $96 million in 
the Japanese yards. The KFH is sitting on a very, 
investment ( 12) . 
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very sound 
Table 7.2 
KFH Investment Figures (All amounts in KD million) 
Year 1984 
Affiliated Companies a) 
Less: 
Provision for diminution I 
in value 
Net Investment 
Subsidiary Companies b) 
Less: 
Provision for losses 
Net Investment 
Joint Ventures in 
Commercial Activities 
Less: 
Provision for 
Anticipated losses 
Net Investment 
TOTAL 
3.10 
3.13 
1. 88 
l. 25 
0.43 
0.11 
0.32 
4.68 
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1985 1986 1987 
3.86 5.23 
0.81 1. 01 
3.5 3.05 4.22 
2.5 1. 16 1.16 
0.8 0.36 0.26 
1.7 0.80 0.90 
0. 1 0.11 0.08 
0.07 0.07 0.04 
0.04 0.04 0.04 
5.28 3.89 5.16 
1988 
7.55 
1. 01 
6. 4 5 
1.16 
0.26 
0.90 
0.08 
0.04 
0.04 
7.48 
a) Affiliated companies are Islamic institutions 
incorporated outside Kuwait. 
b) Subsidiary companies are represented by 100% of the 
shares of International Turnkey Systems. 
Source: KFH Annual Reports, 1984-1988 
7.4 The Social Responsibility of the Investment Department (ID). 
One tool for investment is 'Mur~baha' financing which is at 
the core of the ID's strategy. Any assets can be financed as long 
as they are not in contradiction with the Shari'a. It is at the 
moment participating in a US $ 100 million Mur~baha facility for 
tha Rice Export company of Pakistan. The syndicate financing the 
deal was lead-managed by the Feisal Islamic Bank of Bahrain and 
the Islamic Banking section of the Arab Banking Corporation. This 
is typical of the way the ID sees the Murabaha investment being 
used, so that it promotes social equity and harmony. 
However in an interview with Mr. Jassar Al-Jassar it became 
obvious that he would like the department to be involved in more 
Mudaraba and Mush~raka deals, and he quoted the tanker fund as a 
"typical" Musharaka deal with the real profit being realised 
after an extended period. He conceded that Mush~raka, especially 
on an international scale, was very costly and risky as nobody 
will guarantee an Islamic institution. In Sudan there is an 
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encouraging trend whereby the Inter Arab Guarantee Investment 
Corporation , established by a handful of Arab governments, gives 
a 70% - 90% guarantee on deals, but still the unacceptable risks 
remain. If the credit department at the KFH can find a way to 
conduct riskier deals in the local market, then and only then 
will the international investment department try to emulate the 
feat. 
The desire to promote an equitable, habitable society is 
seen most clearly in the 1985 deal to purchase US $ 20 million 
worth of crude oil for Marrocco in cooperation with the IDB, and 
the providing of KD 14.8 million worth of education materials for 
Sud;;;n. StJch deals reaffinn the ideology of develul-'menL for ct 
better society, which the KFH has adopted. 
7.5 The Future of the Investment Department. 
In all dealings the law of the Shari'a must be adhered to, 
but more importantly a spirit of cooperation must evolve. So far 
there ctre three mctjor cooperative bodies within the world of 
Islamic financing; the first is the Dar Al-Mal Al-Islaml which l~ 
based in Geneva and is the parent of the Feisal group. The second 
is the Al-Baraka group parented in Jeddah and the third is the 
only real forum for discussion apart from the IDB; that is the 
Association of Islamic Banks established in 1977 to encourage 
cooperation, an aim which has largely been a failure. The problem 
is how to form the basis for investment of funds in the long term 
rather than the short term maturities which are prevalent at the 
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moment. If an Islamic capital market were to be formed maybe this 
situation would change. 
In 1984 the KFH profits from investments were KD 4,681,282 
and total foreign investments totalled KD 112 million. The income 
for 1988 has grown to KD 7,485,954, the major rise coming from 
"affiliated companies"; whether this increase is reflected in 
total investments can only be conjectured. The search for new 
investment tools is on; the geographical area being covered is 
wide, and if the imagination of the KFH Investment Department is 
sharp enough there will be many opportunities for development. 
7.6 Introduction to the Trading Department and its Car Sales. 
As a company generating profits, the KFH has a large trading 
department which looks after direct trade operations, selling by 
Murabaha and commercial participation. In 1988 the services 
offered by this department were summarised as: 
a) Direct trade-import and export of many commodities, 
b) Cash sale, 
c) Deferred payments scheme, 
d) Murabaha according to clients wishes, 
e) Selling of used cars, 
f) Direct trade in electronic goods, and 
g) Direct trade in consumer goods through the Prisunic store in 
the Al-Muthanna complex (13). 
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The seed for the development of a department which is now so 
diversified was the idea in 1979 to import and sell cars in the 
affluent Kuwaiti market. As stated in the first chapter of this 
study, trade injunctions are at the very heart of the laws of 
Islamic banking and finance, and so what happens in this 
department is particularly subject to scrutinisation by Islamic 
scholars. The aims of the trade department are "to provide 
consumers with essential goods at reasonable prices by means of 
charging low profit margins''(14). It is our job to conclude if 
the department is run with these aims in mind. 
Cars have always been at the centre of the KFH trading 
policy because this market was identified as a constant one with 
high turnover, especially in Kuwait, where very few people do not 
own a car (15). New cars are imported directly and are sold at 
very competitive prices in three showrooms at Farwaniya (trading 
sector head office), Fahahil and Al-Sharq. In all these 
showrooms there is the possibility of buying on deferred payment 
(Bai' Al-Ajal);in 1989 the KFH, when selling by Bai' Al-Ajal aims 
for an overall profit of 28% more than the cash price, 
five year period at the most. 
over a 
Car sales are doing well with the last notable increase 
being that of 37.5% in sales (by volume) from the previous year. 
The new enlarged showrooms brought in that year did help, but the 
major contributing element was the fact that closer cooperation 
with the main car agents was implemented. 
The customer buys the car as he would from any normal 
showroom, but a run-down of the prices showi that the KFH can 
offer very competitive prices to give it an advantage in the 
local market. The stated aim is "to serve all income levels in 
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the society''(16), which is a concession to the fact that Kuwaitis 
have realised in the second half of the 1980s that their money 
supply is not inexhaustible. 
As a natural consequence of the last point made, the KFH 
decided to enter the world of used car dealings. Already they had 
built up a car maintenance service to deal with customers 
problems and by a little expansion of those services it was made 
possible to revamp second hand cars for resale. This idea was 
implemented in 1986, and the showroom in Farwaniya juxtaposes the 
chrome-plated indoor world of the new car showroom and the 
open-air showplace for the less glamourous dealings in second 
hand cars. 
The way the KFH acquires these cars is one of its more 
controversial dealings from an Islamic point of view. Their own 
'automobile technicians' estimate the value of a car which a 
customer wants to exchange with the KFH for a new car; naturally 
the customer pays the difference in cash. M.E.M.S. Rabooy, in his 
thesis on Islamic banking, questions if the KFH's dealings in 
second hand cars are allowed under Islamic law. "Is it exchange 
barter or separate sale?" (17). 
The problem is that under Sharl'a injunction, it is not 
allowed to have two separate deals for one sale, (literally it is 
not allowed for two sales to be conducted in one) A Fatwa was 
tabled by the KFH on the subject (18) - it concluded ~hat the 
action of taking a second hand car and cash in return for a new 
car did not constitute two deals but one deal, which is the 
buying of the new car; but the price is paid in two parts, the 
value of the car and the cash price agreed upon. If the customer 
decides not to take the new car then the whole deal, being a 
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unified entity, is cancelled. The KFH has justified its dealings, 
to itself in that, for the whole deal, there should only be ''one 
handshake"(19) before a successful outcome. 
7.7 Murabaha in the Trade Department. 
As described before, if the customer requests to buy an 
article that the KFH does not own, it may buy the article to 
resell to the customer. The areas in which the KFH specialises 
are cars, furniture, heavy equipment and construction materials. 
In 1985 these four items made up 81% of all Mur~baha deals. In 
this year Murabaha sales were some KD 13 million up from the KD 9 
million of 1985, that is a rise of 43%. By using contacts already 
gained in their direct trading operations the House can procure 
good price estimates and therefore give its customers a good 
deal. One of the most perplexing ideas is that a Murabaha deal 
can be struck for a car while the KFH has its own showrooms, even 
in some cases when the KFH has the same car in stock. The 
explanation lies in the fact that a person may see his/her 
desired car at a price which meant that even if he/she paid by 
Mur~baha, he/she would pay less than if he/she bought direct from 
the KFH on a deferred payment basis. In 1987, when Murabaha sales 
increased by 46.6%, cars by themselves made up 70% of the total. 
It is a proviso on all Mur~baha deals that the customer is 
kept informed of any price negotiations being carried out, so 
that the profit can be altered accordingly. Full accountability 
is necessary to ensure that the Islamic law is adhered to. 
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7.8 Other Trade Department Services. 
As a way of participating in the building of an Islamic 
society and providing its necessities, a programme was set up to 
import chicken slaughtered according to Islamic law. From this 
beginning new products were introduced in the local market 
mainly meat products. Then, marketed under the name 
"Al-Safwa" (20), the products were distributed to the cooperative 
shops that are at the heart of Kuwait's retail food industry. 
Also in 1986 at Farwaniya a retail supermarket selling solely 
Al-Safwa goods was opened, having been built by the RPD. In the 
trade department this year rumour is rife LhctL the supermarket is 
about to be closed down in favour of marketing the Al-Safwa 
products for sale by other retail outlets 121). The problem is 
that the supermarket is just too far out for a commodities store 
in an area which offers natural advantages for car showrooms and 
industrial sales. 
Always looking for new opportunities, the department is 
marketing the products of some local factories such as the 
National Industries Company, and it has also acquired the agency 
for distributing some Iraqi commodities inside Kuwait. 
More high profile than these operations are two shops or 
centres, which have extended consumer services in Kuwait. Firstly 
is the Prisunic shop and secondly the electronics showroom, which 
are both situated in the Al-Muthanna complex and have been very 
successful because of a lavish marketing programme. The 
electronics complex, the first of its kind in Kuwait, has all the 
latest Japanese Hifi systems and is unmatched in the Gulf. 
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7.9 The Trading Department's Contribution to the KFH body. 
As a contributor to the profits of the House, the trading 
sector has grown in importance since the value of land in the 
Gulf has weakened considerably in the second half of the 1980s, 
and there arc still many possibilities open in Kuwait. The 
importance attached to the department was evident in the fact 
that they offered high starting salaries to graduates who had 
done well at university especially in economics. One young person 
in the trading sector, who gained the economics prize at the 
University of Kuwait in 1988, was offered a higher salary than he 
was by all the other banks and so, naturally he took up the KFH's 
offer; he was put straight into the trade department. 
The reason that this sector of the House's activities has 
not been covered so fully in this work is that the services it 
offers are mainly those of a very powerful trading establishment 
which it is hard to see in a purely banking context. This is the 
way forward for Islamic financial institutions, but it is to be 
hoped in the future that the skills attained in such dealing 
will be used in more of a consultative role, so that Islamic 
financial institutions become regulators of the economic system 
rather than aggressive protagonists inside it. 
- 183 -
Notes. 
1. Explanatory brochure on the KFH. Printed 1984. Page 13. 
2. Ibid. 
3. The Islamic International Audio-Visual Company is a firm 
based in Egypt which produces Radio and T.V. programmes on 
Islamic issues. 
4. Based in Egypt. 
5. Interview with Mr. Adnan Al-Bah~r, General Manager of the 
KFH. 4 I 4 I 8 9. 
6. Its name in Turkish is "Kuveyt Turk Evkaf Finans Kurumu 
7\. ,... " C"l.. LJ • 
'!. This is one of the bigger Turkish banks, with which the KFH 
parLicipat8d in this project. The actual section of the 
Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi that put up the money, was the 
association for its retired employees. 
8. This is the association that looks after Waqf land in Turkey. 
9. Middle East Business and Banking Journal April 1989. 
pp 12-14. Interview with Mr. Fehmi_Akin, General Manager 
of the KTFH. 
10. The Middle East Journal, February 1980, Issue No. 172. 
Page 28. Article on the KFH. 
11. Mr. Jassar Al-Jassar, in the Investments Department at the 
KFH . Interview 814189. 
12. The Middle East Economic Survey. Vol. 32 No.22. 6/3/89. 
Page 7. "High Prices Deter Kuwait's Tanker Building Plan". 
13. KFH Annual Report, 1988. 
14. KFH Annual Report, 1982. 
- 184 -
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8.1 Social Values At The Kuwait Finance House. 
Unlike a normal western bank the KFH includes in its yearly 
accounts its social and cultural activities for the year; the 
reason for this is to prove further that the Kuwait Finance House 
is a 'caring' institution. The "disseminating (of) Islamic 
consciousness in order to enlighten to the Muslims their 
religious affairs" (1) is one of the stated aims. The English may 
be flawed, but the in~ntion, quite clearly, is not. 
The giving of Zak~t, being one of the five pillars of 
Islam(2), is mentioned in the Qur'~n: this means giving a portion 
of one's wealth to the poor to provide a social security system. 
In fact failure to give Zakat is seen as apost~y(3), as it is at 
the very core of Islam. In the Qur'~n it is written; 
"My mercy is spread on all things. So I shall write it for 
those who are righteous and give Zakat and believe in our 
signs." [Qur' ~n 7: 156] . 
The aim is to alleviate the pressure on people to commit theft 
because of lack of the necessities of life: if a person commits a 
theft because society has not looked after him, that person is 
not punished (4), if there was no other way out of his/her 
predicament. The Shari'a demands that 2.5% of a persons savings 
should be given to the poor and needy for sustenance, and the KFH 
tries to adhere to this injunction as much as possible. 
There ex~ists at the KFH a Board of Directors Committee on 
Zak~t, which provides assistance for Islamic institutions and 
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societies to build schools, Mosques and clinics, and provides 
sustenance for needy people. Representatives of this committee 
attend many conferences on the payment of Zakat. For the period 
1979-1987 KD 2,873,513 was saved for Zak~t., and KD 2,811,833 of 
it was distributed to 2,896 beneficiaries (5) This means that in 
1987 KD 360,223 was distributed: if this were to represent 2.5% 
of savings then that figure would equal KD 14,408,920, which is 
just over half the figure of KD 24,530,610 which represents net 
profit for 1987. Whether the last figure quoted should be that 
from which the Zakat is worked out is a debatable point, as not 
all net profit can be seen as savings, but it is nevertheless a 
good point of reference for the sum of Zakat disbursements paid 
out by the KFH. 
The debate rages on, as the KFH sees itself as giving Zakat 
in other ways by renting out buildings at reasonable prices and 
so on. Therefore the cash payout of Zakat only represents a 
portion of the total payout. The debate centres on whether, in 
such cases as an inv~stment/profit sharing account, the Zak~t 
should be paid on the whole amount or just the profit. In the 
case of investment accounts a Fatw~, tabled by the KFH, says that 
both principal and profit are to be considered when paying out 
Zakat ( 6) . 
Another form of 'charity' which the KFH is involved in, is 
the giving of free loans (7) where only the original principal is 
to be paid back at a certain date. The number of these extended 
to customers is almost negligible as people must fulfill very 
stringent conditions in order to qualify, the least harsh of 
which is transferring their salary directly to the KFH. Since 
1987 this service has been conducted through the Bait al-Zakat 
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(Zak~t house), but the KFH still keeps a note of how much is 
disbursed. For the period 1979-1988 KD 992,799 was given i 1 free 
loans to 690 customers, an amount which the KFH can easily afford 
in what is basically a public relations ex~ercise. 
There is a genuine belief within the KFH in Islamic 
morality, which is upheld by the Fatwa and Shari'a supervisory 
authority, consisting of Shaikh Bader 'Abd al-B~sit, Dr. 'Abd 
al-Sattar Abu Ghuddah and Dr. Khalid al-Mathkur. These three 
learned gentlemen have to check any proposed action by the KFH, 
to approve or disapprove of it. They were instrumental in 
publishing the KFH Fat~w~ books, which are excellent reference 
manuals for all matters on Islamic finance; they are distributed 
free as a moral duty. 
This leads on to the next section on the publishing side of 
the KFH, which prints many leaflets and pamphlets explaining the 
workings of the House. In 1983 a monthly magazine "Al-N~r" (8) 
was started, to form a new platform for discussion of the 
theoretical and practical aspects of Islamic economics. It is 
produced in a very glossy format, and includes articles on the 
KFH itself, the other Islamic banks, and other articles which are 
all linked by their Islamic theme. In 1985 the circulation was 
2,000 per month, a figure which has risen four fold in three 
years to 8,000. Other publications include booklets on Rib~, Bai' 
al-Ajal, Murabaha and personal finance. 
The other social and cultural activities are mainly 
concerned with the disseminating of knowledge and the providing 
of advice to small and large customers alike. One way of doing 
this is by hosting and attending the conferences that now abound 
in the Islamic financial arena. This involves theoretical and 
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practical discussions, whose details are filtered down to the KFH 
staff in training programmes, which are held in order to provide 
them with induction courses in Islamic banking. 
In connection with this, the KFH was very proud to announce 
the approving of an Islamic economic curriculum at the Centre of 
Community and Continuing Education at Kuwait University. It is 
not however a mainstream subject for undergraduates, which must 
be the goal in order to encourage further study in this field. 
Whereas now students are taught economics from a western 
viewpoint, the aim of the KFH is to contribute to the providing 
of a course which will help students to immerse themselves in the 
Islamic economic theories. 
In the future conferences will continue, as there does seem 
a genuine desire among the KFH staff to build for a world ruled 
by Islamic ideals. The role the KFH has to play, in a social 
sense, may well prove invaluable in moving towards a society 
where Islamic financial principles can be adhered to as a natural 
extension of the normal affairs of one's life. 
8.2 Income and Net Profit. 
Having covered all the major departments within the Kuwait 
Finance House the reader is now ready to see how the KFH has 
fared in its overall performance. It was noted how dependent the 
House was on income from its real estate involvements, and during 
the early 1980s income from the purchase and resale of property 
was especially significant. Property is now of less importance as 
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the KFH has matured, out of necessity, into an institution 
drawing its strength from many different areas. In the Table on 
the following page it can be seen that aggregate income was at 
its highest in 1982, but declined in consonance with the growth 
patterns of Kuwait as a whole. Since then the aggregate income 
has been clawing its way back up, but is still some KD 17 million 
less than the 1982 level. 
Until 1983 the co~nercial activities made up over 90% of all 
income, but in 1983 real estate prices fell and so did the KFH's 
overall income. In 1984 the turmoil in the Kuwaiti economy is 
reflected in the fact that banking activities income more than 
doubled from the previous year, and for the first time 
accounted for over 50% of all income. Since then banking and 
commercial activities have shared approximately equally in the 
profit. 
The worst year in respect of overall profit was 1985, but 
since then income levels have attained their highest figure in 
the House's career, apart from the 1982 bumper year. There is 
evidence here that the Bank is maturing very well. In comparison 
with assets, income has stayed in line with other Kuwaiti banks. 
Assets have risen every year from a figure of KD 569 million in 
1982 to KD 1,173 million in 1988. In 1982 the ratio of aggregate 
income to total assets was 1:11, whereas it is now 1:27, giving 
evidence of the decline in the whole Kuwaiti banking sector, and 
of the consolidation undertaken by the KFH to insure its future. 
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Table 8.1 
The Aggregate Income of the KFH (All Amounts in KD) ( 9) . 
Year Income from Income from Total 
Banking Activities Commercial Activities 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1978 26,287 890,140 916,427 
2.9% 97.1% 100% 
1979 370,531 4,302,272 4,672,803 
7.9% 92.1% 100% 
1980 1,139,706 12,761,647 13,901,353 
8.0% 92.0% 100% 
1981 1, 569, 985 32,444,453 34,014,438 
4.6% 95.4% 100% 
1982 3,358,304 48,749,840 52,108,144 
6. 4% 93.6% 100% 
1983 9,907,505 32,175,569 42,083,074 
23.5% 76.5% 100% 
1984 22,178,688 19,169,588 41,348,276 
53.6% 46.4% 100% 
1985 13,798,099 12,896,189 26,694,288 
51.7% 48.3% 100% 
1986 17,664,001 13,576,374 31,240,375 
56.5% 43.5% 100% 
1987 17,242,540 17,976,749 35,219,289 
49.0% 51.0% 100% 
1988 43,303,362 
Source:KFH Annual Reports 1979-1988 (10). 
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The income having been accounted for, it is now essential to 
see the pattern in the figure for "Expenses and Provisions", 
before we assess the net profit and its disbursement. From Table 
8.2 it can be noted that "General Administration and Salary 
Expenses" have risen every year except 1988, as staff levels have 
been constantly rising but are now tailing off. A rise in this 
area is only natural for a new bank, but the progress was almost 
halted in 1984, when the aforementioned figure rose only slightly. 
"Provisions for losses and contingency" was higher than the 
general administration figure only in 1981 and 1984. The 1981. 
shock was because of a rise of 600% in the provisions for 
doubtful accounts, whereas the seemingly ludicrous figure for 
1984 is because of the generally bad performance of all KFH 
assets, and the extraordinary need to set aside KD 28,496,509 for 
contingencies. It was necessary to write off a proportion of the 
non-performing assets, and many clients simply ran out of 
liquidity. Without government backing at this point the KFH would 
surely have had to fold. 
With regard to the S~q al-Man~kh affair, the Km.rait Finance 
House fared very well in comparison to the other banks. This was 
firstly because of the ideology of the bank, which decreases the 
possibility of lending on the basis of insecure plans, and 
secondly because the KFH was quick to make debt provisions in 
1984, one year before the Gulf Bank, the Commercial Bank of 
Kuwait and the Burg~n Bank (11). Therefore in 1985 the KFH was 
able to record a profit unlike the other named banks, although 
it must be remembered that these other banks did not have the 
same eztensive commercial activities t~o soften the blow of 1984. 
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Table 8.2 
Expenses and Provisions (All amounts in KD) . 
YeariGeneral Administrinationl Net Provision for 
19791 
19801 
19811 
19821 
19831 
< 12) I 
19841 
19851 
19861 
19871 
19881 
and Salary Expenses 
943,051 
79.0% 
2, 330, 651 
55.3% 
3,234,875 
36.0% 
5,081,625 
81.7% 
6,027,541 
112.4% 
7,214,949 
17.4% 
7,715,801 
84.1% 
9,642,830 
90.3% 
10,932,679 
97.2% 
9,734,652 
74.5% 
!Losses and Contingency 
250,000 
21.0% 
1,887,646 
44.7% 
5,734,317 
64.0% 
1,135,017 
18.3% 
(667,164) 
(12.4%)2 
34,133,327 
82.6% 
1,458,372 
15.9% 
1, 032, 677 
9.7% 
296,000 
2.8% 
3,334,421 
25.5% 
Source: KFH Annual Reports 1978-1988. 
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Total 
1,193,051 
100% 
4,218,287 
100% 
8,969,192 
100% 
6,216,642 
100% 
5,360,377 
100% 
41,348,276 
100% 
9,174,173 
100% 
10,675,507 
100% 
10,688,679 
100% 
13,069,073 
100% 
Since 1985 "Expenses and Provisions" have been kept down to 
a figure of roughly KD 10 million as the subsidiary company, 
International Turnkey Systems Ltd, is now forecasted to make 
profit rather than loss (13). The rise in the 1988 overall 
figure, although larger than for previous years, presents no 
problem as total income has risen in proportion. 
As the next Table 8.3 shows, the KFH has been profitable 
every year and so has been able to reward its shareholders and 
depositors accordingly, except in 1984 when all the income was 
needed for the bank to keep its head above water. The pattern of 
net returns is much the same as that of aggregate income, showing 
the highest net return in 1982 and the lowest net return (apart 
from the initial three years and 1984) in 1985 when the 
rebuilding started. The figure is now almost back up to the same 
level as in the early 1980s, but the bank is now less reliant on 
one area of its activities, and can therefore be viewed as being 
more stable. There have been three stages in the development of 
the bank which can be clearly seen from Table 8.3: the first 
stage was of heady growth from 1978-1983; the second stage was 
1983-84, and the third stage is 1985 until the present day and 
onwards. On the very recent past Mr. Khalid a~-Budai said in 
February 1989; 
"[Last year] we had some local debt expenses, but substantially 
less than other bar~s in Kuwait. Our provisions for doubtful 
accounts (in Mur~baha) totalled only KD 11.33 million last year, 
and this year it will be much less."(14) 
From this quotation it can be seen that the KFH looks to increase 
its net profit in 1989 and continue on its path to former 
profitability levels. 
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Table 8.3 
Net Profit (KD) (15) 
1980 9,683,066 
1981 25,045,246 
1982 45,891,052 
1983 36,722,367 
1984 Zero 
1985 17,520,115 
1986 20,564,868 
1987 24,530,610 
1988 30,234,269 
8.3 Appropriations and Disbursements of Net Profit. 
The net profit realised is normally distributed to five 
different areas and groups of people. Firstly there are the 
transfers to .the Statutory and General Reserves which will be 
discussed in detail in the next section on "Shareholder's 
Equity". Secondly there is the "Contribution to the Kuwait 
Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences (KFAS)", and thirdly 
there are the directors fees. Then finally the investors in the 
bank, the depositors and shareholders, are allocated their share. 
From the second annual report in 1979, the KFH showed its 
support for the KFAS. The original methorl of allocating money to 
the KFAS was worked out as follows: 
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Net Profit for the Year 
Less: Transfer to the Statutory Reserve 
Less: Distribution of Profit to Deposit and Savings Accounts. 
Then 5% of the total achieved would be contributed 
to the KFAS (16). 
This sort of arrangement is vindicated by Sami Hassan Homoud in 
his book "Islamic Banking"; 
"It is permissible to set aside part of the profit for a 
certain specified party other than those involved in the 
investment."(17) 
The formula arrived at for the disbursement was deemed fair, as 
it was dependent on allocation of profit to those actually 
involved in the action of investing, and the KFAS was supported 
with the full knowledge of all depositors. The KFH has kept up 
this level of contribution except for 1984 when there was no 
profit to disburse. 
The directors share of net profit has always been spread 
between ten people of whom seven or eight are ordinary members, 
and above whom Ahmed Bazi al-Yasin has presided as chairman since 
the beginning. The figure allocated has always been a round ten 
thousand Kuwaiti Dinar. 
The figures reflect roughly the profitability of the House 
except in 1985, when, despite lower net profit than in 1983, the 
directors received a higher share of the profits. From a fleeting 
glance at the figures it seems that the directors fees are 
decided according to no set formula, being totally at the mercy 
of the management, however the amounts decided on are not 
unjust (18). 
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Table 8.4 
Year 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Directors' Fees (KD) (19) 1 Directors' Fees as % 
40,000 
80,000 
80,000 
80,000 
60,000 
Zero 
50,000 
40,000 
40,000 
50,000 
of Net Profit. 
1.1% 
0.8% 
0.3% 
0.2% 
0.2% 
0.3% 
0.2% 
0.2% 
0.2% 
The share of the depositors and investors in the bank is 
gained by dint of their being Rabb Al-M~l of the money which they 
have given the bank the authority to invest. In a sense the 
returns to investors should nQt be affected by the activitie~ of 
the other banks in Kuwait, because the profit to be distributed 
is not dependent on imposed interest rates. However outside 
factors do influence the appropriations, because the House must 
offer a competitive investment package to stop people reverting 
to the commercial banks (20). In Kuwait a person may choose to 
use a western-style bank or an Islamic one, and some people, not 
motivated by religion, will simply use the one offering the best 
returns. 
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The KFH has to balance ~he share given to the sh~rcholders 
(in the way of a dividend or a bonus share issue) agaj_nst that 
given to depositors. Both sorts of investors are given a certain 
percentage of the profils which is at the discretion of the 
Board, to be agreed upon at the General Assembly. 
To deal firstly with the depositors; earlier it was noted 
that there are three kinds of investment deposits for customers 
Lu chouse from. Below is a breakd0\·.'!1 of hO\·.' much of these 
deposits is invested; 
Table 8.5 
PeLcelli...ctlJe u[ Ll!e Arnount Invested 
------------------------------1-----------------· 
SctvillgS Accuunl 60% 
Fixed Time Deposit 80% 
Continuous Time Deposit 90% 
Therefore the ratio between the three deposits should always be 
6:8:9. The basis for the difference in the pcrccnt~gc invested, 
is the fact that the Savings Account must be the most liquid and 
the Continuous Time Deposit the least liquid. The depositor is 
rewarded for his/her trust in the Bank if he/she decides to use 
an inflexible deposit system, so that someone with a continuous 
time deposit account will gain a larger percentage share in the 
profit than both the other sorts of account holders (21). 
According to the 1983 explanatory brochure (22) 1 the 
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depositors take a share of the returns on investment. The 
brochure explains the system thus: if X % represents the rate of 
return on investment, then the rate of return on continuous time 
deposits is X% x 90%, the rate of return on fixed time deposits 
is X% x 80% and the rate of return on saving accounts is X% x 
60%. Thus the 6:8:9 ratio reflects the ratios invested from each 
type of fund. 
Table 8.6 
Rates of Return on Investment Accounts (23). 
Year I Investrnent Fixed Tirne Unlimited Time 
!Savings Accounts!Investment Accounts!Investment Accounts 
------l----------------l-------------------1--------------------
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
6.75% 
9.00% 
8.00% 
5.00% 
2.66% 
3.50% 
3.60% 
3.70% 
9.00% 
12.00% 
10.65% 
6. 67% 
3.55% 
4.67% 
4.80% 
4.62% 
10.12% 
13.50% 
12.00% 
7.50% 
4.00% 
5.25% 
5. 4 0% 
5.50% 
Table 8.6 shows the fortunes of the Kuwait Finance House. As 
in all other aspects of the House's finances, 1982 was the best 
year before the S~q al-Manakh affair devastated the economy, but 
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the rate of return has been increasing steadily since 1985. In 
comparison with the commercial banks, whose deposit rate depends 
on the discount rate set by the Central Bank of Kuwait, the 
returns of the past few years have not been as competitive as was 
hoped. For the financial year 1987/88 the discount rate was set 
at 5.5% therefore the deposit rates were the following: 
Deposits of one month to 90 days Discount rate 5.5% 
Deposits of 91 to 180 days Discount rate +0.5%=6% 
Deposits of more than 180 days Discount rate + 1%=6.5% 
The depositor rate at the KFH was slightly lower thQn this, and 
with the discount rate set at 7.5% (24) for this year the KFH 
will need to realise a substantial rise in profits in order to 
compete with the rates offered by its competitors in the banking 
sector. 
The shareholder's return will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
8.4 The Statutory and General Reserves. 
In the 1983 explanatory brochure it is simply stated that 
"10% (of profit) is allocated to the statutory reserve and 10% to 
the general reserve. This 20% represents the share of the KFH as 
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managing partner of the investment~s." (25) This all_ seems very 
simple but, as with anything in banking, this is far from the 
truth. 
Firstly to deal with the statutory reserve. "The statutory 
reserve shall noL be distributed among shareholders but may be 
used to secure distribution among shareholders of div Lrlr~nds 
amounting to five percent, in such years where the profits of the 
company do not facilitate distribution up to such ~ porcentage. 
If the statutory reserve exceeds half the capital of the Company, 
the General Assembly may decide to discontinue deductions or to 
use the excess amount in such manner as it deems appropriate and 
in the interest of the Company and its shareholders." (27) Below 
it is possible to observe the progress of the statutory reserve. 
1978 
Total (10% of net profit) 
1979 
Balance from Previous Year 
+10% of Net Profit 
Total 
1980 
Balance from Previous Year 
+10% of Net Profit 
Total 
- 202 -
KD 
KD 
I<:D 
KD 
52. 966 
57, %fi 
347,975 
400,941 
KD 400,941 
KD 968,306 
KD 1,369,247 
1981 
Balance from Previous Year 
+10% of Net Profit 
Total 
1982 
Balance from Previous Year 
+1 0 96 of Net Profit 
+Premium on issue of shares 
Total 
1983 
Balance from Pr8viouc Ycur 
+2.5% of Net Profit 
Total 
1984 
Balance from Previous Year 
No Transfer 
Total 
1985 
Total 
1986 
Balance from Previous Year 
+c. 4.5% Net Profit 
Total 
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KD 1 1 369 1247 
KD 2 1504 1525 
KD 3 1873 1772 
KD 31 8731772 
KD 415891150 
KD 413281054 
KD 1217901976 
KD 12 1790 1976 
KD 8871715 
KD 1 3 I 6 7 8 I 6 91 
KD 13 1 678 1 691 
KD 13 1 678 1691 
KD 13 1 678 1691 
KD 13 1 678 1691 
KD 9351063 
KD 14 1 613 1754 
1987 
Balance from Previous Year 
+c. S% of Net Profit 
Total 
Balance from Previous Year 
+c. S% of Net Profit 
KD 14, 613, 7S4 
I<D 1 , 2 8 S, 713 
KD 1S,899,467 
KD 1S,899,467 
KD 1,S04,284 
Total KD 17,403,7Sl 
Until 1982 the statutory reserve was quite straightforward, 
but in that year the Board of Directors decided to add to it the 
share premium to bring it to roughly half the capital of the 
company. This move was approved at the General Assembly as the 
first move in arranging contingency plans. From 1983-1988 the 
amounts transferred have been less than 10% of net profit, and in 
the 198S Annual Report there is this explanatory note; 
"In accordance with the Articles of l\ssociation and the La1v 
of Commercial Companies the Company has resolved to discontinue 
the annual transfer of 10% net income for the year as the reserve 
is now SO% of share capital" (27). Since that date transfP.rs have 
been made to the statutory reserve, but only to keep it at SO% of 
the value of the company's capital. 
The idea behind the statutory reserve is as an insurance for 
the dividend of the shareholders. In 1984 when the statutory 
reserve should have been brought into play the shareholders voted 
to accept no dividend in order to facilitate the restructuring 
needed. This was witness to the fact that the shareholders are 
willing to give the House time to prove itself, and that they are 
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prepared to torgo personal gain for the future success of the 
Islamic banking experience in Kuwait. 
Originally it was intended that the general reserve would be 
a fund over whose distributions there were no restrictions. Its 
components made up a fund wlliclt the l\FH could disburse as it 
desired, and were specially formulated so that the KFH could pay 
the 2.5% Zakat. Below it is possible to follow the progress of 
the General Reserve. 
1978 
Total (10% of Net Profit) l~D 52,966 
197 9 
Balance from Previous year KD 52,966 
+10% of Net Profit KD 347,475 
-Zakat Paid (KD 2' 64 8) 
Total KD 398,293 
1980 
Balance from Previous year KD 398,293 
+10% of Net Profit KD 968,306 
-Zakat paid (KD 19,981) 
Total KD 1,346,618 
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1981 
Balance from Previous Year 
+10% Net Profit 
+Reserve Accounts Share of Net Profit 
+Proposed Dividend 
-Zakat paid 
Total 
1982 
Balance from Previous Year 
+10% of Net Profit 
+Reserve Account Share of Net Profit 
+Proposed Dividend 
-Zakat 
-Bonus issue cover 
Total 
1983 
Balance from Previous Year 
No Transfer from Net Profit 
KD 1,434,284 
KD 2,504,525 
KD 410,016 
KD 369,144 
(KD 70, 088) 
KD 4,647,881 
KD 4,647,881 
KD 4,589,150 
KD 1, 306, 694 
K.D 498,651 
(KD 213, 041) 
(KD 2, 953, 152) 
KD 7,876,152 
KD 4,135,928 
None 
-Money given to Provide Cash Dividend (KD 814, 391) 
516, 455) -Zakat (KD 
Total 
1984 
Balance for Previous Year 
-Zakat 
Total 
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KD 2,805,082 
KD 2,805,082 
(KD 410,261) 
KD 2,394,821 
1985 
Balance from Previous Year 
-Zakat 
-Amount for Proposed Bonus Shares 
Total 
1986 
Balance from Previous Year 
-Transfer to Retained Earnings 
-Zakat 
Total 
1987 
Balance from Previous 
+Transfer from Profit 
1) 
2) 
-Zakat 
Total 
1988 
Year 
of 
Al-Muthanna 
Net Profit 
Balance from Previous Year 
+Net Profit Transfer 
-Zakat 
Total 
KD 2,394,821 
(KD 
(KD 
401, 837) 
343, 967) 
KD 1,649,017 
KD l, 6 4 9 I 0 1 7 
(KD 
(KD 
KD 
KD 
KD 
KD 
(KD 
KD 
KD 
875,000) 
391,793) 
382,224 
382,224 
365,565 
184,304 
373,398) 
558,695 
588,695 
KD 1,026,901 
(KD 365,564 
KD 1,220,032 
The first thing to note in the above figures is the 
discrepancy between 1980's total and 1981's balance from the 
previous year. The increase of KD 87,666 is because in the 1980 
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report "The reserve accounts share of the net profit" was not 
included in the general reserve, whereas in 1981 the board 
decided to begin allocating to the general reserve the share of 
the profits realised by the fully invested funds of the reserve 
accounts (ie. The statutory and general reserves). This was 
worked out at the same rate as that applied to the share capital 
as both are 100% invested. 
Zakat has been paid every year at 2.5% for the first few 
years, but since then the amount has been less then 2.5% of net 
profit every year. In 1981 the board proposed, and the 
shareholders agreed, that of the proposed dividend a certain 
amount should be transferred to the general reserve to bolster 
it. 
In 1982 again a sum was transferred to the general reserve 
from the dividend, but a sum of KD 2,953,152 was deducted to fund 
a bonus share issue (see section 8.5). The discrepancy between 
the 1982 total and the 1983 "Balance from the Previous Year'' is 
because KD 3,740,255 was taken for the "Proposed dividend to 
shareholders". In this year the board rec#ommended and the 
General Assembly agreed to a cash dividend of 20%. The shortfall 
was made up from the general reserve and the reserve accounts 
share of net profit, which had previously been deposited in the 
general reserve. A further KD 814,391 was taken from the general 
reserve to provide a cash dividend. 
In 1984 the fund remained the same, apart from the payment 
of Zak~t, even though no profit was realised. Also in this year 
the board clarified the situation as regards transfer of net 
profit to the general reserve. 
"In accordance with the Company's Articles of Association, 
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the directors have decided not to transfer 10% of net profit to 
the general reserve this year." (28) No reason was given, but the 
desire to offer returns to investors and directors alike must 
have played a major part in the decision. Bonus shares were 
approved to please the shareholders, and some money had to be 
diverted from the general reserve. 
1986 again saw no transfer from net profits to this reserve 
fund which was again depleted by an KD 875,000 transfer to 
strengthen retained earnings. However no money was taken out to 
provide bonus shares, as the profit from the Al-Muthanna complex 
took over that role. In the next year transferrals from net 
profit were re-started, but at a lower rate than in the first 
years of the House's existence. In 1988, in very similar 
conditions to the year before, the general reserve was sustained 
by a roughly 1% share of net profit. 
The 1988 total of general reserve funds is evidence of the 
struggle that the KFH has had in the last few years to reward its 
investors. On the other hand this fund is to be distributed in a 
way that will benefit the bank as much as possible, so that if 
its funds are almost totally used up, it is a sign that the KFH 
is unwilling to let any of its funds lie stagnant in order to 
provide a safety net. 
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8.5 Share Capital, Bonus Shares and Dividends. 
The original authorisation for shares was 10,000,000 shares 
at KD 1 each (29) . This has been raised periodically so that the 
value of all the shares held is now KD 26,151,393. In 1987 each 
share of KD 1 was divided into ten of KD 0.1 (100 Fils) (30), so 
that 261,513,930 shares are now authorised and fully paid up. 
These represent 1.5% of total liabilities, much less than in the 
mid 1980s, when the average was about 5%. From this we can deduce 
that share capital has grown at a lesser rate than liabilities, 
pointing to a large increase in depositors rather than 
shareholders. Although the share capital has increased, th~ 
stakes in the capital have remained the same: that is to say the 
ministry of finance still holds 20%, the Minister of Justice 20%, 
the Ministry of Awq~f 9% and the Private Sector 51% (31). 
The KFH has defined two ways of giving reward to its 
shareholders: firstly by offering them bonus shares, and secondly 
by paying out a cash dividend. Each year the rate of return on 
investments is worked out and the rate of return on shareholders 
money is the s~me. This ensures that the shareholders always gain 
a slightly higher reward than the depositors, because of the 
higher risk that the shareholders take. This risk consists of the 
fact that in case of bankruptcy, the depositors would be assured 
of a return of some of their money, but the shareholder has very 
little such assurance (32) 
From 1978-1983 the House concentrated on assuring a cash 
dividend for its shareholders. In 1984 it offered no dividend and 
then for the years 1985 to 1987 inclusive bonus shares were 
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issued but no dividend. Only in 1988 were both bonus shares and a 
cash dividend proffered in the same year. 
The years 1985, 1986 and 1987 saw bonus shares issued at 
10%, 12.5% and 13% respectively (That means in 1985 one bonus 
share was issued for every ten held, in 1986 one bonus share was 
issued for every eight held and in 1987 one bonus share was 
issued for every 7.5 held). This was in order to provide a wider 
base for expansion and to make the share capital higher in 
proportion to the total liabilities (33), so that the boat should 
not be too heavily weighted on the depositors side. 
In 1988 shareholders were rewarded with the bonus shares and 
a cash dividend. Of the KD 3,399,681 to be distributed to the 
shareholders KD 2,353,625 was given in bonus shares and KD 
1,046,056 was givon as a dividend. The figure of KD 3,399,681 was 
made up of: 
1) Profits attributable to shares (6.16%) KD 1,612,756 
2) Profits attributable to reserve accounts (6.16%) KD 992,430 
3) The Net Profit-o£ the Al-Muthanna complex after the .Transfer 
to the general reserve KD 794,495. 
It is stated in the report that the profit generated by the 
Al-Muthanna complex is solely for the shareholders, so how is it 
possible to defend the transfer to the general reserve in 1988? 
One answer is that it may be of indirect benefit to the 
shareholders as it is in the general interest of the KFH that the 
money is transferred. 
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8.6 Assets and Profitability. 
The assets of the KFH have grown steadily every year, except 
1984 when there was only a slight drop. Since 1984 assets have 
risen by 32% to KD 1,173 million in 1988, but the real mark of 
success is a rising profitabilty. Let us take as a mark of 
profitability the net profit divided by the assets, to leave a 
percentage which represents the profitability of the House. 
Table 8.7 
Profitability of the KFH 
1980 5.7% 
1981 7.1% 
1982 8.0% 
1983 4.6% 
1984 
1985 2.2% 
1986 2.4% 
1987 2.3% 
1988 2.6% 
There has been a recovery since 1984 but an average 
profitability of 2.375% does not augur well, even though the 
figure is slowly rising. 
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8.7 Review of the KFH's Performance. 
This has been a review of the KFH accounts which gives 
evidence of prudent management since 1984. Profitability has been 
kept low in order to keep liquidity high, which maintains the 
confidence of the depositors. This shows a conservatism which has 
been necessary in the past few years, because of the lack of a 
developed Islamic inter-bank market. However new opportunities 
have arisen to deposit some of this idle liquidity in other 
Islamic banks, and the IDB opened a special deposit fund in 1987, 
which may blossom into a fully-fledged interbank market (34) 
The shareholders have kept faith with the KFH partly because 
the shares are very little traded, and partly because most of 
them realise the experimental nature of the venture; they do 
however hope for substantial gains in the next few years. The 
above review shows a revitalised Kuwait Finance House ready to 
expand into the 1990s and beyond, ''In sha'a Allah" (God willing). 
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Notes. 
1. KFH Annual Report,1980. Page 13. 
2. The others being prayer, fasting during the month of 
Ramad~n, the performing of the Hajj, and the saying of the 
Shahada: "There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is the 
messenger of God." 
3. Aposta5y also includes the non-performance of the above five 
pillars of Islam. 
4. This is in keeping with the decision of the Caliph 'Umar b. 
Al-Khatt~b not to punish those accused of theft in time of 
famine in Medina in the first century after the Hijra. 
5. For 1988 only the total amount distributed was availJblc, 
therefore the 1987 figures were used. 
6. For all the Fat~w~ on Zak~t published by the I<FH, See Part 
II of "Shari'a Fatawa in Economic issues" published by the 
KFH (Arabic), pp 167-172. 
7. The Arabic name being "Qard Hassan". 
8. This means "The Light" and signifies the light which leads 
one on the straight path towards Allah (Al-Sir~t 
al-Mustaq!_m). 
9. From the Annual Reports, 1979-1988. 
10. In the 1988 Annual Report the income was not divided between 
Banking and Commercial Activities. Only net rental income 
was quoted separately, therefore it is very difficult to 
make a comparison with former years. 
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11. Volker Nienhaus, "The Performance of Islamic Banks: Trends 
and c.ases" "Islamic Law and Finance. II page 153. Published by 
Graham and Trotman, 1988. 
12. This was a special year in which "Expenses and Provisions" 
included a figure of KD 1,454,417 for "Provision no longer 
required for decline in value of investments" and a figure 
of KD 188,266 for "Provision no longer required for absolute 
and slow moving inventory and anticipated losses on 
uncompleted contracts". This means that, after taking 
into account provision for losses there was a profit of 
KD 667,164. 
13. Annual Report 1988, page 22. 
14. Journal of the Middle East. Issue No. 172, Page 28. Mr. 
Khalid Budai is one of the Assistant General Managers nf the 
KFH. 
15. See note 1. 
16. Annual Report 1979. Page 39. 
17. Sami Hassan Homoud "Islamic Banking", page 249-256. 
Published by Arabia Information, London 1985. 
18. At this point it is appropriate to point out that the wages 
of the House's personnel and management are counted as 
expenses and not approprations: that is they are deducted 
before the profit makers get their share. 
19. See note 1. 
20. See Dr. R. Wilson. "Islamic Banking in a consumer society." 
Page 18. 
21. op.cit. Sami Hassan Homoud. For methods of calculating 
returns on deposits. Page 255. 
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22. Explanatory Brochure. "The Kuwait Finance House", Page 19. 
Published by the KFH, 1984. 
23. See 1\Tote 1. 
24. Interview with Muhammad Hayd~r al-Ghulum. 
25. See note 13. 
26. " The Kuwait Finance House: Memorandum of Agreement and 
Articles of Association". Page 32. 
27. Annual Report 1985,page 24. 
28. Ibid. 
2 9. op. cit. "The Kuwait Finance House: 1'1erno:candum of Alrceemenl 
Articles of Association". Page 16. 
30. Annual Report 1987, page 37. 
31. op.cit. ExplaDalOLy BLochuLe. ~ctge 37 
32. op.cit. Dr. R. Wilson. Page 17. 
33. Interview with Mr. Zuhair Bibu. 30/3/89. 
34. op.cit. Dr. R. Wilson. Page 18. 
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CHAPTER 9 
The Future of the Kuwait Finance House. 
9.1 The KFH and Venture Capital. 
9.2 Problems in Islamically Funding Venture Capital. 
9.3 The KFH Future Planning 
Notes 
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9.1 The KFH and Venture Capital. 
One problem pinpointed in the above study has been the lack 
of risk capital available in an Islamic bank, in this case the 
Kuwait Finance House. The instruments of Mudaraba and Musharaka, 
described in the very first chapter, seem to correspond with the 
actions of the Western Venture Capitalists, which were described 
in chapter 2. There are fundamental differences, such as the fact 
that a venture capitalist can rely on loan capital as well as 
equity participation, and he also looks to have a minority 
shareholding whilst being the lead-manager. These differences, 
however, cannot mask the fact that venture capitalists do 
encourage growth in a way that lslamic banks would do well to 
emulate. 
In general, most Islamic banks regard encouragement of 
growth as their main aim, but show very little regard for laying 
the foundations for long term, therefore, stable investments. 
Only the Feisal Islamic Bank (FIB), Egypt, the Jordanian Finance 
House and the Jordan Islamic Bank have had success in fostering 
development (mainly in industry and agriculture) ~n countries 
where they are not given too much government support. The Feisal 
Islamic Bank, Sudan has also had success in encouraging small 
businesses in order to widen the base of the economy. 
The funds at the KFH's disposal are of necessity short-term 
because of the depositors' needs. The high liquidity rate, higher 
than conventional banks, is unavoidable without a Central Bank to 
orchestrate liquidity levels by bond issues (1) (2): this means 
that investments with a maturity of five or more years are very 
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difficult to sustain. In the 'Tanker Fund' the KFH is solving the 
problem by lead-managing a broad spectrum of investors in a plan 
which reaps stable gains; however it has not led directly to the 
formation of new business. The venture capitalists seek to form 
new businesses in order to benefit society's flexible 
development, whereas the KFH's investments have so far been in 
money-management rather than trade encouragement. 
The private sector must be built up by an Islamic system 
just as it has been in Pakistan. Pakistan now has a wholly 
Islamic financial system whose effect on the private sector has 
been very pleasing to behold; in the four years preceding 
Islamisation the private sector doubled from Rupees 1.5 billion 
to Rupees 3 billion, but in 1984/85, only one year after 
Islamisation, it went up by almost 50% to Rupees 4.2 billion. 
This is in a totally Islamic financial system, where legislation 
is obviously favourable, but the situation is totally different 
in an interest-based economy (3) . 
The problem for institutions such as the KFH is, that to 
manage risk capital, one needs specialists in the field of 
investment envisaged. This has been proved in the West, where 
firms prefer to have speciar-ists in a small number of fields, 
rather than a whole host of generalists. However, many started 
out with no intended specialisation, just like the KFH, but 
drifted into one area because of the successful accomplishment of 
two or three plans in one arena of industry or agriculture or 
mining. Once the specialisation is decided on, and a financial 
institution becomes known for its work in that field, its job of 
attracting worthy projects becomes much easier. 
The problems are of difficulty in finding the expertise 
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necessary, and in being able to offe~ an individual, interested 
in participating with the Islamic financial institution, 
unconditional liquidity in times of trouble. To offer back-up 
capital after the initial outlay is essential in instilling 
confidence in the private sector. Another consideration of the 
KFH is moral responsibility, which prohibits them engaging in any 
business which they believe does not conform to Islamic ideals. 
Thus the Mud!":l:_raba deals, discussed in Chapter 5 of this study, 
were rejected because of moral considerations as well as 
corr~ercial ones. 
Can venture capitalism be seen as equivalent to the profit 
and loss sharing ideals of many Islamic financial scholars? Do 
the t':IO systerns share the same <JO.=!l nf rlRsire to encourage small 
and medium ::;izeu l.Juslness (S~1B) growth? T~ the cu.~e of the KFH, _j_JJ 
the second question is particularly relevant for the internal 
economy of the state, which has been ruled since the middle of 
this century by the public institutions and massive family owned 
conglomerates. SMB growth requires a personnel hungry 
personal gain, of which they will have been starved; but this 
personnel does not exist in Kuwait as it does in the West. 
Countries such as America, Britain and France have great numbers 
of unemployed people, hungry to generate their own profits, 
whereas in Kuwait it has been government policy to pander to 
people so they are not starved of anything. The supply of 
entrepreneurs, full of vitality and new ideas, has been stifled 
by the easy life offered to them. In short, there has been no 
incentive, but now the incentives must be offered to small or 
medium sized entrepreneurs in order to help Kuwait into 
adulthood. The internal aim of the Kuwaiti government should be 
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to encourage small and medium sized businesses in order to 
revitalise the economy, by making people more accountable for 
their own standard of living. In the previous sections we have 
noted how the Central Bank of Kuwait has pushed for 
accountability in the financial sector: this is the same path 
that must be followed in the private, productive sector. The KFH 
is in a good position to lead people on to this path through 
Islam. 
9.2 Problems in Islamically Funding Venture Capital. 
The first stage in any long term corrmercial investment is 
finding and funding research on an idea, and then providing 
enough capital to carry the idea through to production. In this 
period there is no gain for any party involved, and the risks are 
legion: risk in the marketability of the products, risk in the 
management chosen and risk in the inherent lack of liquidity. 
The KFH would want to confirm a "hands on" attitude in any 
investment, because this would be their only insurance against 
loss of equity capital. This is very akin to the sharing of 
responsibility envisaged in a Musharaka deal, which would 
necessitate a great extension in staffing levels, which the KFH 
would find inordinately large and prohibitive. A "hands off" 
agreement would be more akin to a Mudaraba deal, where the major 
investor takes a re-active, rather than pro-active role; it is a 
more efficient way of keeping interested in many projects, 
because the monitoring costs are a lot less. 
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In our earlier study of venture capital we identified two 
main movers in the contract, the major financier and the 
lead-manager. The point has been introduced in Chapter 7, that 
the KFH should become more of a regulator of the system rather 
than a main protagonist in it. This was a view expressed by Dr. 
Ja'far at the university of Kuwait, who saw the future role of 
the KFH as a deal-maker among Islamic investors (4). For this 
role a system of commission would have to be instituted, because 
the House is in essence a commercial venture making profit from 
Islamically honest trade. As a regulatory body investing small 
sums in varied projects, the KFH could develop into the focal 
point of an Islamic economy, which may well be formed in Kuwait 
as a reaction to dwindling oil revenues in the not-too-distant 
future. 
In a typical venture capital deal to finance a project, 60% 
of the capital is made up in interest bearing loans, 5% in 
management contributions to equity and 35% in venturist equity 
capital. Only just over one third of the capital is put up by 
outside investors on a 'profit-sharing' basis : this is a fact 
that shows how much emphasis is put on being able to gain profit 
by riba. Islamic banks could offer a Qard Hassan, and structure 
their equity returns to escalate in order to make up for lack of 
definite return, so that in a successful venture, profit would 
come gradually over ten to fifteen years. The problem remains of 
losses following an unsuccessful venture this is where 
government funds, instead of being directed to avoiding making 
people pay any tax, should be used to secure the system. The 
Amiri Decree, which was gained at the founding of the Kuwait 
Finance House (5), shows substantial government support for the 
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experiment, but its concentration has lately been directed at 
setting right the country's economy by introducing instruments of 
control which were developed by western economists . This has 
probably set back the development of Islamic finance in Kuwait by 
about ten years. 
The government can be prodded into action, however, ancl Llle 
forming of a wholly new department in the KFH (apart from the 
credit and investment departments) to deal with venture 
capitalism should be discussed. Credit managers are at the moment 
trying to regulate the Murabaha deals, when they should really be 
set free from everyday profit-earning activities, in order to 
form a body inside the House, which seeks ways of finding 
insurance in the risky world of SMB growth. 
This idea fits in with the decentralisation procRss 
mentioned by Mr. Adnan al-Bahar when interviwed (6). An article 
by Dr. H. Kabbara deals in detail with the need to promote 
National Development Finance Institutions (NDFis) to finance 
industry in cooperation with Islamic banks, as both would have 
the same objectives and a specified role to play. One suggestion 
is that the NDFis could be used in the start-up stages, ~nd an 
Islamic bank couldprovide the back-up capitaL in the_ middle 
stages of growth (7) . 
At this point it is fitting to mention the government's 
possible contribution. It was noted that moves to establish a 
venture capital industry in the U.S.A. in the 1960s failed 
because of a lack of government support. Now private individuals 
are given incentives to invest their money in innovative schemes 
by dint of the governemnt offering tax incentive deals. This 
model has been followed in Britain in the Business expansion 
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schemes (BES). 
How can the Kuwaiti government give the personal investor 
the courage to invest in a venture capital industry run through 
the Kuwait Finance House? What allowances can be made to 
investors? For the present it is impossible to 'incentivise' by 
pref0rential tax treatment, although this method could come to 
the fore in the 1990s. One strategy would be to offer a potential 
investor a non-interest bearing loan, if he/she committed so much 
capital to a venture capital fund - his/her contribution could 
rise or fall annually depending on the state of his/her own 
investment. This would lead to a gradual building up of funds 
the government would have to lay out a very large original sum 
(maybe coming from the Reserve Fund for Future Generations 
(RFFG)), but as the scheme would grow so would its reserve of 
private funds. 
Government involvement is of the essence, that is why it is 
possible to see the KFH as an instrument of a government 
initiative. The main chink in the armour of this plan is that it 
could be seen by people as a tax on risk-taking, and it also 
requires a substantial amount of capital from the entrepreneur; 
however the ideas must come from the small entrepreneurs, who may 
be contracted to the big companies, and those entrepreneurs must 
show confidence in their own ability by backing themselves. An 
entrepreneur who is not prepared to back him/herself, should not 
be supported. 
This brings us again to the problem of how a person with no 
money can bring to fruition his skill in business. The solution 
here is to canvass big firms to support new ideas on a 
contractual basis, and use the SMBs that would be created as a 
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'window-on-technology and advancement' (See Chapter 2) . As a 
regulator of this sort of initiative, the KFH could be a major 
influence in the present financial restructuring in Kuwait. 
There is one further problem created by the S~q al-Man~kh 
affair. Stock market trading in Kuwait was substantially hit, and 
trading remains to this day very slack. The perfect end to a 
venture, sponsored by venture capital in the West, is a full 
listing on the stock exchange in order to realise the largest 
profit possible. The liquidifying of assets is therefore a 
problem for the prospective Kuwaiti venture capitalists. This 
situation will only change as a consequence of renewed 
confidence, which the government is trying to foster; however 
this renewing of confidence is not encouraging new ventures and 
so we have come full circle. The circle can, and will only be 
broken, when confidence is restored, which is not a short-term 
likelihood. 
9.3 The KFH Future Planning. 
The general direction of the KFH was summed up by Mr. Adn~n 
al-Bahar when he referred to four essentials for continuing 
success. Firstly he addressed the need for a three year plan of 
action. This plan was to stress expansion abroad, especially in 
trade and in forming concrete links with as many countries as 
possible. He realised the need to go beyond the locally 
overbanked market, so it is possible to envisage the KFH 
spreading its wings in a country like Jordan, which is being 
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denied income from the Gulf as the number of Jordanians (or 
Palestinians) in countries such as Kuwait is decreasing. For 
this reason it is necessary to keep on developing the departments 
already existing, while auspicating a venture capital department 
to encourage new money in denuded countries. 
help development on a wider scale. 
Kuwaiti money could 
Secondly Mr. Bahar referred to the development of manpower 
training in order to equip the KFH with suitable personnel 
particularly in the middle management. Increasingly recruitment 
is from among Kuwaiti nationals in compliance with government 
policy. In 1988 the KFH was recognised as the largest employer 
among the Islamic banks, with only the Feisal Islamic Bank of 
Egypt being within 300 of the KFH staff total of 1,300(8). In ten 
years this number has increased almost twenty fold, and only in 
1985 and 1986 did recruitment fall below one hundred. The staff 
are sent on specially devised training courses "as they are the 
only way to ensure the continuing success of the KFH" (9). 
Thirdly the process of decentralisation is a major issue. 
This is a move to encourage a quicker, more efficient, decision 
making service. It also has the effect of giving middle 
manag~ement more responsibility and more pride in~ a department. 
The final way of directing future actions is detailed budgeting 
to decide how much man-power to put into one area. There will be 
a rise in the number of staff employed in the credit and trade 
departments, but banking activities will need less monitoring as 
more high-tech machinery is installed. 
Turkey is obviously a hope for the future. At the moment the 
KTFH is still working its way into the Turkish financial system. 
The only black-spot on the horizon is the fact that Turkey 
- 226 -
already has three Islamic banks with which the KTFH will have to 
fight for Islamically motivated depositors and investors. The KFH 
has no experience in this field of competition and will have to 
rely heavily on the experience of the employees trained in 
conventional banks, who are used to the 'game' of winning over 
customers. 
Involvement abroad will also be sought in more direct trade 
and more financing of import-export trade. In fact this should 
become the KFH's most profitable tool in the near future, 
although it would be preferable, from the view of experimental 
Islamic banking, if encouragement capital were to become the most 
successful tool. 
The search for new financial products is a major concern. 
The KFH has made the first steps in the tanker fund and in the 
real estate portfolios, which show that innovation is possible. 
The next step in this direction will be a form of Islamic unit 
trust to offer an alternative mode of investments for small 
investors. 
The so-called investment auctioning presaged in the eleventt1 
report of the elimination of interest in Pakistan offers the 
chance lor industry encburagement. The idea rests on ~arming a 
consortium between banks and investment institutions with the 
objectives of initiating and promoting industrial projects. The 
consortium would study a certain proposal, prepare a final 
report, and then invite bids for the contract, which is awarded 
to the most deserving bidder: the consortium would then reap its 
gain by means of a service charge. This fits in with the venture 
capital aspirations that many people (including the author) have 
for Islamic banks (10). 
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On the agenda for development is the forming of a life 
insurance instrument ( 11) . This is seemingly an idea which goes 
against Islamic morality, but whose development is being actively 
encouraged by practical economists. One company participating in 
research is the Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf. It offers 
a deal whereby a client buys a certificate worth $20,000, paid in 
annual installments of $1,000, so it matures in twenty years with 
such profits or losses as have been realised from the invested 
money. If the holder dies before twenty years, the full face 
value (ie. $20,000) is recoverable as well as any profits made up 
to that time. The certificate holder expressly agrees to 
relinquish a portion of his/her profits in proportion to his/her 
participation, as a contribution to Affect payment of the 
installments remaining Uiltil maturity for any deceased person. 
This system is a start, but seems to punish a certificate holder 
for the death of the original subscriber, therefore it is a 
system which must be refined. 
Above are suggestions for refinements to the system already 
functioning at the KFH. The new paths to be followed must be 
researched with the other Islamic banks, so that the new 
instruments offered take on a standard form, and so that 
different institutions can benefit from each other's experience 
and knowledge. 
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CONCLUSION 
In concluding it is to be remarked upon that there are two 
sets of factors affecting the future of the Kuwait Finance House. 
Firstly how it should adapt internally and secondly how the 
system it works in should adapt. 
Internally it remains an all-purpose bank trying to offer 
everything to everyone; investment opportunities, banking 
services, trade finance and real estate purchase. It has to offer 
all these services in order to form a broad base for survival, in 
what is still an experimental period. In doing so it is in danger 
of becoming 'A Jack of all trades, master of none', providing too 
many services under one roof. The decentralisation talked of as 
a major policy direction of the next three years, may lead to the 
different sections of the Bank becoming more distinct from each 
other, each one finding a separate identity. At this stage the 
idea is to keep all services under central management, but as 
specialist niches are found, it is foreseeable in the next twenty 
or thirty years that the different sections will be connected 
only by name. 
All sections of the bank look healthy now, with the 
possibilities in investment offering the greatest hope. Direct 
trade carried out on such a large scale is sure to do well, as is 
banking if enough effort is made to keep up with modern 
technology so that the service becomes as slick as possible. The 
real estate department will have to look more and more to 
countries outside Kuwait in order to fulfill its potential, 
because Kuwait's empty spaces are being filled very rapidly. 
- 230 -
The KFH has adhered as strictly as possible to the Islamic 
ideals upheld by the Shari'a committee, and has made great 
strides in educating people in the Muslim way of life not only 
with regard to finance. The fact that the House has its own 
department to deal with publications bodes well for the 
understanding of the social responsibility that an Islamic 
financier must bear: the KFH is always mindful of its duty to 
society. 
The need has been mentioned for more risk-taking in order to 
emulate the success of the venture capital industry in Europe and 
the U.S.A. This means more use of the Musharaka and Mudaraba 
arrangements prescribed in Islamic Fiqh (law) . This leads us on 
to considering how the system in which the KFH operates will 
adapt: for the KFH to show more readiness to take risk the 
Islamic financial movement must form an ideal way of insurjng at 
least 90% of an investment. The cooperation is so far lacking in 
the Islamic financial movement, because the Islamic financial 
houses are not able to present a unified force united by ideals, 
practices and outlook. 
The Islamic Development Bank will have a major role in the 
organisation of the movement, and this role should be encouraged 
by the KFH and other Islamic banks so that they have a focal 
point. The IDB could lay down modes of practiCe in order to 
ensure growing uniformity on a pan-Islamic level. 
The KFH still relies on the Central Bank of Kuwait for 
guidance, because it regulates the internal system under which 
the KFH operates. It also has a major role because of the heavy 
government involvement (32%) in the KFH. The CBK does not govern 
the KFH as it does all the conventional banks, but its role 
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should be to nurture the development of Islamic banking in 
Kuwait, even if it means allowing for Islamic competition for the 
KFH. At the moment Islamic banking in Kuwait is regulated by the 
Amiri decree which does not legislate for any other Islamic 
banks apart from the KFH. It is hoped this will change because 
the KFH needs competition, but whether the financial sector can 
support another institution is doubtful. 
The revival in Muslim financial circles has tapped a 
potentially very rich seam. In 1987 there were 1,040.5 million 
Muslims in the world in more than sixty countries. Muslims were 
said to hold 77% of world oil reserves, 25% of world gas 
reserves, 11% of all the cultivated land in the world, 10.8% of 
all livestock and 6% of all the fish reserves in the world. With 
the financial muscle that these resources provide, Islamic 
banking, if it manages to convince Muslims the world over that it 
can provide a just and equitable system, can become a major 
source in the regulating of the world economy. 
As for the KFH the last words must be left to the General 
Manager Mr. Adnan al-Bahar. 
"It is not easy to operate a different system. However we are 
living in a world of abundance, and our role is to segment 
markets and fulfill the needs of our customers at a time of 
growing Islamic awareness." 
The KFH has now matured and is ready to take up a responsible 
position led by a pragmatic management team. The key to future 
success lies in pan-Islamic cooperation in which the KFH will 
take a leading role. 
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